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An agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration any disputes or differences between them
is the foundation stone of modem international commercial arbitration. If there is to be a
valid arbitration, there must first be a valid agreement to arbitrate. This is recognized both by
national laws and by international treaties.
2
2. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-06 (3d ed. 1999) (hereafter "REDFERN & HUNTER").
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Arbitration is contractual by nature - a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit....It does not follow, however, that under the
[Federal Arbitration] Act an obligation to arbitrate attaches only to one who has personally
signed the written arbitration provision. This court has made clear that a non-signatory party
may be bound to an arbitration agreement if so dictated by the ordinary principles of contract
and agency.
3
Most of the situations discussed in international arbitral practice where one or more parties
had not themselves formally signed or countersigned the arbitration clause have one element
in common: namely the element that justice would not seem to be done if the only criterion
applied and considered was the criterion that a particular third party did not itself sign or
countersign the arbitration clause. It is because ... reliance on the merely formalistic argu-
ment.. that no arbitration clause had been signed by a particular party... would result in such
a manifestly wrong and unjust solution that more subtle and more appropriate thoughts had to
be given to appropriately consider the situations as they occur in international business prac-
tice.
4
I. INTRODUCTION
As encapsulated in the first quote above, it is irrefutable that the arbitration
agreement is the "cornerstone of the arbitration process"5 and thus "[tihe exis-
tence of both parties' consent to submit the dispute to arbitration is clearly a
necessity."6 Yet, the second quote, drawn from the leading United States case,
envisages permitting the arbitration agreement to be extended to a "non-
signatory," 7 although only where this is in accordance with "ordinary principles
3. Thomson-CSF S.A. v. Am. Arb. Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omit-
ted).
4. Dr. Marc Blessing, The Arbitration Agreement - Its Multifold Critical Aspects, in THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT - ITS MULTIFOLD CRITICAL ASPECTS, A.S.A. Special Series No. 8, 19
(December 1994) (hereafter "AAMCA") (emphasis omitted).
5. TIBOR S. VARADY, JOHN J. BARCELO II, & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 83 (1999).
6. ADAM SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A STUDY OF BELGIAN, DUTCH, ENGLISH, FRENCH, SWEDISH, SWISS, US AND WEST
GERMAN LAW 96 (1989).
7. A terminological distinction needs to be made at the outset. The term "non-signatory" is
being used to refer to someone who has not physically signed the agreement within which the arbi-
tration clause is contained. The term "third party" is being used to refer to someone who is not
named as a party in such an agreement, usually this person will also be a "non-signatory." Both a
"non-signatory" and a "third party" may by application of various legal theories be found to have
rights and/or obligations in relation to the arbitration agreement (whether or not this amounts to
being a "party" to the agreement). Another necessary definition is what is envisaged in speaking of
the "third party problem." For discussion purposes this is reduced to the paradigmatic scenario of a
simple (international) contract ("main agreement") between A ("promisor") and B ("promisee") that
includes an arbitration agreement. B enters into some kind of relationship with C ("third party").
The "problem" is deciding to what extent C is bound by and/or entitled to enforce the arbitration
agreement in the main agreement in respect of disputes with A and/or B.
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of contract and agency."8 Turning now to the third quote, how can we rational-
ize the commentator's willingness to apply the arbitration agreement to a non-
signatory merely because otherwise "justice would not seem to be done" with
our initial proposition: that without a valid agreement manifesting the parties'
consent there can be no valid arbitration?
This article analyzes the legal theories and other mechanisms employed in
international commercial arbitration to achieve a workable compromise among
the above-cited propositions. In so doing it touches on larger, more complex
questions like the position of third parties in contract law, the jurisdictional
foundations of arbitration, and the role of choice-of-law issues in determining
the validity of the arbitration agreement. However important these broader con-
cerns may be, they should not undermine the importance of the issue in its own
right. As stated by Dr. Blessing, in introducing a seminar on the topic:
[T]his now brings us to the middle of our most difficult topic of our Conference: the topic of
the extension of the arbitration clause to non-signatories - probably one of the most difficult
topics in international arbitration, a topic which gains more and more importance as a conse-
quence of the globalization of international business and trade.
9
A. Objectives and Structure of This Article
The objectives of this article are five-fold: (1) to probe the situation in
which third party non-signatories have been permitted to compel arbitration and
to dissect and comment on the legal theories advanced in this respect; (2) to
investigate the extent to which these legal theories conform with general con-
tract law doctrines; (3) to test how the legal theories offered correspond to com-
peting views on the jurisdictional basis for arbitration; (4) to examine to what
degree, if any, different legal systems take the same approach to similar third-
party problems; and (5) to offer some observations on the likelihood of the third
party problem being resolved by an international coordinated agreement or,
alternatively, by reliance on transnational or anational norms.
The first issue is approached by collating published awards and court deci-
sions dealing with third party non-signatories and analyzing the legal theories
used by the courts to justify extending or limiting the arbitration agreement to
the third party. The inquiry here is to consider if there are alternative explana-
tions available, what factors have influenced courts in reaching their decisions
and if the third parties are "extra-contractual." Each case discussed is classified
8. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 776 (quoting McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A&S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d
519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980)).
9. Blessing, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 18.
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within one of the legal theories identified and the decisions are compared and
contrasted.
The second issue places third parties in arbitration law within the broader
context of third parties in general contract law. It investigates how far legal
systems have moved away from a strict privity of contract doctrine to permit
third party enforcement in reliance upon one of the available doctrinal excep-
tions, e.g., assignment or third party beneficiary.
The third issue addresses the question of whether the legal theories em-
ployed by the courts in extending the arbitration agreement to third parties with-
stand scrutiny on general contract principles or does the court or tribunal treat
arbitration as a "special case"? For example, is the court influenced by a con-
cern that extending the arbitration agreement will "oust the jurisdiction of the
courts"? ° Conversely, does the court recognize a policy consideration of up-
holding arbitration clauses as a necessary part of international commerce?
The fourth issue compares legal systems in England, France and the United
States and their approaches to third parties in arbitration and contract law. In-
cluded is a discussion of the international and transnational attempts to solve the
third party problem.
The final objective is to draw together the similarities in the various ap-
proaches and comment on what, if anything, should be done to encourage use of
a synthesized coordinated solution to the third party problem and, should any
such model be national, international or premised on anational norms. This puts
the instant issue of non-signatories within the broader vociferous debate of na-
tional versus international versus transnational arbitration law."
The structure of this article broadly corresponds to the five objectives. Sec-
tion I.B provides a framework for assessing the third party problem that is sensi-
tive to the unique characteristics of arbitration. Section II establishes the practi-
cal and academic significance of third party non-signatory issues before collat-
ing the legal theories employed to try to overcome the third party problem and
setting out the scope of the inquiry into those theories in this article. The legal
theories are then subjected to comparative analysis undertaken in Sections III to
V: Section III summarizes and compares each of the theories identified as ap-
plied by courts and arbitrators in each of the subject jurisdictions; Section IV
considers factors other than the legal theories that impact on the position of the
third party non-signatory; Section V offers broad conclusions from the compara-
tive project. Section VI draws on these conclusions to identify seven possible
"solutions" to the third party problem. The appropriateness of these solutions is
10. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S.A. v. Arntorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir.
1942) (discussing the genesis of this concern).
11. See generally FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION §§ 1443 et seq. (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (hereafter
"FOUCHARD"). See also further discussion below in Section VIF.
474
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then analyzed in Section VII through the filter of the various jurisprudential
theories of arbitration. As a result of this investigation, Section VIII concludes
that the preferable option is a solution constrained by domestic contract law and
warns that broader approaches imperil the continued credibility of international
arbitration.
B. Framework for the Third Party Problem
1. Traditional Approach to the Problem
If it is necessary in some cases to extend an arbitration agreement to a non-
signatory, then one view of private international law and international arbitration
holds that choice of law rules should answer any questions regarding when this
is appropriate. Professor Sandrock advocates what he calls the "traditional ap-
proach:"
[E]ach commercial contract is governed by a set of definite national proper law rules. The
same is true of the arbitration agreement. Therefore the question of whether or not an arbitra-
tion agreement binds not only a company which is a signatory to it, but also one of several
other companies which have not attached their signatures to it, but which belong to the same
group as the signatory company, has to be answered under the respective rules of the proper
law of contract. In other words: the exceptions to the principle of privity of contract have to
be derived from precise, well-defined and largely recognized rules of the respective domestic
law to which the arbitration agreement in question is subject.
12
If correct, this article would be no more than a comparative law project ex-
tracting each jurisdiction's applicable rules for choosing the proper law and then
discussing the law governing the particular third party situation. However, even
Dr. Sandrock acknowledges that the "precise well-defined"' 3 rules he envisages
may not be so easy to discern. Further, the traditional approach assumes that
substantive contract law is the correct model to apply, does not consider whether
this is suited to the consensual nature of arbitration and dismisses any transna-
tional or anational dimension to the third party problem.'4 While Professor San-
drock's conclusion has an appealing logical purity, this article seeks to analyze
the problem by remaining sensitive to the constraints imposed by the nature of
12. Dr. Otto Sandrock, Extending the Scope of Arbitration Agreements to Non-signatories, in
AAMCA, supra note 3, at 169. Professor Sandrock uses the term "traditional" only to distinguish
his position from what he calls the "lex mercatoria" concept and specifically in the context of the
group of companies doctrine.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., for a discussion of the application of transnational rules, FOUCHARD, supra note
11 paras 1443 et seq.
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arbitration as well as the practical need for international commerce to permit a
degree of business flexibility but not so as to undermine the certainty required of
international transactions.
2. An Approach Constrained by the Nature of Arbitration
Two fundamental characteristics of general arbitration law frame the third
party problem debate. These two characteristics define the substantive dimen-
sion of arbitration (e.g., does a valid agreement exist to arbitrate the dispute?)
and the jurisdictional dimension of arbitration (e.g., does a valid agreement exist
to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal and foreclose other jurisdictional rights to
litigate?). These are explained by way of introduction below, applied in the
course of the comparative project, and their relevance reassessed in the conclu-
sion.
Substantive Dimension: Arbitration is Contractual by Nature
"Arbitration is the creature of a contract between the parties."' 5 Thus, any
solution to the third party problem must be based on, or at least take into ac-
count, the contractual nature of the agreement that binds the signatories. How-
ever, despite Professor Sandrock's theory that the proper law of the contract will
provide a sure result on all third party issues, 6 it is not at all clear that general
principles of contract law alone will suffice.
Jurisdictional Dimension: Basis of Arbitration is Consent (Intentions of
the Parties)
As a leading commentator notes, "party autonomy is certainly the differen-
tia specifica of the arbitration process."'' 7 In other words, the "crucial difference
between arbitration and courts lies in the fact that the basis of the jurisdiction of
an arbitral tribunal is the will of the parties, while courts owe their competence
to procedural norms of state or of an international convention." 1"
Any solution to the third party problem must also be consistent with the
consensual nature of arbitration-the fundamental feature distinguishing the
position of third parties in arbitration from third parties in litigation. In courts,
substantive law and rules of civil procedure (backed by the jurisdictional author-
ity of the court) create procedural rights, not contingent upon consent, enforce-
15. STEWART MCCLENDON & R. E. GOODWIN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN NEW YORK 3 (1986).
16. Sandrock, supra note 12, at 169.
17. VARADY, BARCELO, & VON MEHREN, supra note 5, at 61.
18. Id.
8
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able by and against a third party. A third party has the power to bring an action
against an entity to which it has no contractual relationship (e.g. alleging a tort);
may intervene in proceedings merely on the basis that it is an interested party; or
may itself be compelled to join a proceeding by way of a third party joinder
application. None of these situations involve "consenting" to the jurisdiction of
the court. The threshold question in arbitration is: did the parties consent to
resolving their substantive dispute by arbitration?
Under normal circumstances, consent to arbitrate is manifested in the arbi-
tration agreement, most often by way of a clause compromissoire contained
within a larger contract. Sometimes a signatory may argue that she did not in
fact intend to consent, or her consent may have been induced by fraud, or given
under duress, or is otherwise imperfect. In such a case, in most jurisdictions
outside of the United States, the Kompetenz/Kompetenz principle is usually
applied to empower the arbitral tribunal to determine the genuineness of this
claim. Thus, some form of prima facie consent (e.g. a signature) is sufficient to
empower the arbitral tribunal to undertake this investigation. However, some-
times a court or arbitral tribunal is asked to look beyond the question of who
signed the arbitration agreement to ascertain whether a third party (i.e. a non-
signatory) has in fact given its consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement
and that the parties (i.e. the signatories) have also consented to the third party
being bound. This can be seen as a corollary to the situation where the signatory
claims its signature is not conclusive evidence of consent to arbitrate. Here, the
argument is that the signatures of the parties to the contract containing the arbi-
tration agreement are not conclusive evidence of all those who have consented
to have their disputes determined by arbitration. If willing to accept the validity
of the former inquiry, then why not also the validity of the latter?
This article investigates the circumstances under which the latter situation
arises, the justifications given for its appropriateness, and the methods used to
determine whether consent exists, and how this fits with the contractual (sub-
stantive) dimension. The working thesis of this article is that if the arbitration
agreement is not always conclusive on its face, such that "consent" to arbitrate
can be divulged from other sources or manifested in some other forms, then
there must be clear limits on what other "sources" or "forms" are legitimate.
That is, what are the acceptable bounds of the inquiry into consent?
9
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II. THIRD PARTY NON-SIGNATORIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
A. Defining the Third Party Problem
1. Practical Significance of the Third Party Problem
The issue of how to deal with the third party non-signatory was described in
1992 as being "among the most delicate and critical aspects in international
arbitration."' 9 Other commentators have referred to it as "the source of much
controversy" 20 and it has been the focus of demands for reform in various busi-
nesses, especially construction 2' and reinsurance.22 The problem is not limited
to the classic scenario of arbitration with state entities, 23 as the third party prob-
lem has also manifested itself in areas such as software distribution agreements,
in which non-signatory purchasers of software have been implicated in arbitra-
tion agreements between distributors and manufacturers. 24 Meanwhile, peren-
nial problem areas like bills of lading remain subject to conflicting doctrinal
approaches and inconsistent decisions.25
The practical significance of the third party problem manifests itself in dif-
ferent ways and at different times. Most frequently, it arises in the context of a
dispute in which it must be decided whether the third party is bound to arbitrate;
is entitled to arbitrate at that party's discretion; or is excluded from the arbitra-
tion agreement and should proceed with litigation. However, it also can be an
issue in a range of commercial transactions in which, for example, parties re-
quire certainty that when they transfer contractual rights they are also transfer-
ring the arbitration agreement. In a different context, the problem may appear
where a third party finds that it is affected by the decision in an arbitration in
19. Blessing, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 7.
20. SAMUEL, supra note 6, at 101.
21. Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Practical Problems in Resolving Disputes in an International
Construction and Infrastructure Project, 26 INT'L Bus. LAWYER 196 (May 1999).
22. Stephen W. Schwab, Caught Between Rocks and Hard Places: The Plight of Reinsurance
Intermediaries Under U.S. and English Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 485 (1985).
23. See e.g. the infamous Westland Helicopters decisions, in Switzerland: Decisions of the
Court of Justice of Geneva and the Federal Tribunal (Excerpts) Concerning Award in Westland
Helicopters Arbitration (Annulment of Award with Respect to Egypt), 28 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 687
(1989) (upholding a decision of the Court of Justice of Geneva setting aside in part International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration: Interim Award Regarding Jurisdiction in the Arbitra-
tion Between Westland Helicopters Ltd. and The Organization for Industrialization, United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Arab British Helicopter Company, 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L
1071 (1984)) (hereafter "Westland Helicopters").
24. See e.g. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cit. 1976); Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
25. See e.g. infra note 319 and accompanying text.
10
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol4/iss3/6
[Vol. 4: 3, 2004]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
which it did not even participate or where a state finds that it is obliged to arbi-
trate with an investor that has structured its deal to take advantage of an invest-
ment treaty. As will be seen in the cases examined, the fact situations involved
are as varied as the legal theories employed to address the third party problem.
2. Commentary on the Third Party Problem
The position of third parties in arbitration arises quite frequently in the con-
text of specific areas of practice: the construction industry;26 maritime arbitra-
tions;27 arbitrations involving state entities28 and, more recently, investment
treaty arbitrations.29 It has also been discussed in articles on related procedural
topics like multi-contract/multi-party arbitration and consolidation. 30 However,
these articles do not attempt to look at the "big picture" of how to deal with third
parties outside of the particular doctrinal area at issue.
Until recently, the only broad-ranging discussion of non-signatory issues
occurred at two conferences: (1) L'Arbitrage et les tiers, convened in Paris on
May 5, 1988 by the Comit6 Franqais de L'Arbitrage; 3' and (2) The Arbitration
Agreement - Its Multifold Critical Aspects, convened in Basel on June 17, 1994
by the Association Suisse de l'Arbitrage.2 Papers at both conferences sought to
go beyond superficial identification of the problem to identify doctrinal issues,
distinguish between different solutions, and probe these differences to reveal
conflicting conceptions of private international law and international arbitration.
As Dr. Blessing noted in the latter, the conference papers sought to go be-
yond the usual "basics" to "explor[e] the subject matter in its depth. 33 How-
ever, having done so he advised that:
[T]here are no final conclusions which can be drawn from the proceedings at the ASA Con-
ference. Indeed, all of the subject matters are constantly under review in modern arbitration
practice, and new jurisprudence is being developed every day. It is the fascination of the top-
26. See e.g. Bcckstiegel, supra note 21.
27. See e.g. Jerome C. Scowcroft, Arbitration - Vouching-In and Third Party Claims, 19 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 605 (1988) (discussing S.C.A.C. Transp. U.S.A. Inc. v. S.S. Danaos, 845 F.2d
1157 (2d Cir. 1988)).
28. See e.g. J. Gillis Wetter, Pleas of Sovereign Immunity and Act of State before Arbitral
Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L. ARB. 7 (1985).
29. See e.g. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. LAW J.
232 (1995).
30. See e.g. Philippe Leboulanger, Multi-Contract Arbitration, 13 J. INT'L. ARB. 43 (1996).
31. Papers published as L'Arbitrage et les tiers, in REVUE DE L'ARBrrRAGE, No. 3, at 429-
556 (plus Annex) (July - September 1988) (hereafter "ARBrrRAGE").
32. Papers published in AAMCA, supra note 4.
33. Blessing, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 7.
11
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ics herein covered to discover evolving trends in international arbitration, to discover a pro-
gression from "classical/old" conceptions (formulated one or more decades ago) and more
modem approaches and conceptions which have adjusted their optics to the demands of today
and tomorrow. In fact, the ASA Conference and the discussions have revealed a number of
fundamental differences of approach.
34
As the next section discusses, the problem is by no means of academic interest
only and is of growing practical importance, as the Paris conference concluded:
On mesure A la simple enumeration de ces divers cas tires de la pratique des affaires, la diver-
sit6 et l'ampleur des interrogations que nourrit le theme "L'arbitrage et les tiers": la dimen-
sion theorique du probl~me 6gale la richesse de ses applications pratiques.
35
Indeed, in the last couple of years the treatment of non-signatories to the ar-
bitration agreement has become an increasingly common topic for commenta-
tors.
36
B. Legal Theories Employed to Resolve the Third Party Problem
Legal doctrine on the position of third parties in arbitration has been heavily
influenced by two recurring fact scenarios: "groups of companies" situations in
which it is claimed that companies in the corporate chain other than just the
signatory company are bound by the arbitration agreement and "state entity"
disputes in which the paradigmatic case involves a claimant seeking to bind a
state to the arbitration clause entered into by a state owned (or controlled) com-
mercial enterprise. Various legal principles have been applied to these factual
scenarios with widely divergent results.
For example, in Isover-Saint-Gobain v. Dow Chemical France,3 7 the Paris
Court of Appeals refused to set aside an I.C.C. interim award,3 8 finding jurisdic-
34. Id.
35. B. Oppetit, Presentation Ginirale, in ARBITRAGE, supra note 31, at 436.
36. See especially the very comprehensive treatment in Bernard Hanotiau, Problems Raised
by Complex Arbitrations Involving Multiple Contracts - Parties - Issues, 18(3) J. INT'L ARB. 251
(2001). See also e.g., Anthony M. DiLeo, The Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements By and
Against Nonsignatories, 2(1) J. AMER. ARB. 31 (2003); Carolyn .B. Lamm & Jocelyn A. Aqua,
Defining the Party - Who is a Proper Party in an International Arbitration Before the American
Arbitration Association and Other International Institutions, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 711
(2003); John Savage & Tan Ai Leen, Family Ties: When Arbitration Agreements Bind Non-
Signatory Affiliate Companies, 16 ASIAN DisP. REV. 16 (2003); Michael H. Bagot, Jr. & Dana A.
Henderson, Not a Party, Not Bound? Not Necessarily: Binding Third Parties to Maritime Arbitra-
tion, 26 TUL. MAR. L.J. 413 (2002); Charles L. Eisen, What Arbitration Agreement? Compelling
Non-Signatories to Arbitrate, 56 DIsp. RESOL. J. 40 (May/July 2001). As discussed above, this
article was originally written in 1999/2000 and pre-dates these later discussions which, while not
discussed herein, are recommended to the reader.
37. C.A. Paris, Oct. 21, 1983, Isover-Saint-Gobain v. Dow Chem. France, REVUE DE
L'ARBrrRAGE 98 (1984).
38. Dow Chem. v. Isover Saint Gobain, I.C.C. Case No. 4131 (September 23, 1982), REVUE
DE L'ARBITRAGE 137 (1984).
480
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tion over a claim made by various companies of the Dow Chemical group in-
cluding the parent company and a related subsidiary, neither of which were sig-
natories to the arbitration agreement entered into by two other Dow subsidiaries.
The tribunal recognized the "undivided economic reality" of the group of com-
panies as well as the "mutual intentions of all parties"3 to be bound. As to the
second scenario, in Arab Republic of Egypt v. Southern Pacific Properties Ltd.
& Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd.,4° a French court set aside an
I.C.C. award rendered on the basis that Egypt had been a party to an arbitration
agreement evidenced only by the Minister of Tourism's signature appearing at
the bottom of the main contract under the words "approved, agreed and ratified".
In the latter case, the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz) did not preclude judicial review of whether in fact the
arbitration clause was binding on all parties.
The "group of companies" and "state entities" doctrines are jurispruden-
tially closely related. They have also dominated commentaries on the position
of third parties. At the Basel conference one of the papers categorized all third
party arbitration scenarios as being one of either "outside the pure group-of-
companies-domain," "group-of-companies resembling situations" or "hard core
group-of-companies cases."'" The same paper identified eight criteria which
alone or in combination are necessary to extend the scope of the arbitration
agreement.42 These criteria are essentially factual: a "representation ... which
has confused the opposite party as to which company [the agent] represents; 4 3
the non-signatory is directly affected by receiving shares or other benefits;' or
the company representative may be personally liable for fraudulent behavior.45
One of the themes of this article is that these factual criteria are already indica-
tive of well-recognized legal doctrines" and courts and tribunals should apply
39. Id. See also FoucHARD, supra note 11, at § 503.
40. France: Court of Cassation Decision in Southern Pacific Properties Ltd., et al v. Arab
Republic of Egypt (Appellate Review of Arbitral Awards Between States and Private Parties), 26
INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 1004 (1987) (setting aside International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbi-
tration: Award in the Arbitration Between S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd., Southern Pacific Properties
Ltd., and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels, 22
INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 752 (1983)) (commonly known, and hereafter referred to, as the "Pyramids"
case).
41. Sigvard Jarvin, The Group of Companies Doctrine, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 181.
42. Id. at § 4.2, at 199-201.
43. Id. at § 4.2.2, at 199.
44. Id. at § 4.2.5, at 200.
45. Id. at § 4.2.8, at 201.
46. In the preceding examples, these are, respectively: estoppel by representation; third party
beneficiary; fraud (or fraud by an agent).
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these established legal principles rather than rely on vaguer notions such as the
"group of companies" doctrine.
1. A Compilation of Legal Theories
With this in mind, a review of published arbitral awards, case law and secondary
materials reveals an extensive list of legal theories claimed to bind non-
signatories to arbitration agreements. The starting point in compiling the fol-
lowing list is the leading United States case of Thomson-CSF S.A. v. American
Arbitration Association,47 in which the court "[riecognized a number of theories
under which non-signatories may be bound to the arbitration agreements of oth-
ers. Those theories arise out of common law principles of contract and agency
law."48 The theories49 identified in Thomson are the first five listed below, with
the rest from other sources:
(1) Incorporation by reference: "a non-signatory may compel
arbitration against a party to an arbitration agreement
when that party has entered into a separate contractual re-
lationship with the non-signatory which incorporates the
existing arbitration clause."
50
(2) Assumption of obligation: "in the absence of a signature, a
party may be bound by an arbitration clause if its subse-
quent conduct indicates that it is assuming the obligation
to arbitrate."-"
(3) Agency: "traditional principles of agency law may bind a
non-signatory to an arbitration agreement.
' 52
(4) Veil piercing/alter ego/group of companies/consortium/joint
venture: "In some circumstances, the corporate relation-
ship between the parent and its subsidiary are sufficiently
close as to justify piercing the corporate veil and holding
47. Thomson-CSF S.A. v. Am. Arb. Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Cosmotek
Mumessillik Ve Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketti v. Cosmotek U.S.A., 942 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. Conn. 1996)
(applying the same principles in the context of an international arbitration).
48. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 776.
49. The term "legal theories" (rather than "doctrines" or "principles") is used in this article
because it appears both in Thomson, 64 F.3d at 773, and in commentaries on this topic. See e.g.
VARADY, BARCELO, VON MEHREN, supra note 5, at 200.
50. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 777 (citing Imp. Exp. Steel Corp. v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co.,
351 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1965)).
51. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 777 (citing Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1105 (2d
Cir. 1991) cert denied, 502 U.S. 910 (1991)).
52. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 777 (citing Interbras Cayman Co. v. Orient Victory Shipping Co,
S.A., 663 F.2d 4, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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one corporation legally accountable for the actions of the
other. As a general matter, however, a corporate relation-
ship alone is not sufficient to bind a non-signatory to an
arbitration agreement." 53 Similarly, the so-called "group
of companies doctrine" provides a precedent for treating a
group of companies as a single economic unit for the pur-
poses of being bound by an arbitration agreement to which
not all individual companies within the group are signato-
ries. The arbitral tribunal will "[clonsider closely the
structure and organization within a Group of Companies.
The fact that such a group ... may form a so-called unitM
economique would be a significant element and as such
may justify a conclusion that not only a particular subsidi-
ary "C" must be considered bound by the arbitration
clause, but also its sister "B" or its parent "A" etc. ' 5 4 A
similar argument is made in cases of "consortium," part-
nerships and joint ventures. 55
(5) Estoppel: "This Court has also bound non-signatories to
arbitration agreements under an estoppel theory ...by
knowingly exploiting the agreement, the [plaintiff] was es-
topped from avoiding arbitration despite having never
signed the agreement." 56 The Court also referred to "an
alternative estoppel theory" where "[a] signatory was
bound to arbitrate with a non-signatory and the non-
signatory's insistence because of the 'close relationship'
between the entities involved, as well as the relationship of
the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory's obligations and
duties in the contract . . . and [the fact that] the claims
53. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 777 (citing In re Arb. between Keystone Shipping Co. & Texport Oil
Co., 782 F. Supp. 28, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l,
Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1993)).
54. Blessing, Extension of the Arbitration Clause to Non-signatories, in AAMCA, supra note
4, at 151, 161.
55. See e.g. International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration: Interim Award Re-
garding Jurisdiction in the Arbitration Between Westland Helicopters Ltd. and The Organization for
Industrialization, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Arab British Helicopter Com-
pany, 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 1071 (1984).
56. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 778 (citing Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9
F.3d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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were 'intimately founded in and intertwined with the un-
derlying contract obligations.'
57
(6) Assignment: "This situation frequently arises in practice.
The claimant or the defendant party is the assignee of the
rights and benefits of a contract, including its arbitration
provision."
58
(7) Novation: "In this situation the claimant or defendant in
the arbitration is a person who has replaced the original
party to the arbitration agreement; the original person has
ceased to have any rights or liabilities under the con-
tract."
, 59
(8) Succession by operation of the law: "This situation occurs
in bankruptcy. The receiver adopts the contract and seeks
as claimant in an arbitration to enforce it in the place of a
bankrupt party, named in the contract. Or the receiver is
attacked as defendant.., and has to answer in the arbitra-
tion since he has succeeded in the place of the bankrupt
party." 60 This may also arise in certain testamentary and
similar disputes.
61
(9) Subrogation: Closely related to the above, this arises
mainly in the insurance and reinsurance in which the sub-
rogee "stands in the shoes" of the original party to the
agreement containing the arbitration clause.62
(10) Third party beneficiary: "The parties to a contract may ex-
pressly stipulate that, in addition to themselves, a third
party shall acquire rights thereunder. Even if no express
stipulation has been made by the parties to a contract
whereby a party acquires rights, including the right to ar-
bitrate, circumstances may indicate that the parties have
such intention. The third party beneficiary will then de-
57. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 779 (citing Sunkist Softdrinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d
753,757-758 (11 th Cir. 1993) cert denied 513 U.S. 869 (1994)).
58. Jarvin, in AAMCA, supra note 41, at 183.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See e.g. T. Reueede, Gueltigkeit von Schiedsklauseln in Letztwilligen Verfuegungen, in
AAMCA, supra note 4, at 142.
62. Smith v. Pearl Ins. Co. Ltd., [1939] 1 All E.R. 95.
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rive his right to be a party to the arbitration from a tacit
agreement.
' 63
In reviewing this list note, first, that there is some overlap between theories
(e.g. it is difficult to distinguish how the Court in Thomson considered "assump-
tion of responsibility" to be different from "estoppel"). Second, the list does not
include examples of fact-specific extensions of the arbitration agreement to third
parties (e.g. where an arbitration agreement is extended to a guarantor64). Some-
times these fact-specific scenarios require applying a "one off' legal theory or
even statutory rule (e.g. the law of cautions in France) but more often they can
be explained on the basis of one of the aforementioned general legal theories
(e.g., subrogation is at the heart of insurance cases; incorporation by reference is
employed in the guarantee context).
2. An Attempt at Categorization
In order to analyze the legal theories identified it is tempting to try to group
them into different categories based on common characteristics that are inherent
to each doctrine. However, as is demonstrated in the following four diagrams,
this is a difficult task.
(1) Contract Law v. Other Legal Rationales
(A categorization based on the jurisprudential basis for the legal theory em-
ployed.)
Rights grounded in contract law Rights explained by other rationales
Assignment Assumption of obligation
Subrogation Estoppel
Third party beneficiary Agency
Novation Succession
Incorporation by reference Veil piercing
(2) Status of C vis A vis B
63. Jarvin, in AAMCA, supra note 39, at 185-186.
64. Id. at 185; see also RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION § 3-013, at 98 (David St. John Sutton et al.
eds., 21" ed. 1997).
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(A categorization based on whether the legal theory involves mere transfer
of rights and duties from B to C or the creation of rights and duties different
to those held by B.)
Transfer from B to C
Subrogation
Assignment (?)
Novation (?)
Veil piercing (?)
Agency
Succession
C has rights/duties in addition to B
Third party beneficiary
Assumption of obligation (?)
Estoppel (?)
Incorporation by reference
(3) Spectrum of Consent
(A categorization based on the notion that consent is the basis for arbitration
and that each of the legal theories is inherently more consensual or less con-
sensual than another.)
More consensual
Novation
Assumption of obligations
Estoppel
Agency
Incorporation by reference (?)
Veil piercing (?)
Subrogation
Assignment
Succession
Third party beneficiary
Less consensual
(4) Introduction of a Stranger
(Put slightly differently, a categorization focused on the likelihood that A
will be obligated to arbitrate with C even though C was unknown to A.)
C unlikely to be known to A
Succession
Third party beneficiary (?)
C more likely to be known to A
Novation
Agency
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Assignment Assumption of obligation
Subrogation Estoppel
Veil piercing
Incorporation by reference
Clearly, none of the categorizations is entirely satisfactory. The legal theo-
ries in categorization (1) do not fall neatly into contract as opposed to other legal
doctrines. Categorization (2) suffers from the uncertainty of what is meant by
the "transfer of rights" and the fact that the results are highly fact-specific and
the theories vary between jurisdictions. Categorization (3) plagued by the fact
that while novation is clearly consensual the degree of consent associated with
the other theories is highly dependent on specific facts. For example, in some
scenarios, succession may be wholly non-consensual but in others the parties
may have explicitly consented (e.g., to a corporate acquisition) or should have
anticipated the possibility of succession (e.g. an executor of an estate upon the
original party's death). Categorization (4) at least accurately reflects a real and
identifiable concern that A will be bound to arbitrate with a stranger who was
beyond reasonable contemplation at the time of entering into the arbitration
agreement. Yet, this categorization focuses only on one aspect of the third party
problem and in any event is equally dependent on factual variables. For exam-
ple, not all third party beneficiaries will be unknown (e.g., the beneficiary could
even be named in the agreement) and in some veil piercing situations the ro les
of all corporate actors may not be clear at the time of consenting to arbitration.
The failure of this exercise suggests that an overall categorization of theo-
ries is impossible. Indeed, it is perhaps indicative of the jumble of doctrinal and
factual rationales that characterize this aspect of arbitration. For this reason (as
well as that of space), the comparative project in Section III will be the subject
of two delimitations.
3. First Delimitation: Focus is on Non-Signatory Compelling Arbitration
Several cases 65 and academic commentaries' distinguish between situations
where one of the original parties to the contract is seeking to compel the third
party to arbitrate and where the third party is seeking to compel arbitration
against the signatories. Similarly, another important distinction is the procedural
65. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 779 (referring especially to the estoppel context).
66. See e.g. Blessing, supra note 4, at 151; but cf FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at n.200 (in the
context of "group of companies" doctrine).
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history of the claim (i.e. who has brought the substantive claim and is it by way
of litigation or arbitration and in what circumstances has the court or arbitral
tribunal been asked to rule?).
With this in mind (and using the same general scenario of parties A and B
being signatories to an arbitration agreement and C being a non-signatory) the
following five basic scenarios can be identified:
(1) A brings arbitration claim against C (and maybe B) -
C opposes jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal on the basis
that it is not a party to the arbitration agreement, i.e.
the burden is on A to establish that C is a party.
(2) C sues A (and/or B) - A (and/or B) seeks stay of liti-
gation claiming that C is a party to the arbitration
clause, i.e. seeks to compel C to arbitrate.
(3) A sues C - C seeks stay of litigation, claiming benefit
of the arbitration clause and compels arbitration.
(4) C brings arbitration claim against A (and maybe B) -
A (and maybe B) oppose jurisdiction on the basis that
C is not a party to the arbitration agreement.
(5) A commences arbitration proceedings against B - C
seeks to join arbitration proceedings on the basis that
it is a party to the arbitration agreement.
On anecdotal evidence, situations (1) and (2) above are the most common, i.e. A
or B seeks to compel C to arbitrate.67 Situation (1) typically involves a scenario
where B is an unattractive respondent and A is seeking a more liquid respondent
to increase the chances of obtaining an enforceable award.68 Situation (2) is
essentially a defensive measure by A. 69 However, for the following reasons the
more interesting situation is that where the non-signatory seeks to compel arbi-
tration (situations (3) and (4)) or seeks to join the arbitration (situation (5)).
First, while situation (1) usually arises as a device to lure a more attractive
respondent on the argument that it was always the "real" party to the agreement,
in (3)-(5) the non-signatory is seeking to become part of an arbitration agree-
ment as a genuine third party not as a "stand in" for the signatory. Second, as
the parties could always consent to the third party taking part in the arbitration,
67. This situation is "far more common." VARADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 5,
at 203.
68. See e.g. Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that signatory could
seek to compel arbitration on the basis that non-signatory solvent bank was the alter ego of signatory
counterparty but on the facts finding it was not the alter ego).
69. See e.g. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GmbH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000)
(manufacturer compelling buyer claimant to arbitrate claims).
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the fact that compulsion is used indicates that they have refused to do so. This
goes to the heart of the notion of arbitration as a consensual process. Third, and
related to the aforementioned, it is interesting because it involves the use of
these common law "legal theories" to force a third party's way into having arbi-
tral jurisdiction, thereby fulfilling a role similar to third party intervener in liti-
gation. Fourth, situation (1) is usually dominated by factual interpretations of a
corporate structure, network of contracts or the degree of control exercised by a
state, whereas the third party claim to entitlement requires more of a "legal"
approach. This in turn provides insight into the extent to which the availability
of arbitration is constrained by the (in)flexibility of contract law and jurisdiction
principles. Fifth, as will be discussed, the ability of a third party to enforce con-
tractual rights in general contract law is a dynamic concept that has been the
subject of recent reforms and is arguably achieving some degree of international
convergence.
For these reasons, it is situations (3)-(5) that will be the subject of the de-
tailed country-specific comparative analysis which follows. However, situations
(1) and (2) will be included in considering international developments and op-
tions for reform.
4. Second Delimitation: Legal Theories Examined
Rather than analyze each of the ten legal theories identified, this article ad-
dresses five theories that are representative of types of doctrines most frequently
used to justify extension of the arbitration agreement to a third party. The se-
lected theories are, first, assignment, as the most common example of the subse-
quent transfer of rights (and sometimes obligations) arising under the agreement
to a third party. Second, subrogation, a frequent occurrence in international
commercial arbitration (and the backbone of insurance arbitration), as an exam-
ple of the subsequent transfer to a third party of the right to represent the origi-
nal promisee/subrogor. Third, the third party beneficiary doctrine, which is
highly topical and is a unique example of the vesting of an independent right in
the third party. Fourth, equitable estoppel, a doctrine frequently invoked in
commercial arbitration (especially in the United States), represents the extension
of the arbitration agreement to create a right based not on being a party but by
conduct which resembles undertaking contractual obligations. Fifth, the doc-
trine of incorporation by reference will be examined as it is a longstanding
problem in international commercial arbitration in the bills of lading context and
conceptually raises interesting issues in the scope of evidence permitted to bind
the third party.
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The exclusion of the agency and group of companies theories is not as im-
portant as might at first appear, due to his article's focus on the non-signatory's
ability to compel arbitration. Unlike in the reverse situation of a signatory seek-
ing to bind a non-signatory, it is relatively rare for a third party non-signatory to
make such an argument. Further, where such an argument has been made it has
almost always been rejected because a court or tribunal is unsympathetic to a
non-signatory relying on its own (or its agent's) conduct in failing to disclose
that it was acting on behalf of the non-signatory.7 ° As to novation, this is uncon-
troversial as the original promisee simply drops out and a new contract is
formed with the third party. As to succession, this raises the same sorts of ar-
guments as will be discussed in the analysis of assignment. Similarly, "assump-
tion of obligation" is really no more than either estoppel or the creation of a
separate oral contract. In any event, these other theories will be revisited in the
final conclusion.
III. THIRD PARTY NON-SIGNATORIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In this section, each of the selected legal theories is discussed by analyzing
its application in England, the United States, France and then in international
law (including international arbitral institution rules). This is followed by a
commentary section in which the approaches of the different jurisdictions are
contrasted with reference to the key research objectives identified in Section I.A.
Due to the scope of this project the jurisdictions analyzed are limited to
three. However, it is suggested that each offers a unique perspective on the third
party problem. English common law has traditionally been hostile to general
contractual third party rights and restrictive of arbitration, but has been the sub-
ject of fairly recent reforms in both (i.e., the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
Act 1999 and the Arbitration Act 1996). The United States offers an example of
a less restrictive general contract law and a strong judicial pro-arbitration policy.
France, the sole civil law representative, is chosen both because of its academic
contribution to the third party debate and its more liberal approach to binding
third parties to arbitration agreements. All three countries are heavy users of
international commercial arbitration7 and a rich source of material.
70. Minera Alumbrera Ltd. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 98CIV5673, 1999 WL 269915, *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1999) ("it would be inequitable to permit [non-signatory parent] to take advantage
of any blurring of the line between it and [subsidiary signatory], and we decline to mandate arbitra-
tion based upon that rationale"). See also Non-Signatory Guarantor Cannot Enforce Arbitration
Agreement, 10 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 200 (1999). In such a case a claimant non-signatory in
the United States is more likely to rely on estoppel doctrine. See Fluor Daniel Intercont'l, Inc. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., No. 98Civ.7181, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12983 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1999).
71. See SAMUEL, supra note 6, at 29 n.61.
490
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A. Assignment
A general exception to the privity doctrine exists where a contract contem-
plates that a party may assign his or her rights or obligations to a third party.
The development of assignment as an exception to the privity rule is borne of
commercial necessity72 and as a mainstay of international business dealings is an
area ripe for consideration in international commercial arbitration.
7 3
Two preliminary issues should be mentioned. First, assignment should not
be confused with closely analogous situations such as succession by law or
change in legal form of the original party (e.g., through corporate restructuring)
unless such changes actually involve assignment.74 Second, in an effort to dis-
tinguish the often inconsistent terminology used in this area, assignment issues
arise where there is: (1) assignment of the rights of action arising out of a con-
tract including a clause compromissoire; (2) assignment of a compromis;
(3) assignment of both the rights and obligations (i.e. including performance of
the contract) in a contract containing a clause compromissoire; and (4) an as-
signment agreement of any type which itself includes a clause compromissoire.
1. Assignment: England
Conflicting early authorities suggested that as the rights between the origi-
nal contracting parties and the arbitrator were personal, an arbitration agreement
was not capable of assignment.7 However, the obiter comments in that case
have been discredited76 and, despite some occasional doubts,77 the position now
seems quite clear that:
72. See e.g. Sir William Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the
Common Law, 33 HARv. L. REV. 1997 (1920).
73. For discussion see FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at §§ 690 et. seq. (noting that "In spite of
both its importance in practice and the particularly difficult issues it raises, the assignment of arbitra-
tion agreements was long ignored by authors and commentators. Recently, however it has been the
subject of several major studies."). Id. at n.2. See also Jacques Werner, Jurisdiction of Arbitrators
in Case of Assignment of an Arbitration Clause 8 J. INT'L ARB. 13 (1991); Jean L. Goutal, Le droit
des contrats in L'arbitrage et les tiers in ARBITRAGE, supra note 31, at 439; and the comprehensive
theoretical treatment in Daniel Girsberger & Christian Hausmaninger, Assignment of Rights and
Agreement to Arbitrate, 8 ARBITRATION INT'L 121 (1992) (but note that the jurisdictional overview
is out of date).
74. See e.g. IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT § 18.7.1.2, N.6 (1994); see also FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 690.
75. Cottage Club Estates Ltd. v. Woodside Estates Co. Ltd., [1928] 2 K.B. 463.
76. E.g. Shayler v. Woolf, [1946] Ch. 320 (Eng. C.A.).
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Where the assignment is the assignment of the cause of action, it will, in the absence of some
agreement to the contrary include as stated in section 136 [Law of Property Act 1925] all the
remedies in respect of that cause of action. The relevant remedy is the right to arbitrate and
obtain an arbitration award in respect of the cause of action. The assignee is bound by the ar-
bitration clause in the sense that it cannot assert the assigned right without also accepting the
obligation to arbitrate. Accordingly, it is clear both from the statute and from a consideration
of the position of the assignee that the assignee has the benefit of the arbitration clause as well
as other provisions of the contract.
78
Unlike United States law,79 an assignment may be either legal or equitable.
For an assignment to be legal, it must meet the conditions set out in section 136
of the Law of Property Act 1925, i.e. the assignment must be absolute, must be
in writing by the assignor, and express notice must have been given to the other
party. If satisfied, the assignee is entitled to enforce the arbitration clause in his
or her own name. If these conditions have not been met, then the equitable as-
signee must join the assignor to the action or perfect the assignment by fulfilling
the requirements of the Law of Property Act.t 0
Because of the statutory scheme, slightly different considerations apply
where the assignment occurs after the commencement of arbitration proceedings
(a less common situation). Even there, it was authoritatively decided in The
Jordan Nicolovt' that the assignee may simply take over the assignor's proceed-
ings without having to commence new proceedings. This has subsequently been
applied to situations involving subrogation rather than assignment, even though
the subrogee would have had the option of simply proceeding in his own name. 2
Similarly, the assignee must give notice of the change of claimant to the arbitral
tribunal if it has been convened. 3 Further, the assignee must fulfill the eviden-
tial burden of establishing that any assignment meets the test in section 136 of
the Law of Property Act."
The doctrinal position is put very clearly by Hobhouse J in The Jordan
Nicolov:
77. See London Steamship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass'n. Ltd. v. Bombay Trading Co. Ltd., "The
Felicie," [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21, 25 (supporting Cottage Club Estates dictum).
78. Montedipe S.P.A. v. JTP-Ro Jugotanker "The Jordan Nicolov," [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 11,
15-16. Note that although the assignment occurred after the commencement of the arbitration, Judge
Hobhouse reasserted his position in Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen GmBH v. Voest
Alpine Intertrading GmBH, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 279 (Eng. C.A.).
79. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1233 (3d ed. 1993).
80. Difficulties will arise if the assignor has ceased to exist. See Baytur S.A. v. Finagro
Holding S.A., [1991] All E.R. 129 (assignee unable to enforce award made after claimant ceased to
exist).
81. See The Jordan Nicolov, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 19.
82. See Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 286.
83. See The Jordan Nicolov, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 19.
84. See R.M. MERKIN, ARBITRATION ACT 1996: ANNOTATED GUtDE § 2.37 (2000).
24
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol4/iss3/6
[Vol. 4: 3, 2004]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
In my judgement, the application of principle to this factual situation demonstrates that, ab-
sent some special factor... the assignee is entitled to an award from the shipowners if he, the
assignee, can prove his case on the merits including his case on title to sue. His claim is not
time barred. He is entitled under the Law of Property Act to exercise all the legal remedies of
the assignor. The remedy by way of arbitration having been invoked by the assignor in time,
the assignee can enforce that remedy. It is the same remedy not a new or different remedy.
85
Also consistent with general contract law, where the main contract involves
personal services or is otherwise not assignable (e.g., if i t contains a non-
assignment clause effective to prevent any interest being assigned), then no valid
assignment can take place. 86 English law also provides for assignment by opera-
tion of law (as opposed to voluntary assignment) in certain circumstances, e.g.,
death, bankruptcy, liquidation.
2. Assignment: United States
With respect to arbitrations governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), 87 third party arbitration issues are determined on the same basis as
other issues concerning validity of an arbitration agreement, i.e. by applying
"ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts" and the
"federal substantive law of arbitrability." 88 The general position with respect to
assignment is that stated by MacNeil, Speidel and Stipanowich:
It is unquestionable FAA doctrine that arbitration agreements are to be treated like other con-
tracts, subject to the policy favoring arbitration. In light of this, the law respecting rights and
duties of assignees to arbitrate should follow standard contract doctrine respecting the rights
and duties of assignees generally. If there are deviations from such standard contract doc-
trine, they should be in the direction of arbitrability.8
9
However, some courts have failed to pay adequate attention to standard contract
doctrine and in doing so also have ignored the supposed policy favoring arbitra-
tion.
85. The Jordan Nicolov, [1990], 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 19.
86. MERKIN, supra note 84, at § 2.33.
87. "Enforceability of an arbitration agreement is determined pursuant to the FAA if '(1) the
parties have entered into a written arbitration agreement, (2) there exists an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction and (3) the underlying transaction involves interstate commerce."' Cosmotek
Mumessillik VE Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketi v. Cosmotek U.S.A., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 757, 759 (D.C. Conn.
1996) (citing In re Chung, 943 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1991)).
88. First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
89. MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 18.7.1.1.
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In situations involving the assignment of rights only, an effective assign-
ment of a contract right extinguishes the assignor's right to performance and
transfers that right to the assignee.9 Thus, an assignee of contract rights may
insist on arbitration under the contract just as the assignor could have in the
absence of the assignment.9 Applying general contract law, the assignee takes
the rights subject to all the terms of the contract and, subject to the following, is
bound to observe the arbitration clause.92
However, precedents suggest there are three possible qualifications to this.
First, there are authorities supporting the proposition that a mere assignment of a
contractual right alone does not carry with it the obligation to fulfill duties. The
duty to arbitrate is considered one such nontransferable duty.93 Second, Girs-
berger & Hausmaninger suggest that on the basis of general contract doctrine, an
assignment may not extend to a "personal" obligation. The authors also suggest
that there is old authority for the proposition that this may extend to an arbitra-
tion agreement where, for example, the arbitration clause calls for personal ap-
pointment of an arbitrator.94 Thirdly, the same authors suggest that a compromis
cannot be the subject of an assignment because it is purely "personal."95 How-
ever, these authorities seem out of step with common business practice and are
probably of little real limitation on the assignment of rights and duties to arbi-
trate.
The more common and uncontroversial situation is where the assignment
involves the passing of both rights and obligations. If the assignment is valid,
then the arbitration clause binds both the original promisee and the assignee as
"[b]y taking the assignment, the assignee has consented to become subject to the
arbitration clause ... and there seems little reason not to infer consent to arbi-
trate disputes respecting assumption of duties as well. 96
A complication is added by three variables. First, the exact wording of the
assignment may be relevant to its validity under various state law and federal
common law doctrines. Second, the applicable law which governs the validity
and effect of the assignment (which may or may not be the same as that of the
contract containing the arbitration agreement or the arbitration agreement itself)
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (2003).
91. Chatham Shipping Co. v. Fertex ATP Corp., 352 F.2d 291,294 (2d Cir. 1965).
92. MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 18.7.1.2.
93. See Lachmar v. Trunkline L.N.G. Co., 753 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying New York
state law). But see Hart Enters. Int'l Inc. v. Anhui Provincial Import & Export Corp., 888 F. Supp.
587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (assignee bound to arbitrate where it has taken any affirmative actions
under the assigned contract to demonstrate an intent to assume obligations). See also discussion
generally in Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 125-126.
94. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 125.
95. Id. (citing In re Lowenthal, 199 App. Div. 39, 191 N.Y.S. 282 (1st Dep't 1921), affirmed
in 233 N.Y. 261,135 N.E. 944 (N.Y. 1922)).
96. MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 18.7.1.3.
26
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol4/iss3/6
[Vol. 4: 3, 2004]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
may impact on the matter. Third, there are conflicting decisions as to whether
this is a matter to be determined by the court or the arbitral tribunal.
Bell-Ray Company, Inc. v. Chemrite Ltd. and Lupritene97 touches on all
three of these issues. Briefly, Bell-Ray (a New Jersey company) and Chemrite
(a South African company) entered into a series of trade agreements containing
arbitration clauses to facilitate blending. Chermrite assigned the trade agree-
ments to another South African company, Lubritene Limited. Some time later,
Bell-Ray commenced arbitration proceedings against Chemrite and Lubritene
and obtained an order from the United States District Court in the District of
New Jersey compelling arbitration. Both defendants appealed, alleging that
each was not party to any arbitration agreement on the basis that the assignment
was invalid. Their argument was that since the trade agreements unequivocally
stated that Bell-Ray's consent was required before any assignment, and Bell-
Ray gave no such consent, the assignment was invalid. The District Court, ap-
plying New Jersey law, held that the contractual consent provision operated only
to limit a party's right to assign a contract but did not limit its power to do so in
the absence of a contractual "intent to the contrary with due specificity."98
Despite the consent requirement, in the absence of a contractual provision
that any such assignment would be void, the assignment was valid and enforce-
able against both the assignor and the assignee. Thus Chermrite was bound to
arbitrate.99 The importance of the applicable law in deciding such matters is
well illustrated here: the parties had failed to prove the content of South African
law in the District Court and thus the law of the forum (New Jersey) was applied
by the Court by default."l ° Interestingly, it is questionable whether the court's
determination will be binding on the matter at any subsequent arbitration where
applicable law will presumably need to be argued.1"'
97. Bell-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty.) Ltd. and Lupritene (Pty.), 181 F.3d 435, 445 (D.N.J.
1999).
98. Based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2), incorporated into New
Jersey state law.
99. Bell-Ray Co., 181 F.3d at 445. The decision was partially reversed and remanded to the
District Court on other grounds.
100. Id.at441.
101. There are conflicting decisions on whether this is a matter for the court or arbitral tribunal.
See Elzinga & Volkers, Inc. v. LSSC Corp., 47 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (validity of assignment
was for the arbitrator to decide). See subsequently Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct.
2402, 2407 (2003) ("In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended courts,
not arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter (in the absence of 'clea[r] and unmis-
takabl[e]' evidence to the contrary). AT&T Technologies Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S.
643, 649 (1986). These limited instances typically involve matters of a kind that 'contracting parties
would likely have expected a court' to decide. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79,
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Assignment issues in United States arbitration law are often decided by ap-
plying other legal theories. Many international arbitrations involve complex
contractual relationships that may divert attention from assignments at issue.
For example, Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. Partnership, Inc. v. Smith Cogene-
ration International, Inc. ' involved a joint venture agreement to build a power
plant in the Dominican Republic. The joint venture was contained in more than
one agreement and had been the subject of at least two sets of assignments ne-
cessitated by changes in corporate structure and financing arrangements. The
relationship soured and SCI launched court proceedings in the Dominican Re-
public against "the Enron Group" (being the original contracting parties), but
excluding the subsequent assignees which were also in the Enron Group. The
Enron defendants (i.e. the assignors) sought and obtained an order in the South-
ern District for New York compelling arbitration. SCI appealed on the basis,
inter alia, that the only Enron parties to the arbitration agreement were the final
assignees.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the District Court deci-
sion, both on the basis of "piercing the corporate veil," to find that the "Enron
Group" (i.e. all the Enron defendants) could rely on the arbitration agreement,
and also on the basis of equitable estoppel. The Court stated:
Unquestionably, there were a number of enforceable agreements between SCI... and various
Enron entities, each of which contained an agreement to arbitrate. The assignment of rights
under the 1994 agreement from one set of affiliates to another set of affiliates does not negate
the prior existence of a contract to arbitrate between the parties, and thus do not fall com-
fortably within the inquiry into the making of an agreement. The question before us is not
whether SCI and the Enron petitioners entered into an agreement to arbitrate - they did (and
more than once) - but whether subsequent events deprived all of the Enron petitioners of the
right to compel SCI to live up to that agreement. 103
While perhaps a convenient short-cut, the characterization of the assignments as
merely "subsequent events" is contractually unsound. A better approach would
have been to ascertain on which of the agreements each of the plaintiff's claims
was based and when it arose. On the basis of the judgment, most appear to re-
late to allegations of fraud and tortious interference with contractual negotiations
arising in the early stages of the joint venture relationship. Parties to the joint
venture agreements at that stage should logically be entitled to rely on the arbi-
tration agreement (regardless of the subsequent assignments). It is suggested
that this is preferable to the Court's rather vague treatment of all the various
83 (2002). They include certain gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration
agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of
controversy."
102. Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88
(2d Cir. 1999) (unusual finding where the non-signatory was able to compel arbitration on a varia-
tion of the group of companies doctrine, but justified as an estoppel argument).
103. Id. at 95.
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corporate entities (but not the ultimate assignees) as entitled to rely on the arbi-
tration agreement at any given time because of their "identity of interests.""
A further characteristic of United States case law on assignments is the in-
vocation of the "pro-arbitration policy" of the FAA to permit arbitration with
third parties even where the relevant contract(s) appear unequivocally to restrict
the arbitration provision to the original parties only. Thus, in the context of a
domestic arbitration, the arbitration agreement specifically stated, "[n]o arbitra-
tion, arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall include, by consolidation,
joinder or in any other manner, any additional person, not a party to this Agree-
ment, except by written consent."' 0 5 Despite this clause, the Court held the as-
signee compelled to arbitrate, citing policies favoring arbitration and the free
assignment of contract rights. Thus, it appears that even express contemplation
of limiting the arbitration agreement to the original contracting parties may not
prohibit the court's expansive application of a pro-arbitration policy. Such a
result may arguably protect the assignor's "freedom of contract" but it places the
assignee in a position where it is deemed to have accepted the obligation of arbi-
tration and the original promisor in a position where it has accepted an obliga-
tion to arbitrate with a new defendant, both despite a clear limitation on the face
of the agreement (remembering that it is quite likely the assignment would have
occurred without any contact between the assignee and the promisor; or - even
worse - one or both of the parties might have accepted the assignment on the
basis that there would be no transfer of the arbitration clause).
3. Assignment: France
There is no explicit provision in the French Civil Code dealing with as-
signment of an arbitration clause."°6 As to the validity of an assignment,
Fouchard and Gaillard state that in the case of "voluntary assignments," the
assignee "[w]ill become a party to the arbitration agreement, and in the event of
a dispute will be bound by that agreement."' 7 The authors support the proposi-
tion that acceptance of the assignment of the main contract raises a "presump-
104. Id. at 97.
105. Robert Lamb Hart Planners & Architects v. Evergreen Ltd., 787 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio
1992).
106. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 130.
107. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 708 (distinguishing between "voluntary assignments" and
"other means of assigning" the arbitration agreement such as statutory subrogation or succession).
This is typical of the overlap between concepts which occur in trying to compare common and civil
law jurisdictions.
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tion" of acceptance of the arbitration agreement in cases where the entire con-
tract has been transferred.18 Girsberger & Hausmaninger support this proposi-
tion by analogy to Article 1122 of the French Civil Code.' 9
As to the concomitant question of the enforceability of the assignment of
the arbitration agreement against the original contracting party, Fouchard and
Gaillard state the following proposition:
[If the identity of the co-contractor [the original contracting party] was not a determining
factor on signature of the initial arbitration agreement, there is a presumption that such
agreement included the initial co-contractor's implicit acceptance of any assignment to a third
party." 10
The authors state that where it is a case of the entire contract being as-
signed, there is no difficulty in enforcing the arbitration clause against the origi-
nal party."' Discussing this case, the authors state the broad logic used to justify
the conclusion:
The Court added that the assignment "necessarily implies that the assignor transfers the bene-
fit of the arbitration clause - which forms part of the economics [of the ] contract - to the as-
signee," although this did not suffice in itself to justify a presumption of acceptance on the
part of the initial co-contractor. Given the generality of the terms of the arbitration clause in
dispute and the fact that arbitration has now become a normal method of resolving disputes in
international trade, it was legitimate to assume that the initial co-contractor had accepted the
possibility of an assignment of the arbitration agreement.112
Thus, where the presumption is not enough, the Court will treat a broad arbitra-
tion clause and the mere fact of international commerce as sufficient to arrive at
the "assumption" that consent to assignment exists. Girsberger and Hausman-
inger justify this approach on an analogy to Article 1692 of the French Civil
Code, which provides that the assignment of a claim "includes all accessories
attaching thereto, such as a right against the surety and any right of property or
mortgage securing the same," thus the arbitration agreement is analogous to a
"right attaching to the claim" and automatically forms part of the assignment."13
An exception to the presumption applies where the initial contracting party
is able to establish that the arbitration agreement was entered into intuitus per-
sonae, that is, in consideration of the identity of the original contracting party
(i.e. the assignor). This may be established either from the factual circum-
stances" a or from an express term of the contract (including that the agreement
108. Id. at §§ 711-12.
109. Id. See n.55 for authorities cited.
110. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 716 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at § 718 (citing C.C.C. Filmkunst v. E.D.I.F., REvUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 565 (1988), 116
JOURNAL Du DROrr INT'L 1021 (1989)).
112. FOUCHARD, supra note il, at § 718 at 432.
113. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 131.
114. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 721.
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is not assignable)." 5 As to the former, the authors suggest that the initial con-
tractor would have to establish that "[i]t viewed the assignor as possessing the
good faith and procedural loyalty necessary for an arbitration to run smoothly,
and that the assignee might not share those qualities. That will, of course, be
very difficult to establish, given that arbitration is a common means of resolving
international disputes.""1
6
As a final comment on the French position, French courts have been strict
in holding that the assignee obtains rights only as good as those held by the as-
signor. Thus, the Cour de Cassation has held that in a contract concluded out-
side France between two non-French companies, the arbitration clause was en-
forceable against the French company to which the rights had subsequently been
assigned, but that it was not permitted to rely on its rights as a French company
to have jurisdiction conferred on the French courts." 7
4. Assignment: International Law/Institutional Rules
Neither the New York Convention, the European Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration (1961) nor the UNCITRAL Model Law specifi-
cally deal with the issue of assignment of the arbitration agreement." 8 The rea-
son for this presumably is that the issue is left to the domestic law to be applied
pursuant to the conflict of law rules." 9
As to institutional rules, the ICC Rules of International Arbitration (1998)
are similarly silent and arbitral tribunals have instead applied the applicable law
relevant to the dispute. ° One procedural difference with an ICC arbitration is
that it is the Court which must first decide that the arbitration is to proceed "if it
is prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement under the Rules may ex-
115. Id. at § 722.
116. Id.at§ 721.
117. Id. at § 724 (citing Cass. Civ., Montan6 v. Compagnie de Chenin de Fer Portugais, 77
JOURNAL Du DROIT INT'L. 1206 (1950).
118. To the extent that these conventions and the UNCITRAL Model Law refer to the require-
ment of an "agreement in writing" and a "defined legal relationship" this is discussed below at
Section IV.C
119. For an alternative view that the issue is addressed in Article I of the New York Conven-
tion see Zimmer (USA) Europe S.A. (Belgium) v. Giuliana Crenascoli (Italy), June 3 1985, XI
YEARBK. COMM. ARB'N 518 (1986), cited in Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at n.62
and accompanying text.
120. For example, I.C.C. Award No. 1704 (1977), JOURNAL DU DROIT INT'L. 977 (1978),
applying French law to find that the assignee was bound by the arbitration clause. See generally
CRAIG, PARK & PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION §5.09 (2d ed.
1990).
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ist..'' This is a very low hurdle to clear and the ICC will not enter into a con-
sideration of the legal position of the asserted assignee at this preliminary stage.
5. Assignment: Commentary
All three of the domestic legal systems analyzed lack specific rules to deal
with assignment of arbitration agreements, but conform on one broad proposi-
tion (not always consistently applied): the arbitration agreement is prima facie
assigned with the entire contract in the absence of an express prohibition or
some factual manifestation of intent that the agreement was of a personal nature
between the original contracting parties. The unique characteristics of the Eng-
lish system stem mainly from requirements imposed by the Law of Property
Act. This, in turn, is an historical necessity to overcome the strict English ap-
proach to the privity doctrine. However, the notice and writing requirements
can be seen as two addressing concerns. First, to ensure that the assignee has
consented to the assignment and second, that the original promisor has been
sufficiently notified of the assignment. These concerns are apparently of less
importance in the "presumption" approach under French law and in the more
generous position in the United States. The harshness of the English approach is
significantly mitigated by the opportunity of assignment in equity, although such
cases are likely to be rarer in international commercial arbitration.
The United States position is somewhat conflicting and suffers from the
added complication of multiple state jurisdictions. However, the assignability of
arbitration clauses seems to be treated as a matter of general contract law but
without the formality burdens imposed by the stricter English approach and with
the added variable of the invocation of the "pro-arbitration policy," applied here
to weigh in favor of presuming consent.
The French courts have a longer tradition of the so-called "automatic"
transmission of the arbitration agreement as part of the assignment of the entire
contract. Girsberger also suggests that civil law systems are more willing to see
the arbitration agreement as "generally incorporated into the main contract" and
are therefore more willing "to analogize arbitration agreements to security inter-
ests or accessory rights which attach to the claim they relate to.
' 122
Both Fouchard & Gaillard and Girsberger note French resistance to the
"automatic" assignment of the arbitration agreement, premised on the basis that
the principle of the autonomy of the arbitration agreement (i.e. separability)
demands that it be seen as independent of the main contract, especially where
the arbitration agreement may be governed by a different applicable law to the
main contract. 123 However, Fouchard & Gaillard state that the "French courts
121. ICC RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1998), Art. 6(2).
122. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 138.
123. See authorities cited in Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 137.
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have consistently rejected" such arguments.i24 Those authors agree with the
French courts' insistence that, in the absence of a clear indication to the con-
trary, the assignee is presumed to have accepted the contract as a whole and no
proof is required that the parties had "two distinct intentions - one regarding the
main contract, one regarding the arbitration agreement."' 25 This willingness to
infer intention to arbitrate from intention to be bound by the main agreement is
doctrinally questionable and is discussed later. 26
Another trend noticeable in all three jurisdictions is the willingness to pro-
tect the practical efficacy of international arbitration. This is evident in a French
commentary:
[lit would hardly be in keeping with the needs of international trade if one were entirely to
dissociate the substantive aspects of the contract from the provisions concerning jurisdiction.
To allow the assignees to avoid those provisions would be to disregard the parties' intentions,
irrespective of whether one is dealing with a straightforward waiver of Articles 14 and 15 or a
positive choice of jurisdiction, or even an arbitration clause.127
A similar pragmatism is evident in England in Detlev von Appen,"2 s in which the
Court was able to invoke its inherent equitable powers to grant an injunction that
gave effect to the arbitration agreement, despite the fact that the result in terms
of the effect of assignment as a matter of contract doctrine is questionable. So
too in the Smith/Enron Co-Generation case in the United States, in which the
contractual effect of assignment was downplayed to prevent the plaintiff signa-
tory from "trying to escape its obligation to arbitrate."' 2 9
As a final comment, cases from all three jurisdictions combined with the
absence of rules in international agreements and institutional rules dealing with
assignment, suggest that the applicable law is fundamentally important. This is
discussed elsewhere. 3 ° So too is the question of whether or not the validity of
assignment is a matter for the tribunal or a court.'
124. FoUCHARD, supra note 11, at 427.
125. Id. at 427.
126. See infra at notes 207 and 266 and accompanying text.
127. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 724, at 435 (citing A. Pomsard in note 4 Cass. le civ.,
March 21, 1966, La Metropole v. Muller, REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INT'L. PRivt 670-677 (1966)).
128. Schifffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 292 ("The application
of the time charters for an injunction has been made to protect a contractual right of the time charter-
ers that the dispute be referred to arbitration, a contractual right which equity requires the insurance
company to recognise.").
129. Smith/Enron Co-Generation, 198 F.3d at 97.
130. See infra at Section IV.B.
131. See generally supra note 101.
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B. Subrogation
A discussion of subrogation suffers in the international commercial arbitra-
tion context from two potential difficulties. First, the phrase "subrogation" has
subtle differences of use in different legal systems. Second, awards, interna-
tional agreements, institutional rules, and commentaries often confuse the con-
cept with assignment and novation.
1. Subrogation: England
In the words of a leading commentator: "[s]ubrogation is literally 'substitu-
tion.' The term is used in the context of English and Commonwealth law to
describe a process by which one party is substituted for another so that he may
enforce that other's rights against a third party for his own benefit."'32
The more expansive definition provided in CHrrY ON CONTRACTS cites
applications of the concept that exemplify how important subrogation is in the
context of international commercial arbitration:
By virtue of 'subrogation,' a person may , in certain situations, 'step into the shoes' of an-
other so as to enjoy the latter's legal position or his rights against a third person. These rights
are akin to other restitutionary rights and are based on general principles of natural justice but
subject to statute. Thus, an insurer who pays a claim under an indemnity policy in respect of
a particular loss is entitled to enforce the rights of the insured person arising out of the loss
against any third person; a guarantor who pays the debt of the principal debtor is entitled to
require the creditor to give him the benefit of any security given by the principal debtor to the
creditor; an endorser of a bill of exchange who pays the bill may claim analogous rights. 1
33
The straightforward position in England is that the subrogee is both bound by
and can enforce an arbitration agreement contained in the principal contract.
However the doctrine vests no cause of action in the subrogee and thus the arbi-
tration claim must be pursued in the name of the subrogor1 34  The subrogee
receives rights only as good as those enjoyed by the subrogor. 135 However, it
may also arise (particularly in the insurance context) that the subrogee enters
into a formal assignment of the claim and can then pursue the arbitration in its
own name as an assignee.
136
132. CHARLES MITCHELL, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION 1 (1995) (citations omitted).
133. CHrrrY ON CONTRACTs, Vol. 1, § 29-121, at 1482 (A.G. Guest ed., 1994) (citations omit-
ted).
134. "The Ailos," [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 25, 25-30. The situation is different where it is a case
of "reviving" a cause of action by way of subrogation but this is unlikely to be the subject of interna-
tional commercial arbitration. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 132, at 37.
135. This has caused difficulties in the reinsurance context. See Mercantile & Gen. Reins. Co.
Plc. v. London Assurance, (unreported, Eng. C.A., 1989), cited in MERKIN, supra note 84, at § 15.1;
see generally Schwab, supra note 22, at 485.
136. See Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 279. See also supra
note 80 and accompanying text.
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In the specific arbitration context, section 82(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996
provides that the Act applies to all persons acting "under or through" a party to
the arbitration proceedings. This mirrors section 4 of the Arbitration Act 1950
and section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975, although in those Acts the provision
applied only in the limited context of jurisdiction to apply for a stay of proceed-
ings pending arbitration. Earlier case law had held that a subrogee is a party
claiming "under or through" a party to the arbitration agreement, although the
subrogee obtains no rights of its own but is simply "standing in the shoes" of the
subrogor. 13 7 Professor Robert Merkin states that it is "now clear" that an insur-
ance company exercising subrogation rights and pursuing the insured's claim in
arbitration is not a party to the arbitration in its own right and cannot claim the
benefit of the "through or under" jurisdiction.138 It is perhaps worth noting that
the case Professor Merkin cites for this proposition, The Frotanorte,139 was con-
cerned with whether the insurer had reached a separate arbitration agreement
with the third party against whom the claim was being made so as to avoid alle-
gations of delay. Indeed, the court of first instance specifically stated that it
would not proceed to the alternative argument that the insurer was capable of
bringing an arbitration agreement in its own name." The issue of the extent to
which the "through or under" provision may impact on third party enforcement
of arbitration provisions is considered below.141
Finally, certain statutes grant rights analogous to subrogation. The most
important is the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930, permitting a
third party to bring a claim directly against an insurer who, for example, refuses
to pay out on a claim in certain specified circumstances, e.g. insolvency. It is
clear that in doing so, the Act "transfers to the plaintiffs not the claim but the
contractual rights of the insured" subject to any arbitration clause contained in
the policy, i.e. it is subrogated thereto.'
137. See e.g., Smith v. Pearl Ins. Co. Ltd., [1939] 1 All E.R. 95.
138. Merkin, supra note 84, at § 1.37.
139. Frota Oceanica Brasiliera SA v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass'n (Bermuda), "The
Frotanorte," [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 254 affirmed [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 461 (Eng. C.A.).
140. The Frotanorte, [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 260. Although the court does state obiter that
"[i]t is elementary law (at any rate in England and in Wales) that any such [subrogated] claim must
be pursued in the name of the insured. Any agreement to arbitrate must therefore be with the insured
... if it is to be effective."
141. See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
142. Charterers' Mut. Assurance Assoc. Ltd. v. British & Foreign & TMM Transcap, [1998]
I.L. Pr. 838, § 38 (Q.B.D., Comm. Ct.) (citing Fanti & the Padre Island (No. 2), [1990] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 191 (HL); London Steamship Owners, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 21 (discussing position where
arbitration proceedings have already commenced)).
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In Charterers' Mutual Assurance Assoc. v. British & Foreign & TMM
Transcap,143 an English court had to resolve an alleged conflict between the
English approach of granting limited rights of subrogation in the Third Party
(Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 and the French law governing this situation.
After members of a charterers' liability insurance association failed to pay out
on claims made by certain third parties, the third parties commenced litigation in
France against not only the members but also the association. The association
sought and obtained an anti-suit injunction in London on the basis of an arbitra-
tion agreement between it and its members providing that all disputes be arbi-
trated. Pursuant to French law the third party plaintiffs were arguably entitled to
pursue an action directe, by which an injured party is permitted to proceed di-
rectly against the insurer of the party that caused the harm. However, the Eng-
lish court found that as a matter of French law the right of the injured party is
governed by the limits and defenses available under the terms of the relevant
liability policy and that the policy was to be construed according to the applica-
ble law. The policy had specifically chosen English law and, applying English
law, the Court concluded that "any rights which the [third parties] may have
acquired.. .are rights which are subject to the arbitration clause."" Accord-
ingly, the French litigation "must be regarded in English law as unconscionable
and so unjust" such as to necessitate the anti-suit injunction.'45
2. Subrogation: United States
As stated by a leading text on insurance law:
Whether legal or conventional, subrogation places an insurer in the place of the insured with
respect to any claim the insured has against a third party for causing the loss. To reach this
point, the insurer is required to have paid its insured under the terms of the policy. The in-
surer gets no greater rights than the insured had to give so far as a claim against a third party
is concerned.1
46
This basic contract law approach applies also to an arbitration agreement in the
head contract, which will bind the subrogee both as a potential claimant and
respondent. Thus, in Tencara, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
143. Charterers' Mut. Assurance Assoc. Ltd. v. British & Foreign & TMM Transcap, [1998]
I.L. Pr. 838.
144. Id. at § 44.
145. Id. at § 46. However, it appears that this result is in fact consistent with French law on the
action directe, which is also limited by the existence of an arbitration clause.
146. KENNETH H. YORK, JOHN W. WHELAN & LEO P. MARTINEZ, CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS ON GENERAL PRACTICE INSURANCE LAW 364 (3 rd ed., 1994).
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an insurer bound to arbitrate, as it is "clearly established that an insurer-
subrogee stands in the shoes of its insured."'
147
United States case law evidences a pragmatic approach to the position of
subrogees in arbitration. For example, in Hammermills the District Court for the
District of Columbia rejected a challenge to enforcement of an arbitral award
under the New York Convention premised on an argument that the enforcement
action by Hammermills was barred because it was not the "real party in inter-
est."'148 Hanmermills had filed for bankruptcy and the arbitration was permitted
to proceed on the basis that its insurer (Argonaut) would fund the arbitration
costs. The unsuccessful party in the arbitration argued that Argonaut and not
Hammermills must bring the enforcement action. The Court accepted that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that "every action shall be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party and interest" and accordingly "if the insurer
has paid the entire claim it is the real party and interest and must sue in its own
name." 149 However, the Court concluded that such an interpretation would be
contrary to the New York Convention which "creates a substantive right on
behalf of a party to an arbitration proceeding to bring a federal action for con-
firmation of that award."' 50 Thus, despite the fact that Argonaut was, for the
purposes of federal law, the "insurer subrogee" and therefore, the "real party in
interest," this did not preclude Hammermills bringing the enforcement action in
its own name.
Even in the absence of a direct action statute, there are precedents permit-
ting a third party non-signatory to bring claims against an insurer alleged to have
failed to pay out on a policy that would have benefited the third party. In the
leading case of Asmaa,'' seamen brought asbestosis claims directly against their
employers' insurer (although there was no direct action statute) on the basis that
they were entitled to stand in the shoes of the former employers and recover for
their injuries under the indemnity contracts with the Association. However they
were held bound to the arbitration clause contained in the policy with the Asso-
ciation because:
147. Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349 (2d Cir. 1999). Note
that added complications arise where there are direct action statutes and the possibility of limited
application of the FAA in favor of state regulation of insurance matters.
148. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills Inc., No. CIV.A.90-0169, 1992 WL
122712 (D.D.C. May 29,2002).
149. /d. at*7.
150. ld. at * 8.
151. Aasma v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. and Indem. Ass'n., 95 F.3d 400(6th Cir. 1996).
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When a plaintiff 'bases its right to sue on the contract itself, not upon a statute or some other
basis outside the contract, the provision requiring arbitration as a condition precedent to re-
covery must be observed.' 
152
However, where the third party has sought to argue that its claims are based not
on the policy itself but some other claim against the insurer, it is not bound by
the arbitration agreements in the policy. Thus, in Powell v. Sphere Drake Insur-
ance Plc,'53 the Court of Appeals of Washington overturned a lower court au-
thority to hold that plaintiff Powell was not bound by an arbitration clause in the
insurance policy between Sphere Drake and the owners of a vessel on which
Powell was injured (the corporate owners of the vessel having being dis-
solved). 54 Interestingly, the Court relied heavily on Thomson'55 and the five
"theories" by which a non-signatory could be bound to an arbitration agreement.
Noting that none of those included subrogation theory'56 and drawing on federal
case law that confirms that "despite the strong policy in favor of arbitration,
parties to a dispute will generally not be compelled to arbitrate unless they have
agreed to do so,"' 7 the Court concluded that Powell's claims based on state
consumer protection and fraudulent conveyance statutes were not bound by the
arbitration agreement. 5 8
These cases are indicative of two often conflicting general trends in the
United States courts' approach to the third party problem. First, concern not to
bind the subrogee to arbitrate where he "clearly did not bargain to do so.' 59
Second, a conceptual uneasiness where the claim can be brought on a basis other
than relying on the contract containing the arbitration agreement, such that there
is no other foundation for consent to arbitrate. Both concerns can be answered
by more careful analysis of the relationship between claimant and respondent. If
152. Id. at 405 (quoting Cheshire Place Associates v. West of England Shipowners Mut. Ins.
Ass'n, 815 F. Supp. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), see Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp. v. London Ship
Owners' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 408 F. Supp. 626, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (mortgagee who was a loss payee
on an insurance policy, sued for payments allegedly due under that policy and was bound by the
arbitration provision in the policy).
153. Powell v. Sphere Drake Insurance Plc., 988 P.2d 12 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
154. Powell, 988 P.2d at 16.
155. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 776, as discussed herein at note 47 and accompanying text.
156. Powell, 988 P.2d at 15. Note, however, that, as already discussed, it is suggested that the
five "theories" listed in Thomson do not constitute a comprehensive catalog of possible applicable
doctrines (nor do the courts feel bound by the Thomson categories where it suits them to depart
therefrom).
157. Powell, 988 P.2d at 16, citing Zimmerman v. Int'l Cos. & Consulting Inc., 107 F.3d 344,
346 (3d Cir. 1997); Morewitz v. West of England Ship Owners' Mut. Prot. and Indem. Ass'n., 62
F.3d 1356, 1365 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating "although we recognize that Morewitz now 'stands in the
shoes' of General Development, we are reluctant to mandate arbitration where the claimant clearly
did not bargain to do so"), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1114 (1996); In re Talbott Bigfoot Inc., 887 F.2d
611,614 (5th Cir. 1989).
158. Powell, 988 P.2d at 16.
159. Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1365.
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it is truly one arising out of subrogation, then all claims within the scope of the
arbitration agreement should be arbitrated. In contrast to criticism from some
commentators, 6 it is suggested here that in Powell either the plaintiff had an
independent claim against the insurers (and thus was not a subrogee) or, if his
claim was as a subrogee, his action based on fraudulent misrepresentation with
respect to the security provided may well have been outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement with the insured (whose shoes plaintiff stood in).
3. Subrogation: France
As noted by Fouchard & Gaillard, in cases where an insurer succeeds to the
right of an insured, the courts have "consistently held that the insurer is bound
by the arbitration agreement accepted by the insured from whom it derives its
rights."'' French courts have not hesitated in holding that, in the absence of a
provision to the contrary, the initial promisor accepts that it will be bound to
arbitrate against any eventual subrogee. Indeed, this logic has been applied not
only in the insurance context, but also where a bankrupt foreign company sold
its assets to a new third party,'62 and where a bank succeeded to the rights of the
beneficiary to a bill of exchange endorsed in its favor. 63 French law appears to
differ from the English or United States' position in that the "insured retains the
right to commence arbitration against the party with which it concluded an arbi-
tration agreement, and it will still have standing to take such actions if the in-
surer requires it to do so, or if the action is wholly or partially for its benefit."'6
Thus, it is not the complete subrogation that characterizes the common law
model. As noted by Girsberger & Hausmaninger, this exposes the promisor to
potential claims from both the promisee and the subrogor.'6 On the other hand,
it may allow a promisor claimant to pursue both promisee/subrigor and subro-
gee, thereby increasing the chance of recovery.
160. See MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 18.7.1.2., n.6.
161. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 714, (referring to Cass. Comm, May 13, 1966, Socidtd
d'approvisionnements textiles v. Compagnie de navigation 'Fraissinet et Cyprien Fable,' 1967 REV.
CRrr. DIp. 355).
162. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 719. (citing C.A. Paris, Oct 8, 1997, Solna International
AB v. SA Destouche, DALLOZ INFORMATIONS RAPIDES 233 (1997)).
163. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 719 (citing French Bank v. Indian Company, I.C.C. Case
No. 1704 (1977), 105 JOURNAL DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL 977 (1978)).
164. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 719 (citing I.C.C. Award No. 6733 (1992)).
165. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 138.
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4. Subrogation: International Law/Institutional Rules
While subrogation is not specifically dealt with in any of the international
agreements on model contract clauses, it has arisen in the context of interna-
tional law as applied by certain international arbitral tribunals. The UN Com-
pensation Commission to Administer Claims arising out of the Gulf War is au-
thorized to apply the "rules of international law" and its jurisprudence recog-
nizes a number of "international usages" and "general principles of law," includ-
ing subrogation.'66 Subrogation arguments have also been made in the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal.'67 Similarly, the claims of a subrogee insurer
failed in the same Tribunal where it could not prove that it was a true subrogee
so as to be entitled to the benefit of the US nationality of the original claimant.
68
5. Subrogation: Commentary
There is a broad consensus that subrogation involves the replacement of the
original contracting party/subrogor with the third party subrogee who can be in
no "better" position than the subrogor, and therefore is bound by any arbitration
agreement. This result is not surprising, as the non-signatory is simply picking
up the rights of the original contracting party. Thus, in the paradigm situation of
the subrogee insurer, it is clear that the insurer is bound by the arbitration
agreement and can enforce the arbitration agreement in the subrogor's name.
While the logic is unsurprising, the result is that the original promisor is
bound to arbitrate with a new party (or the old party as represented by its subro-
gee) even in the absence of consent and even though the promisor may well
have had no control over the contractual arrangements between the subrogor and
subrogee. The French justification is that the promisor has initially accepted the
possibility of arbitration with any future subrogee and in the typical case of in-
surance, this seems plausible as being within the range of foreseeable commer-
166. See B.G. Affaki, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Era in Claims
Settlements? 10 J. INT'L. ARB. 10, 21 (1993) (citing case law and the claim forms themselves as well
as I BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 483 n.7 (1981) (recog-
nizing subrogation as a general principle of law)).
167. See e.g., I.C.C.A. YEARBK. Vol. XXII, 1997, at 482-496, (citing Case 381 where equitable
subrogation claim failed because subrogation had not occurred before the relevant date which gave
the Tribunal jurisdiction).
168. Ocean-Air Cargo Claims Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award and Case No. 11429,
Dec. 15, 1989, I.C.C.A. YEARBK. Vol. XVI, 1991, at 377. This issue has become very controversial
in the context of arbitration claims brought pursuant to investment treaties. See e.g. The Loewen
Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, June 26, 2003, at 91t1220-240, available
at www.naftaclaims.com (finding no jurisdiction over Canadian corporate claimant where pursuant
to a bankruptcy reorganization it was reincorporated in the U.S. and also refusing to acknowledge
legitimacy of purported assignment of claim to a Canadian shell company).
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cial possibilities. Outside of insurance one can understand some hesitancy in
binding the promisor and/or subrogee to arbitrate.
Generally speaking, all three jurisdictions view subrogation as a "transfer"
of the subrogor's rights to the subrogee with the transfer governed as a matter of
contract law. Certainly in both France and the United States (and probably in
England), separate manifestation of an intent to be bound by the arbitration
agreement is not necessary as the arbitration agreement is a "condition prece-
dent" (Aasma) to the substantive claim being pursued. This can be justified on
the basis that the subrogee obtains only those rights of the subrogor (and must in
England pursue the claim in the subrogor's name).
There are, however, two qualifications to this. First, under French law, the
promisor can still bring a claim against the original promisee/subrogor, in addi-
tion to a claim brought against the subrogee. This is different from the position
in the United States and England (although this may depend on the extent of the
rights granted to the subrogee).
Second, where the non-signatory third party pursues a claim against the
original contracting party (usually an insurer) in circumstances in which the
original promisee (usually an insured) has become unavailable due to liquidation
etc., this has been termed "subrogation." While the English Charterers' Mutual
Assurance case achieved a similar result to that which would apply in a French
action directe, i.e. the third party is bound by the arbitration clause, it is sug-
gested that subrogation may not be the correct legal concept to apply. Rather,
this may better be analyzed as an application of the third party beneficiary prin-
ciple or reliance on the conceptually distinct rights accrued by invoking a direct
action statute. Recognizing this distinction helps explain those apparently in-
consistent cases in which United States courts have applied a direct action stat-
ute without also enforcing an arbitration provision contained in the underlying
insurance policy.169
169. See In re Talbott Bigfoot, Inc., 887 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying direct action
statute and stating that the federal policy favoring arbitration does not apply where the third party
was not contractually bound to arbitrate).
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C. Third Party Beneficiary Doctrine
1. Third Party Beneficiary: England
Until reforms enacted in 1999, English law adamantly refused to recognize
a general rule of contractual rights for the benefit of third parties. 17 ° Thus, the
quintessential statement of the supremacy of the privity doctrine is that of Vis-
count Haldane in Dunlop v. Selfridge, who referred to the fundamental principle
of English law "that only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it" and
that "English law knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio arising by way of
contract.''
However, the privity doctrine was the subject of much criticism and legisla-
tors and judges continuously extended the range of exceptions to it. Reform
efforts were attempted in 1937172 and 1965' but failed to be implemented.
Finally, in 1991 the Law Commission released a consultation paper 174 and, fol-
lowing public submissions, its 1996 final report: Privity of Contract: Contracts
for the Benefit of Third Parties, 175 which recommended implementing a statutory
right for third parties to enforce contractual benefits where such was the inten-
tion of the original contracting parties (hereinafter "Law Commission Report").
The Law Commission Report led to the drafting of a 1998 bill which was ulti-
mately enacted'76 as the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (hereinaf-
ter "C(RTP) Act 1999), which came into force on November 11, 1999 (al-
though, unless explicitly agreed, does not apply to contracts entered into before
May 11, 2000'..)
170. References are to England rather than to the United Kingdom as Scottish law has tradi-
tionally recognized the concept of jus quaesitum tertio. However the position in Wales and Ireland
is the same as that in England. See H.L. Hansard, 11 Jan. 1999, Cols. 26-27.
171. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd., [1915] A.C. 847 (HL).
172. THE LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, SIXTH INTERIM REPORT, 1937, CMD. 5449, cited in
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOETZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW - VOL. II: THE
INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 13, n.52 (trans. by Tony Weir 1987).
173. FIRST PROGRAM OF LAW REFORM, ITEMS ONE AND THREE, cited in THE LAW
COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER 121, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THIRD PARTIES § 1.43 (1991).
174. THE LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER 121, PRIvrrY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES (1991).
175. THE LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 242, PRivrry OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES (1996) (hereafter "LAW COMMISSION REPORT 242").
176. The Bill was introduced into the House of Lords on December 3, 1998, ultimately passed
by the House of Commons on November 1, 1999, passed in its amended form by the House of Lords
on November 10, 1999 and received the Royal Assent on November 11, 1999.
177. C (RTP) Act 1999, section 10.
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Arbitration and Third Party Beneficiaries: Pre-C(RTP) Act 1999
Prior to the C(RTP) Act 1999, the position of a third party beneficiary seek-
ing to enforce an arbitration clause to which it was not a party essentially re-
flected the general contract law position: strict enforcement of the doctrine of
privity with piecemeal exceptions. 78 Thus, arbitration would be compelled only
in limited circumstances such as where the third party was able to establish the
promisee contracted as his trustee179 or agent.180
Occasionally, parties were able to persuade courts to enforce an arbitration
clause which could have been justified on third party beneficiary principles.
Thus, in Northern Regional Health Authority181 (NRHA) the court had to resolve
an issue where there were separate arbitration agreements in a head contract
between NRHA and Crouch and a subcontract between Crouch and Crown. The
subcontract contained a poorly designed mechanism that entitled Crown to bring
arbitration proceedings against NRHA in relation to any dispute arising between
them but such arbitration was to be brought in Crouch's name. On a dispute
arising, Crown lodged an arbitration notice in Crouch's name. NRHA sought an
injunction on the basis that it was not a party to any arbitration agreement with
Crown. The Court of Appeal declined to grant the injunction, holding that even
though there was no privity between Crown and NRHA, Crown's only remedy
in the absence of arbitration would be to sue Crouch on the subcontract, seeking
a declaration that Crouch commence arbitral proceedings against NRHA in or-
der to obtain benefits due to Crown. This would amount to a "serious injustice"
as it ignored the "special arbitration machinery" that had been provided in both
contracts.1
8 2
The case relies heavily on the particular facts and the result essentially
rested on the basis of the "network of contracts" that existed between the three
parties."' However, this rather vague reasoning could have been avoided if the
third party beneficiary principle had been available. It seems likely all parties
intended for Crown to resolve any contractual dispute with NRHA by arbitra-
178. For a comprehensive list of "exceptions to or circumvention of" the privity doctrine, see
Law Commission Report, at §§ 2.8-2.62.
179. See, e.g., Lynch & Templeman v. Clemence, (1699) 1 Lutw. 571.
180. See, e.g., Fagan v. Harrison, (1849) 8 C.B. 383.
181. Northern Reg. Health Auth. v. Derek Crouch Const. Co. Ltd., [1994] 2 All E.R. 175.
182. Id. at 183.
183. The result may also be justified on the basis that the court was exercising its equitable
powers in considering an injunction application.
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tion.'" This case is an interesting example of the kind of "legal gymnastics" the
law required of courts faced with third party beneficiaries seeking to enforce a
contractual benefit by way of arbitration."i 5 It is therefore surprising that the
question of whether or not the C(RTP) Act 1999 should apply to arbitration
agreements became such a contentious topic.
Arbitration and the C(RTP) Act 1999: Legislative History
The Law Commission's initial 1991 Consultation Paper did not mention the
consequences of privity reform for arbitration. However, in response to submis-
sions, the Law Commission Report sought not only "to rectify that omission"
but also acknowledged that it was "one of the most difficult issues we have
faced in this project." '186
The Law Commission ultimately recommended that: "[a] third party shall
have no rights of enforceability under our proposed reform in respect of an arbi-
tration agreement or a jurisdiction agreement."' 7 The Commission used the
following rationale:
[S]uch agreements cannot operate satisfactorily unless any entitlement of the third party to
enforce the arbitration agreement carries with it a duty on the third party to submit to arbitra-
tion... Yet our reform is concerned only with conferring of rights and benefits on third par-
ties and not with the imposition of duties and burdens. In our view, a third party should in
general only be bound by an arbitration... agreement if it has agreed to be so bound in which
case it becomes a true contracting party to the agreement and is no longer a third party to
it.
188
The Law Commission Report records that the Committee was "originally at-
tracted by the idea that an arbitration agreement ... could operate as a procedural
benefit to the third party and could also constitute a procedural condition on the
third party's right to enforce the substantive benefit."'189 But it:
[R]eluctantly c[a]me to the view that arbitration and jurisdiction clauses must be seen as both
conferring rights and imposing duties and do not lend themselves to a splitting of the benefit
and the burden. Following on from that, one radical approach would be to bind the third
party to those agreements in respect of a dispute affecting a third party's rights as if he were a
184. Under the C(RTP) Act 1999, supra note 177, the court's inquiry would have been directed
more to this question. In this respect there is some evidence that the NRHA may have been able to
rebut the presumption of an intention to benefit, e.g., it was exempted from liability to subcontrac-
tors under the NRHA/Crouch head contract. There would also have been a question as to whether
Crown was sufficiently "identified" for the purposes of the Act.
185. This result might have also been obtainable by applying subrogation principles of the
broader sort seen in the insolvent employer/insurer cases. See e.g., Aasma v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut.
Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, Inc., 95 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1996).
186. LAw COMMISSION REPORT 121, supra note 175, at § 14.14.
187. Id. at § 14.19.
188. Id. at § 14.15.
189. Id. at §§ 14.16-17.
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party to them. While we have considered this possibility at length, we have ultimately re-
jected it essentially because it would contradict a central philosophy of our reform in that we
are concerned only with the conferring of rights, and not the imposition of duties on third par-
ties.
190
Despite this clear conclusion, during debate on the Bill's second reading,
Lord Wilberforce advised that the clause specifically excluding arbitration
clauses from the reach of the proposed legislation had been deleted from the
Bill.' 9' The justification given by the Lord Chancellor was that "on further re-
flection" the Law Commission had concluded:
Although in theory the third party might seek to rely on an arbitration clause to stay court
proceedings without being bound to arbitrate, in practice no stay would be granted by the
court unless he had shown willingness to go to arbitration. On that basis, the conclusion was
that there was no good reason to exclude these clauses from the operation of the reform.
192
This led to further debate when reporting back from the Committee stage.
The Lord Chancellor explained, that once the Law Commission had "[c]hanged
its mind and accepted that arbitration agreements should not be excluded ... [i]t
was then necessary to decide whether any amendment to the Bill was needed to
enable a third party to refer a dispute to arbitration."' 93 The key problem was
that the "third party is not a party to the arbitration agreement" for the purposes
of Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996, and thus the Bill was amended to "provide
that where a third party has the right under Clause 1 to refer a dispute to arbitra-
tion and chooses to do so, there shall be deemed to be an arbitration agreement
between himself and the promisor, so triggering Part I of the Arbitration Act."'94
At this stage the Law Commission made further amendments to extend to
arbitral tribunals the courts' powers to enforce benefits on behalf of third parties.
The Lord Chancellor also rejected amendments proposed by Lord Hacking that
would have expanded the obligations of a third party to rely on the arbitration
clause.' 95 The Lord Chancellor successfully opposed such amendments on the
basis that there should be:
190. Id. at § 14.18.
191. H.L. Hansard, 11 January 1999, Vol. 596, Cols. 27-28.
192. Id. at Col. 33.
193. H.L. Hansard, 27 May 1999, Vol. 601, Cols. 1058-1059.
194. Id. at Col. 1059. Note that it was arguable whether this was necessary given section 82(2),
Arbitration Act 1996 which provides that any reference to "a party to an arbitration agreement in-
cludes any person claiming under or through a party to the agreement" (emphasis added). See dis-
cussion infra at note 362 and accompanying text.
195. Id. at Col. 1053.
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[N]o question of the third party being bound to refer a dispute to arbitration. The proposed
amendment applies only in relation to a matter which the third party himself requires to be re-
ferred to arbitration. That is consistent with the Bill's purpose of conferring rights and bene-
fits on third parties (albeit that a benefit may be conditional) and not duties and burdens.1
96
Remarkably, this stands in stark contrast to the eventual form that the Act
took. It was not until the Bill's final reading in the House of Commons on No-
vember 1, 1999 that a last minute amendment passed, substantially rewriting the
arbitration provisions. A new clause was added (which became present section
8), which reads as follows:
(1) Where -
(a) a right under section 1 to enforce a term ("the substantive
term") is subject to a term providing for the submission of
disputes to arbitration ("the arbitration agreement"), and
(b) the arbitration agreement is an agreement in writing for the
purposes of Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996,
the third party shall be treated for the purposes of that Act as a
party to the arbitration agreement as regards disputes between
himself and the promisor relating to the enforcement of the sub-
stantive term by the third party.
(2) Where -
(a) a third party has a right under section 1 to enforce a term
providing for one or more descriptions of dispute between
the third party and the promisor to be submitted to arbitration
("the arbitration agreement"),
(b) the arbitration agreement is an agreement in writing for the
purposes of Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996, and
(b) the third party does not fall to be treated under subsection (1) as a
party to the arbitration agreement,
the third party shall, if he exercises the right, be treated for the
purposes of that Act as a party to the arbitration agreement in re-
lation to the matter with respect to which the right is exercised,
and be treated as having been so immediately before the exer-
cise of the right.'97
196. Id. at Col. 1059 (emphasis added).
197. Arbitration Act 1996, section 8.
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The Commission justified the changes on the basis that "concerns . . . were
raised during the recess [that] have made us examine the wording carefully."' 98
However, the amendments seem remarkably unclear in their scope and potential
application.
Arbitration and the C(RTP) Act 1999: Commentary
There has not yet been any reported judicial consideration of the effect of
the C(RTP) Act 1999 on arbitration and only limited commentary on the
C(RTP) Act 1999, largely discussing specific fields like insurance, reinsurance
and shipping law,"9 with very little analysis of the specific arbitration provi-
sions.2°° However, there are at least five points worth noting. First, section 8 of
the C(RTP) Act 1999 is unique in the Act in that it actually deems the third party
to be a "party to the contract." This is also in contrast to section 7(4) that spe-
cifically states that a "third party shall not.., be treated as a party to the con-
tract for the purposes of any other act...." This was presumably considered a
practical convenience so as to synchronize properly with the Arbitration Act
1996;, however, it does cut against the notion of the third party beneficiary as
enjoying only certain limited benefits (as opposed to being a "party" as could
only occur by way of novation, etc).
Second, the Arbitration Act 1996 offers no guidance on how the third party
should practically be treated. Questions such as how to deal with appointment
of arbitrators and the position of "consumer arbitration agreements" are left to
be sorted out either by contract draftspeople or by the courts.
Third, the "benefit" versus "burden" dichotomy has been rejected and re-
placed with a theory based on the English Court of Appeals' decision in Detlev
198. H.C. Hansard, 1 November 1999, Vol. 337, Col. 23.
199. See e.g., A.M. Bowyer, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill and Insurance, [1997] J.
BUILDING L. 230, 239; A. Salamat, Reform of Privity of Contract, in Mealey Litigation Reports:
INSURANCE INSOLVENCY 11 (1999); D. Arthur & S. Phippard, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
Act - Implications for Insurers, ANDREWS INT'L. REINSURANCE DiSp. REP. Vol. 4, No. 17, 3 (Febru-
ary 11, 2000). More recently, see Rizvan Khawar, Reinsurance and Privity in the Past, Present and
Future: Privity of Contract in Reinsurance and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 77
TUL. L. REv. 495 (2002); Tony Vlasto and Julian Clark, The Effect of the Contracts (Rights of Third
Parties) Act 1999 on Voyage and Time Charter Parties, 25 TUL. MAR. L.J. (2001).
200. See Philip Wright, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill - What Impact on Arbitration
Clauses? 2(4) INT'L ARB. L. REV. 137-139 (1999) (however the article apparently predates the final
Act). More recently, see Tanya Melnyk, The Extent to Which Non-Contracting Parties Can Be
Encouraged or Compelled to take Part in Arbitral Proceedings - The English (Arbitration Act 1996)
Perspective, INT. ARB. L. REV., 6(2), 59 at 60 (2003); Rizvan Khawar, supra at note 199, at 503.
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von Appen.20 There, Lord Justice Hobhouse upheld the validity of an arbitration
clause included in an assigned contract thereby requiring the assignee to submit
its dispute to arbitration. His Lordship rejected counsel's argument that this
amounted to an assignment of a burden on the assignee. He stated:
The burden of the contract was not transferred. The [third party] came under no actionable
liability to the [promisors]. In my judgement this argument fails to understand the nature of
the equitable remedy which is being sought in this action. The simplest way in which to illus-
trate this is to take a simple analogy. If the assignee of a legal right in action seeks to enforce
that right against the debtor without taking into account an equitable set-off which the debtor
was entitled to raise against the assignor, the debtor's remedy... would have been to apply in
the Chancery Court of Chancery for an injunction to restrain the assignee from asserting the
common law right... unless and until he recognized the equitable right of the debtor.
20 2
The Explanatory Notes to the C(RTP) Act 1999 state that section 8(1) is based
on a "conditional benefit approach," meaning that "[iut ensures that a third party
who wishes to take action to enforce a substantive right is not only able to en-
force effectively his right to arbitrate, but is also 'bound' to enforce his right by
arbitration." 203 "Thus the "conditional benefit" supposedly mitigates against the
original concern not to impose a "burden" on the third party.24
Section 8(2) is justified on the basis that it is necessary where the "condi-
tional benefit approach" does not apply, e.g. where the third party is given a
unilateral right to arbitrate in the agreement or the right to arbitrate a dispute
other than one concerning a right conferred on a third party for the purposes of
subsection 1. Again, to overcome the perceived problem of imposing a "pure
burden," the subsection requires a third party to have chosen to exercise the right
before it is so bound.2 °5
Fourth, there are several major uncertainties about the scope of section 8.
For example, despite the Law Commission's avowed concerns about the scope
of the "intention" inquiry,2°6 there is no separate intention test in section 8.
Thus, the arbitration obligation is presumably automatically transferred with the
substantive benefit based only on the intention test for the substantive right con-
201. Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 279.
202. Id. at 286. However, that case involved the Court exercising its equitable jurisdiction and
it is questionable whether this is a sound basis for a general contract rule.
203. Explanatory Notes to C(RTP) Act 1999 at § 34.
204. Id. The Explanatory Notes further explain that "[t]o avoid imposing a "pure" burden on
the third party, it does not cover, for example, a separate dispute in relation to a tort claim by the
promisor against the third party for damages." Id.
205. Id. In this respect it follows the same questionable logic as the United States line of
authority in Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996).
206. See LAW COMMISSION REPORT 242, supra note 175, at § 4.18-4.19 (expressing concern
that the expansive "intention to benefit" test in the United States has failed to provide consistent
results and, even where limited to intention expressed within the agreement, has not been consis-
tently applied).
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ferred by section 1(2).207 This may undermine the traditional requirement of
consent to arbitrate. Further, there is no explicit mention whether the promisee
is also bound to arbitrate in a position where a dispute arises between the pro-
misee and the third party. Similarly, it is unclear whether subsection (1) is also
intended to apply where the claim is brought by the promisor against the third
party (a distinction United States case law clearly draws). In short, much has
been left to the courts to develop. In so doing, it will be interesting to see to
what extent these issues are resolved by reference to analogous laws in other
jurisdictions.
Finally, one might suggest that the concerns about extending the C(RTP)
Act to arbitration originally expressed by both the Law Commission and the
House of Lords arise from a traditional English reticence to "oust the jurisdic-
tion of the courts."' 8 It is only in this light that one can understand characteriz-
ing the arbitration agreement as a "burden." However, in a situation where the
third party obtains statutory recognition of its contractual benefit only where it
has consented to it, it seems only reasonable that enforcing the benefit is condi-
tional on using the dispute resolution mechanism contemplated by the parties in
the contract.
2. Third Party Beneficiary: United States
Since the 1859 case of Lawrence v. Fox recognized that, despite the priv-
ity doctrine, a third party beneficiary of a contract is entitled to sue on the con-
tract to obtain performance, the United States common law has developed in a
direction decidedly different from that of England. Third party recovery on a
contract is now accepted in all states. 2'0 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
§§302 and 304 seeks to emphasizes the distinction between "intended" benefici-
207. As to the distinction between the intention vis A vis the substantive right and the arbitra-
tion agreement see supra notes 126 and 118; and infra note 266 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping, 126 F.2d at 982-985 (summarizing the English history of
judicial antagonism towards arbitration clauses). In fact, the same concern with preventing access to
the courts is evidenced in at least one commentator's suggestion that the C(RTP) Act 1999 arbitra-
tion provisions might be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. See LAW
COMMISSION REPORT 242, supra note 175, § 4.18, n.26. However, this seems unlikely to be correct
and, as required by law, the responsible Minister confirmed that the legislation was not in conflict
with the Convention. See e.g. HL Bill 5-EN, note prepared by Lord Chancellor's Department.
209. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (N.Y. 1859).
210. See KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 79, at 1200 (noting Massachusetts was the
last to adopt the rule and citing Chote, Hall and Steward v. SCA Services, Inc., 392 N.E.2d 1045
(Mass. 1979)).
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aries (who enjoy a direct right of action) and "incidental" beneficiaries (who do
not).2" Section 302 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and pro-
misee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended bene-
ficiary if... a right to performance in the beneficiary
is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties
and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy
an obligation of the promisee to pay money
to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of
the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not
an intended beneficiary.212
Two factors arising out of this statement of general contract law are especially
relevant in the arbitration context. First, a third party beneficiary need not be the
intended beneficiary at the time of the contract commencement, nor must the
promisee be motivated solely by its desire to bestow a benefit on the third
party.2"3 Second, the question of whether the third party was an intended benefi-
ciary may be determined by examining both the writing itself as well as the sur-
rounding circumstances known to the parties.214
Some courts 2 5 have stated that third party beneficiary status does not, by it-
self, create a right to enforce an arbitration clause.216 Rather, one must establish
that the contracting parties "intended for the defendants to have the benefit of
the arbitration clause."2 7 This may be established by the express language of
211. Id.
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979).
213. Cited in the arbitration context in Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1465,
1469 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (citing Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 941 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
214. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 79, at 1200.
215. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acknowledge that many of the cases men-
tioned in this section are between domestic parties rather than "international parties. '21 5 However,
there is no general reason that these cases are any less applicable to international commercial arbitra-
tion, except to the extent that the Federal Arbitration Act's pro-arbitration policy applies "with
special force in the field of international commerce." See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985). Furthermore, third party issues are as likely to arise in the
international commercial arena as in the domestic. See e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen
Maschinen & Anlagen GmBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000) (international sale of goods); Morewitz,
62 F.3d at 1356 (international insurance).
216. Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1465, 1469 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
217. Price v. Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987).
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the agreement itself. Thus in Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court held that
a brokerage firm (Interstate/Johnson) was entitled to compel arbitration of a
dispute with its former employee (Gilmer) on the basis of Gilmer's application
for registration with the New York Stock Exchange, which included an obliga-
tion to arbitrate disputes arising out of his brokerage activities. 2 8  Thus, the
broad wording of the arbitration provision was clearly intended to include third
party beneficiaries such as Interstate/Johnson.
However, the relevant inquiry has been expressed in broader terms than
this. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in Prudential:
The identification of the parties bound by the agreement to arbitrate need not be confined to
the limited inquiry of identifying the signatories to the arbitration agreement. Rather, the dis-
positive finding is an ".express' and 'unequivocal'" agreement between parties to arbitrate
their disputes. Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago Inc. 19 F.3d 1503 (3d Cir. 1994)...
As this court has previously recognized, "a variety of non-signatories of arbitration agree-
ments have been held to be bound by such agreements under ordinary common law contract
and agency principles." Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 752, F.2d 923, 938,
(1985) ... Indeed, courts have been willing to apply third party beneficiary law in examining
the contractual standing of a non-signatory party to a dispute, provided there is an expression
of the requisite intent between the third party and the plaintiff to arbitrate their claims. See
McPheeters v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 953 F.2d 771,772-73 (2d. Circ. 1992).219
Thus, the Court examined the relevant security industry registration application
forms "[tlo see if there is an express and unequivocal intent that the plaintiffs
would arbitrate their claims" against the defendant and whether "both parties to
the contract express an intention to benefit the third party in the contract it-
self."'22 The relevant clause was drafted in wide terms to require arbitration
with "any other person" where the claim would be subject to arbitration under
the NASD Code. The plaintiff employees fell within the Code, which in turn
required arbitration of disputes "between or among members and/or associated
persons". Therefore, the Court concluded there was "clear and unequivocal
intent to arbitrate claims with third parties" such as the defendant.21
While both Gilmer and Prudential involved finding the requisite intent in
background documents and both required a relatively high test of a "clear and
unequivocal" intent to arbitrate, there are myriad other precedents that have
accepted less "unequivocal" evidence. Indeed, the FAA's pro-arbitration policy
has at times been invoked as a kind of "reverse onus," i.e., the party seeking to
218. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991).
219. In re Prudential Ins. of Am. Sales Prac. Litig., 133 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1998).
220. Id. at 229.
221. Id. at 230.
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deny arbitration was forced to prove that no intent to create a third party benefi-
ciary of the arbitration clause existed.
Thus, in Collins,22 the defendants (IDQ and ADQC) sought to compel arbi-
tration against the sub-franchisee plaintiffs on the basis of an arbitration clause
contained in the sub-franchise agreements (to which they were not signatories).
The Court had to deal with variations in the wording used in the different sub-
franchise agreements. In respect of the agreements that contained an arbitration
clause stating that disputes between the franchisee, sub-franchisor, and the sub-
franchisee were to be arbitrated, the Court found that "the language indicates
clearly and unambiguously that the sub-franchisees did not intend the arbitration
provisions to apply to the defendants." '223 However, relying on the marginally
different wording in the other sub-franchise agreements which referred simply to
disputes "between the parties," the Court found the defendants entitled to invoke
the arbitration clause as third party beneficiaries:
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the benefits conferred upon defendants by the subfranchise
agreements and the repeated references to ADQ throughout the body of the agreements, the
court cannot hold that the agreement to arbitrate disputes "between the parties hereto" has the
necessary precision and unambiguity to clearly indicate that the [subfranchisors] and the
subfranchisees did not intend for ADQ to benefit from it. The language used in the arbitration
provisionfails to demonstrate clearly and unambiguously a specific intention by the subfran-
chisees that the benefits of arbitration "arising under, out of, in connection with or in relation
to" the subfranchise agreement was limited to disputes with the [subfranchisors]. Conse-
quently, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, the courts holds that the defendants
are entitled to invoke the mandatory arbitration clauses in those subfranchise agreements
which make reference to disputes "between the parties hereto" without any additional limiting
language.
224
The appropriateness of this "reverse onus" has been criticized by others22. and is
discussed below.
2 26
Indeed, courts have been willing to lower the threshold of intent considerably.
In Spear, Leeds & Kellogg,227 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the District Court's finding that the plaintiff insurance companies were
not entitled to compel arbitration of their tort claims against a brokerage house
(SLK) concerning the fraud of one of their policy holders who had maintained
an account at SLK. The insurers sought to enforce an arbitration clause con-
tained in the New York Stock Exchange Rules (although they were not mem-
bers). The majority concluded:
222. Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1465 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
223. Id. at 1471.
224. Id. at 1471 (emphasis added).
225. See e.g., Jeff DeArman, Resolving Arbitration's Nonsignatory Issue: A Critical Analysis
of the Application of Equitable Estoppel in Alabama Courts 29 CUMB. L. REV. 645, 656 (1999).
226. See generally infra Section V.C.
227. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life Assur. Co., 85 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Although the trial court held that the defendants failed to show a transactional nexus between
themselves and plaintiffs sufficient to warrant arbitration ... defendants' lack of direct con-
tact with the plaintiff does not prevent them from asserting their rights as third party benefici-
aries. While identification of a beneficiary may help resolve whether he is an intended or in-
cidental beneficiary, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts §308 ... a beneficiary need not
be identified prior to seeking enforcement of its rights under a contract...
Neither a transactional nexus between plaintiff and defendants, nor identification of these
specific defendants as third party beneficiaries, is required to compel [SLK] to arbitrate a dis-
pute in accordance with NYSE procedures.
228
The minority dissent strongly criticized the majority's approach. 29 Cer-
tainly, the third party was beyond the reasonable contemplation of SLK as an
intended beneficiary of the arbitration provision; indeed SLK had no reason
even to know of the insurance policy. The dissent suggests that even where
there is a broadly-worded arbitration provision some kind of "limitation"
thereon is required in "the form of either a direct contract between the parties, or
a relationship between the parties, such that they stand in the [same] chain of
commerce."
230
Thus, as MacNeil, Speidel & Stipanowich have stated, where the third party
is an intended beneficiary of the arbitration clause, it is required to arbitrate any
disputes it has respecting its rights under the contract. 23 The authors suggest the
"position of a beneficiary is comparable to that of an assignee after knowledge
of the assignment by the obligor" and, as such, the beneficiary's "right, like that
of an assignee, is subject to limitations inherent in the contract, and supervening
defenses arising by virtue of its terms. ' 23 2 This may either mean that the third
party brings its claim by way of a reference to arbitration (e.g. SLK above) or it
sues and is forced by the signatory to go to arbitration as a "defensive" meas-
ure.
233
However, where the third party was intended to take the benefit of the arbi-
tration clause, it is not required to arbitrate claims against it. The same authors
state:
228. Id. at 27.
229. Id. at 29-43.
230. Id. at 43.
231. MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 18.7.213.
232. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 309, cmt. c).
233. See, e.g., Ex parte Dyess, 709 So. 2d 447 (Ala. 1997) (requiring claimant injured while
test driving a car to arbitrate with defendant car dealer's insurer based on arbitration clause in
dealer/insurer's arbitration policy where insurer refused to pay out to dealer) (claimant's claim was
premised on the insurance policy and a "[p]arty may not pick and choose the provisions of the policy
that he wants to follow." Id. at 450).
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Under well-understood general contract law a party acquires no obligations under a contract
simply by being a third-party beneficiary. Thus, the mere status of the third-party beneficiary
imposes no duty to arbitrate, although... doing so is a condition to the third-party benefici-
ary's enforcing its rights. 'The conduct of the beneficiary however, like that of any obligee,
may give rise to claims and defenses which may be asserted against him by the obligor, and
his right may be affected by the terms of an agreement made by him.' [citing Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, §309 cmt. c). Thus, in circumstances where a third-party beneficiary
acquires obligations under a contract and not merely rights subject to conditions, under gen-
eral contract law those obligations include that of arbitration.
234
The authors' distinction between "obligations" and "rights subject to conditions"
is highly ambiguous. As will be discussed below,235 the courts often avoid this
conceptual problem by instead jumping to an argument that a non-signatory is
"estopped" from denying the applicability of the arbitration agreement.236 This
is an unsatisfactory outcome because it leaves a third party unsure of how to
respond to preserve its rights without incurring the "burden" of an arbitration
agreement. 
237
As a final comment, courts and commentators have been wary to extend the
third party beneficiary principle to "innovative" arguments. Two international
arbitration examples will suffice. First, in Recold,23 s the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit rejected an attempt by a manufacturer (Recold) to compel
arbitration of litigation brought by a purchaser (Monfort) in reliance on an arbi-
tration clause contained in the contract between Recold and its distributor (Cen-
tral Ice). Monfort's action depended upon a Colorado statute which permitted
direct action on a seller's warranty (i.e., the privity bar is removed). Recold
argued that Monfort, as the statutory beneficiary of the seller's warranty under
the Colorado statute, was bound by the arbitration provision contained in the
Recold/Central Ice contract. Further, it alleged the agreement arose out of a
"legal relationship" for the purposes of Article II of the New York Convention
and as such the FAA required the litigation to be stayed. The Court rejected the
claim on the basis that the Colorado Code "does not require Monfort to sue un-
der the Recold/Central Ice contract, but rather gives Monfort warranty rights
against Recold independently of any contract . . . the [FAA] does not require
parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do SO. ' ' 23  However, it is seri-
ously questionable whether this situation is any different from the "direct ac-
234. MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 18.7.214.
235. See generally Section IH.D and infra notes 293 and 298 and accompanying text.
236. See Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d at 349; Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 417-418.
237. See Int'l Paper Co., id. (situation in which the non-signatory plaintiff faced a "Catch 22"
of being estopped if it asserted its rights against defendant in any forum).
238. Recold, SA de CV (Mexico) v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. (US), 893 F.2d 195 (8d Cir.
1990), I.C.C.A. YEARBK. Vol. XVII, 1992, at 610.
239. Id. at §§ 12-13, citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
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tion" statutes which allow plaintiffs to bring an action against insurers2 ° and on
which there is (inconsistent) case law that the third party plaintiff "is no less
bound by the arbitration clause than the insured would have been.,
241
Second, in the Pavel Dybenko,242 one of two plaintiffs (CVV) sought an or-
der compelling Novorossiysk to arbitrate in London on the basis that CVV was
entitled to bring such action as a third party beneficiary to the charter party be-
tween the other plaintiff (CISA) and Novorossiysk. The District Court had re-
fused to entertain such argument because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on
the basis that Novorossiysk was a sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals ac-
cepted CVV's argument that if it were a third party beneficiary it would be enti-
tled to rely on the exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act which pro-
vides for waiver of sovereignty where a sovereign or state trading entity (within
the definition) has agreed to arbitrate its dispute.
3. Third Party Beneficiary: France
French jurisprudence provides yet another variation on the third party bene-
ficiary principle. The following is a very "broad-brush" summary of the general
contract law position before discussing the somewhat complex situation in arbi-
tration law.
Articles 1165 of the Code Civil reads, "Agreements only take effect as be-
tween the contracting parties: they do not impose any burdens on third parties
and they only benefit them in the case foreseen by Article 1121." Article 1121
in turn provides that "One may also in the same way stipulate for the benefit of a
third party when such is the condition of the stipulation that one makes for one-
self or the gift which one makes for another. The person who has made that
stipulation may not revoke it if the third party has declared that he wishes to
benefit from it.243
However, from what appears to be a strict version of the privity doctrine in
Article 1165 and a narrow exception in Article 1121, French courts have devel-
oped a very broad and flexible doctrine recognizing third party beneficiary
rights. Zweigert & Koetz state:
240. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
241. Heikkila v. Sphere Drake Ins. Underwriting Mgmt., Ltd., No. Civ. 96-0047, 1997 WL
995625, at *8 (Aug. 29, 1997 D. Guam). Also cited in Powell, 988 P.2d at 15.
242. Cargill Int'l S.A. & Cargill P.V. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko & Novorossiysk Shipping Co.,
991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993).
243. Translation from PVD MARSH, COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW ENGLAND, FRANCE,
GERMANY 272 (1994).
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Under Art. 1121 the 'stipulation au promis d'un tiers' is only valid if the person who prom-
ises to render performance to the third party simultaneously promises something to the other
contractor as well, or if the contracting party makes the promisor some gift in connection with
the transaction... nowadays, however, it is established that a contract for the benefit of third
parties may be perfectly valid even if these requirements are not satisfied. The performance
which the promisee must make to the promisor under Art. 1121 need no longer be a gift: any
economic transfer will suffice, and the alternative requirement of the Code, that the promisee
must at the time of the contract always stipulate something for himself, has been understood
by the courts as being satisfied if any 'profit moral' accrues to him as a result of the transac-
tion.
244
As to the jurisprudential justification for this, the authors state:
With regard to the theoretical explanation of the 'stipulation pour autnmi' even the modem
French textbooks follow the old doctrines to the effect that the beneficiary is a fictive as-
signee of the promisee's right or that the beneficiary ratifies the unauthorized agency... of
the promisee in undertaking the matter on his behalf. All these theories are now of merely
historical interest; it is no longer necessary to refer to other institutions of law since it is sim-
ply admitted that it is a practical necessity that the beneficiary acquire a direct claim in his
245
own name.
For the purposes of comparison, note that French case law establishes that
the stipulation pour autrui may be "implied" and this has been given a wide
interpretation.246 Similarly, the wide interpretation given to a stipulation pour
autrui permits a claimant under French law to bring an action in contract where
English law may, if at all, direct an action in tort.
2 47
Professor Jean-Louis Goutal specifically considered the stipulation pour
autrui in the arbitration context in the "L'arbitrage et les tiers" symposium.24
While Professor Goutal's discussion of "les problkmes de relativit" (roughly
equivalent to the privity doctrine) provides an interesting jurisprudential analy-
sis, French courts have superceded his work by the more recent pragmatic ap-
proach to such "probl~mes." Fouchard & Gaillard summarize the position:
The arbitration agreement binds only those parties that have entered into it. However, a party
need not be physically present in order to be bound - an arbitration agreement can be entered
into by an agent or, more generally, by any form of representation ... In contrast, a stipula-
tion in favor of a third party does not entail representation, and the beneficiary of that provi-
sion will therefore only be bound if it subsequently agrees to the specified method of dispute
resolution... similarly, a party guaranteeing an obligation arising from a contract containing
an arbitration clause, will not be bound by that clause, unless it can be established from other
244. ZWEIGERT & KoETz, supra note 172, at 148.
245. Id. at 149.
246. MARSH, supra note 243, at 277-278, citing an (unnamed) case in which a traveler on a
train killed in an accident was held to have impliedly stipulated for the benefit of his widow and
children that they could recover damages directly from the railway company. Cass. Civ. 6 Decem-
ber 1932, GP 1933.1.269.
247. See generally, MARSH, supra note 243 (referring to the "building inspector" type of
cases).
248. J. L. Goutal, Le droit des contrats, in ARBITRAGE, supra note 31, at 439, 447-449.
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circumstances that the parties' true intention in drawing up the guarantee was that the guaran-
tor - often the parent company - would be a party to the arbitration agreement.
249
Thus, French arbitration law is less concerned with finding the legal ingre-
dients for a "benefit" and more concerned with giving effect to the intentions of
the parties. Indeed, a stipulation pour autrui will not bind a third party to arbi-
trate unless she otherwise accepts the arbitration agreement. This is a position
broadly similar to that of the United States.
Unlike the United States, French courts have gone further, essentially obvi-
ating the need for a rule regarding the arbitration clause vis-d-vis the third party
beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui. A cogent example of this pragmatism is
the Paris Court of Appeals' decision in V2000 (formerly Jaguar France) v. Ren-
ault.5 In discussing the case, Fouchard & Gaillard state:
Aside from any representation mechanism, difficulties may arise in determining the exact
scope of an arbitration agreement wherever a contract has been entirely or partially negotiated
or performed by a party that did not actually sign the contract. In such cases, arbitrators, as
well as the French courts, have developed the approach that such involvement can raise the
presumption that the contracting parties' true intention was that the non-signatory party
would be bound by the arbitration agreement. Thus, a long line of similar decisions led to the
rule of the Paris Court of Appeals, in the 1994 V2000 case that: "In international arbitration
law, the effects of the arbitration clause extend to parties directly involved in the performance
of the contract, provided that their respective situations and activities raise the presumption
that they were aware of the existence and scope of the arbitration clause so that the arbitrator
can consider all economic and legal aspects of the dispute.
25 1
While Fouchard & Gaillard suggest that this type of problem usually arises
only in situations involving groups of companies and state owned entities, the
logic of the approach has much broader implications. Essentially, the V2000
doctrine is an invitation to the tribunal or court, in deciding whether or not to
bind a third party to arbitration, to investigate any entity "involved in the per-
formance of the contract" (thereby necessitating analysis of "all economic and
legal aspects of the dispute") so as to interpret whether the parties intended to so
bind the third party.
However, V 2000 deserves closer attention. Essentially, the French courts
declined jurisdiction to hear a suit brought by the French purchaser of a car from
an English company where the purchaser was also suing the French distributor.
There was an arbitration provision in the purchase agreement between the Eng-
249. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 498, at 280 (citations omitted).
250. C.A. Paris, Dec. 7 1994, V2000 (formerly Jaguar France) v. Renault, REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 245 (1996); affirmed Cass. le civ., May 21, 1997, Renault v. V2000 (formerly Jaguar
France), REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 537 (1997) (hereafter "V2000").
251. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, § 499, at 281 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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lish company and the French purchaser, but the French distributor was not a
party. The Court declined jurisdiction on the basis that the arbitration agreement
was valid and enforceable qua both the English manufacturer and the French
distributor. Fouchard & Gaillard's commentary on the case may slightly over-
state its potential for application. On a closer reading of the Court of Appeals'
decision, the Court also made the alternative finding that the French distributor
was a "co-contractante" and therefore directly interested in the litigation.252
Nevertheless, the alternative finding based on international arbitration law
is still a sweeping mandate to include third parties as bound by, or entitled to
rely on, arbitration clauses. Surprisingly, commentators have accepted this re-
sult without criticism. Professor Jarrosson's note on V2000 simply states that it
is now well established that the arbitration agreement can be extended to "par-
ties directement impliqudes dans l'exdcution du contrats" 3  This particular
aspect was not discussed in the subsequent appeal and has similarly not been the
focus of these commentaries. 254 Fouchard & Gaillard also note a similar case
where the supplier of the main contract had assigned the contract.255 The
Court's approach in V 2000 has subsequently been extended to a situation where
a contract had been circulated amongst parties and an oral agreement reached
but one of the parties had not signed it.256 The court held that the non-signatory
was bound to the agreement to arbitrate.
Fouchard & Gaillard draw a passing analogy between the V2000 line of
cases and the equitable estoppel approach of the United States courts. 257 How-
ever, while both share the same focus on intent and permit a broad inquiry in
this respect, the equitable estoppel doctrine (when properly applied) has the
fundamental difference that it operates only to prevent a party from denying
jurisdiction to arbitrate; it is not the basis for jurisdiction. This is discussed
below. 251
252. V2000, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 249-250 (1997).
253. Id. at 254.
254. See FOUCHARD, supra note 11, Note, REVUE DE L'ARBrrRAGE 545 (1998); Gaillard, Note,
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 538 (1997); Horchani, Note, REVUE DE L'ARBrrRAGE 222 (1998) (criticiz-
ing failure to extend the concept into a contemporaneous case involving foreign investment and
insurance law).
255. C.A. Paris, Oct 26 1995, SNCFr v. Voith, REVUE DE L'ARBrrRAGE 553 (1997) cited in
FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at 282 n.187.
256. C.A. Paris, le C, 8 June 1995, Sarl Centro Stoccaggio Grani v. Societ6 Granit, REVUE DE
L'ARBrrRAGE 83 (1997).
257. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at n.187 (citing Deloitte NorauditAS, 9 F.3d at 1060).
258. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
526
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4. Third Party Beneficiary: International Law/Institutional Rules
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has recognized a claimant's right to enforce a
contract as a third party beneficiary. 259  In contrast, in Ocean-Air Cargo
Claims, 2 ° the Tribunal held that a third party beneficiary could only enforce a
contract if that was the parties' intention and that no such intention was evi-
denced on the present facts where the claim was brought by a subsequent in-
surer.
5. Third Party Beneficiary: Commentary
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the general contractual third party bene-
ficiary concept is that all three jurisdictions started from a similar jurisprudential
understanding of the principle of alteri stipulari potest, but then each took a
dramatically different route to avoid its "unjust" consequences before finally
(and remarkably recently in the case of England) reaching a broadly similar
position. The trend in all three jurisdictions is towards greater recognition of
third party beneficiary rights and application of a test which has at its touchstone
the "intention" of the parties. This general trend seems to hold true also on the
question of whether or not the third party is bound to an arbitration clause, i.e. if
the party is able to enforce the contractual benefit then it is also bound by the
arbitration clause unless this is inconsistent with the parties' intentions.
However, when one begins to examine the details of the practical applica-
tion of the doctrine in the arbitral context, real differences (and uncertainties)
emerge. Consider a simple hypothetical in which manufacturer A licences dis-
tributor B to sell to retailer C. An arbitration clause to resolve "all disputes aris-
ing out of this contract" exists in the distributorship agreement between A and B
but no such clause exists in the sale agreement between B and C.261 In the
United States, C will be able to compel arbitration against A, inter alia, if it can
establish that it was an intended beneficiary and (in some circuits) if the dispute
can broadly be characterized as involving the distributorship agreement. A
cannot compel arbitration against C for any claims it has unless C brings a claim
(or presumably a counter-claim) involving the distributorship agreement.262 In
259. Land Serv. Inc. v. The Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 135-331-1, at 16-
7, reprinted in 6 IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL REP. 160-161.
260. Ocean-Air Cargo Claims Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 11429, re-
printed in I.C.C.A. YEARBK VOL. XVI 1991, at 377-380.
261. One should assume that the transaction is "international."
262. This conclusion is subject to the estoppel discussion below.
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England, relying on the narrower test in the C(RTP) Act 1999 it is less likely
that A or C will be able to establish C as an intended beneficiary so as to trigger
the Act.2 63 In France, at least on the authority of the V2000 decision, it seems
likely that C would be bound by the agreement on the basis that it is directly
involved in performance of the distributorship agreement (as supported by eco-
nomic and legal aspects of the dispute). In deciding the matter, the tribunal or
court would also have a different focus. For example, the nature of the substan-
tive dispute (i.e. the legal basis for the claim) would be of little or no relevance
in France, of some relevance (in some jurisdictions) in the United States and
would be decisive in England264 (in as much as it automatically triggers the arbi-
tration obligation).
Another important distinction is the extent to which a focus on the intention
to bind the beneficiary to the arbitration provision is a separate question from
the intention of the parties to bind the beneficiary to the agreement as a whole.
From the doctrinal stand point of separability it seems that these are separate
issues. Yet in England the statutory test simply applies the arbitration provision
where the substantive right is extended to the third party (s8(l)) including the
intention to benefit the third party thereby (sl(2)). This is inconsistent with
other English precedents, for example in the bill of lading context, which treat
the arbitration agreement as a "collateral contract. ' 265 In the United States,
courts have generally focused on intention to extend the arbitration agreement
only (e.g. by focusing on the wording of the arbitration clause, as in Gilmer,
Prudential and Collins), but one commentator has acknowledged that the sepa-
rability doctrine is hard to maintain because the "factual and conceptual nexus
between the arbitration clause and the principal contract is ... sometimes diffi-
cult to overlook. ' 266 Moreover, the application of the separability doctrine is
undermined by those courts which pursue a "reverse onus" test of intent. Par-
ticularly where the "scope" of the arbitration clause determines intent (con-
founding subject matter scope with intended party scope, as in Spear, Leeds &
Kellogg). In France, the separability distinction is consciously collapsed by
undertaking the broad V2000 "intention" test, but including as evidence such
factors as economic interconnectedness, etc.
263. This is especially true if a restricted interpretation of the identification requirement is
taken.
264. Of course, the result in each of the jurisdictions is likely to be influenced by factual mat-
ters not included in this simplified hypothetical, especially the other terms of both agreements.
265. See Aughton Ltd. v. M.F. Kent Services Ltd. 57 BUILDING LAW REP. 1 (1991).
266. JACK J. COE, JR, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 133 (1997) (citing, for general confusion over the doctrine,
Filanto SpA v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1239 (S.D.N.Y 1992)) (also citing, as an
example of the principle being undermined in the context of the third party beneficiary rule,
McPheeters v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 953 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1992)). See also Spear, Leeds &
Kellogg v. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (majority willing to consider broader
business relationship as relevant to intention to bind third party beneficiary).
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A final important difference is the test for the "designation" requirement
(i.e. the third party must be adequately designated) in the English Act as a limit
on its potential application in international commercial arbitration. However
there is still room for movement within the confines of this limitation. For ex-
ample, the Law Commission's Report recommends that the third party must be
"capable of being ascertained with certainty at the time when the promisor's
duty to perform in the third party's favor arises, or when a liability against
which the provision seeks to protect the third party is incurred." '267 While similar
provisions have been interpreted restrictively elsewhere, 2" United States doc-
trine has been wholly unconstrained on this point such that designation is of
relatively little concern in applying the more general intention test.
269
However, these differences should not be overstated. As seen by the Eng-
lish legislator's conversion to the need to include arbitration provisions within
the C(RTP) Act 1999,270 there is a general recognition that third party beneficiar-
ies must have a co-requisite obligation to accept arbitration as the chosen dispute
resolution mechanism. In the United States, exceptions to this general trend
seem to appear only in "special" circumstances such as where the benefit arises
by statute (e.g. Recold). The challenge is to fashion a third party beneficiary
principle flexible enough to overcome the injustices wrought by the strict appli-
cation of the privity doctrine but certain enough to permit efficient allocation of
risk within the relevant contracts. Greater clarity in the application of the third
party beneficiary principle - and resisting the temptation to rely on the vagaries
of estoppel - should provide parties with sufficient information to address the
position of the third party and its relationship to the dispute resolution clause
within the confines of the contracts at issue.
D. Estoppei/Equitable Estoppel
While arguably conceptually different from the purely contract-based prin-
ciples already discussed, this legal theory deserves discussion here because it is
broadly applied in the United States in the non-signatory arbitration scenario and
267. THE LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 242, PRivrrY OF CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES, §§ 8.17-8.18, at 100 (1996).
268. See Rattrays Wholesale Ltd. v. Meredyth Young & A'Court [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 363 (H.C.
of New Zealand) discussed in Brian Coote, Of Nominees, Specific Performance, Subjective Belief
and Things, 4 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 44 (1998); James Hosking, Nominees Under the Contracts (Privity)
Act 1982: A Reply to Professor Coote, 4 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 197 (1998); Brian Coote, Nominees Under
the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982: A Response, 5 N.Z. Bus. L.Q. 3 (1999).
269. See generally ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Part 5, §781, at 70-75 (1971).
270. Id. See Section 1I.C.1, supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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in fact has been characterized by some commentators as a "potential alternative
to consent" as the foundation for a binding arbitration agreement. 271 However,
this characterization is disputed. Indeed, Speidel suggests that in the leading
United States authority of McBro,272 the Court, in estopping a signatory from
denying its obligation to arbitrate disputes with a non-signatory,273 "[c]ould just
as well have put the result in terms of consent ... The decision is probably most
useful in broadening out conceptions of consent, rather than in introducing any
truly separate doctrine."
The following comments are not designed as a comprehensive guide to
situations in which equitable estoppel has been applied. Rather, they are in-
tended to indicate that, to the extent that equitable estoppel exists as an "alterna-
tive" to consent, the same result could better be achieved by applying accepted
contractual principles such as the third party beneficiary rule. The cases dis-
cussed also evidence a shift away from the traditional Equity-based rationale for
estoppel, which further threatens to undermine "consent" as the keystone of
arbitration.
1. Equitable Estoppel: England
The broad application in the United States of equitable estoppel as a tool to
bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement, is not known in England.
While the English legal system accepts the general doctrines of issue estoppel
and estoppel by representation, they are unlikely to be used to overcome privity
problems in the arbitration context.
Having said that, estoppel has been applied in a more limited setting. Thus,
in Jones,274 in a subsequent challenge to an award, the court found that, in the
absence of a reservation on the point, a party was estopped from arguing claims
based on a valid contract while at the same time disputing the validity of the
contract and the arbitration clause.275 Section 73 of the Arbitration Act 1996
now covers this scenario, which requires an early objection to jurisdiction.
The English courts have also employed the idea of an "ad hoc" arbitration
agreement arising where the parties have gone some way towards arbitrating
without creating an enforceable agreement, thereby addressing a similar situa-
tion to that which the United States courts resolve by applying equitable estop-
pel.
276
271. MAcNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 18.2.3.
272. McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
273. MACNEIL SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 71, at § 18.2.3 (citations omitted).
274. Jones Eng'g Serv. Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Bldg. Ltd., 42 CONSTRUCTION LAW REP. 2
(1992).
275. Id. at 12-13.
276. See Willie & Co. v. Ocean Laser Shipping Ltd., "The SMARO," [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
225 (Q.B.D. Comm.).
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2. Equitable Estoppel: United States
The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies where "a person may be pre-
cluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from assert-
ing a right which he otherwise would have had.277 In the present context, the
non-signatory arbitration issue arises where a party by its own conduct is pre-
vented from denying that the other party at issue is entitled to rely on an arbitra-
tion agreement. Some contend that equitable estoppel should be used for this
"narrow" purpose - it should not be a way of "[c]reating such agreements where
none exist. ' 278 The courts' use of estoppel to bind third parties in the domestic
arbitration context has already been the subject of a number of commentaries,
many of which are concerned that the doctrine's overuse undermines consent.279
Such criticism is equally applicable in the international commercial arbitration
sphere.
At the outset, some commentators have drawn a distinction between "tradi-
tional" estoppel and "equitable" estoppel.2" ° Thus, in an international case, 281 an
international accounting firm entered into contracts with its regional affiliates
containing an arbitration clause. Although the firm had begun negotiations , a
Norwegian affiliate never actually signed the agreement even though it was
aware that use of the international firm's name was conditional upon acceptance.
In the ensuing dispute, the international firm sought to compel arbitration based
on the terms of the unsigned agreement. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit compelled arbitration on the basis that the Norwegian affiliate had never
objected to the agreement's terms, was aware of the terms, and knowingly de-
rived a benefit by using the international firm's name.
In discussing the Deloitte case, Sawrie defines this as the application of
"traditional" estoppel, noting this is an example of "[c]onsiderations of equity
perfectly coincid[ing] with considerations of assent. The affirmative derivation
of a benefit from a contract establishes assent to the terms of that contract. 282
277. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (6th ed. 1990).
278. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 893 F.2d at 195 (rejecting the proposition that the "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" could extend to the instant case).
279. See David F. Sawrie, Current Issues in Arbitration: Equitable Estoppel and the Outer
Boundaries of Federal Arbitration Law: The Alabama Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expan-
sive Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 51 VAND. L. REV. 721 (1998); S.M. McKinnes, Enforcing
Arbitration with a Non-Signatory: Equitable Estoppel and Defense of Piercing of the Corporate
Veil, 1995 J. DiSP. REsOL. 197 (1995); DeArman, supra note 225.
280. The terminology is used in making the distinction by Sawrie, supra note 279, at 726.
281. Deloitte Noraudit AIS, 9 F.3d at 1060.
282. Sawrie, supra note 279, at 726.
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While this is an appropriate "estoppel" case, the outcome could also have been
justified on the basis that the "assent" was simply recognition that Noraudit had
by its conduct assumed the obligation to arbitrate283 or had formed an oral
agreement incorporating the terms of the written contract (including the arbitra-
tion agreement).2' This is just one example where applying "normal" contract
principles, rather than estoppel, might achieve a more conceptually sound result.
As to what Sawrie would define as "equitable" estoppel, the case law has
come to draw an important distinction between a claim by the signatory seeking
to compel the non-signatory to arbitrate and a claim by the non-signatory seek-
ing to compel arbitration against the signatory. Thomson outlines the starting
point for analysis of equitable estoppel doctrine.285 In that case, the signatory
supplier commenced arbitration proceedings against both its original contracting
party and that party's parent company (Thomson). On analogy to the Deloitte
case, the court noted that Thomson had notice of the agreement in question, that
the supplier had indicated its intention to bind Thomson, and that Thomson had
proceeded to incorporate the purchaser into its corporate structure and had re-
ceived benefits from that incorporation.2 6 However, the court then distin-
guished Deloitte by saying that Thomson received only an "indirect benefit"
from its relationship to the purchaser and that this is not the benefit which is the
basis of the claim by the supplier. 2 7 The court continued:
Had Thomson directly benefited from the ... Agreement by seeking to purchase equipment
from [the supplier] or enforcing the exclusivity provisions of the Agreement, it would be es-
topped from avoiding arbitration . . . However Thomson received no benefit at all from the
Agreement (as opposed to the acquisition). Thus, Thomson is not bound by its subsidiary's
arbitration agreement .. 288
However, this distinction between an "indirect" and "direct" benefit seems
weak as Thomson was in effect enforcing the exclusivity provisions of the
agreement. Further, an analysis of the case suggests the Court was more con-
cerned about the direct uncontroverted evidence that Thomson had specifically
advised the supplier at the time of purchasing the subsidiary that it would not
consider itself bound by the agreement. Thus, the correct focus should have
been on lack of consent to the agreement.
However, the crucial lesson from Thomson general doctrinal purposes, is
the Court's recognition of the distinction between estopping a non-signatory as
283. See Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991) (non-
signatories' conduct manifested intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement).
284. It is acknowledged that such analysis may raise issues under the applicable law as to
whether an oral arbitration agreement is valid and, further, may impact on the enforceability of the
award. See infra at Section IV.C.
285. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 778.
286. Id. at 778.
287. Id. at 779.
288. ld.
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opposed to signatory claimant. As the court recognized, "Thomson... cannot
be estopped from denying the existence of an arbitration clause to which it is a
signatory because no such clause exists. At no point did Thomson indicate a
willingness to arbitrate with [supplier] .,289 The logic of this is compelling. Yet
courts routinely overlook this distinction, usually where the courts (especially
the Eleventh Circuit) have applied a "hybrid" or "two-prong" test for equitable
estoppel.29
The genesis of the "two-prong" test lies in McBro,29' in which separate
agreements existed between, on the one hand, St Margaret's Hospital (Hospital)
and its electrical contractor (Triangle) and, on the other hand, Hospital and its
construction manager (McBro). Both contracts contained identical arbitration
provisions, but the agreement between Hospital and Triangle expressly denied
there was any contractual relationship between Triangle and McBro. Despite
this denial of any contractual relationship, the court compelled Triangle to arbi-
trate its claims with McBro on the basis that it was equitably estopped from
denying arbitration. This was based on a two-step analysis. The court exam-
ined, first, the relationship between the signatory's claim and the contract con-
taining the arbitration provision and, second, the nexus between the parties.292
This two stage test is most usual in situations where the non-signatory is
seeking to compel arbitration against the signatory. Thus, in Sunkist Soft
Drinks,293 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found Del Monte enti-
tled to compel arbitration of claims brought by Sunkist where Del Monte was
the parent corporation of a newly acquired subsidiary (SSD) with which Sunkist
had a licensing agreement. Sunkist had brought litigation against both SSD and
Del Monte. The Court found that the "nexus between Sunkist's claims and the
license agreement, as well as the integral relationship between SSD and Del
Monte, leads us to the conclusion that the claims are 'intimately founded in and
intertwined with' the license agreement ... [such that] Sunkist is equitably es-
topped from avoiding arbitration of its claims. 294 Commentators have drawn an
analogy between the latter reasoning and traditional "piercing of the corporate
veil. 295  While some consider this an exciting application of corporate veil
289. Id.
290. The "two-prong" characterization is widely discussed by commentators. See e.g. Sawrie,
supra note 279, at 737.
291. McBro Planning & Dev. Co., 741 F.2d at 342.
292. See id. at 343-44.
293. Sunkist Sofidrinks Inc., 10 F.3d at 753 cert denied 513 U.S. 869 (1994).
294. Id. at 758, citing McBro, 741 F.2d at 344.
295. See Sawrie, supra note 279, at note 135; and McKinnes, supra note 279, at 207.
65
Hosking: The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International C
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
piercing theory,2 96 this author's criticism is that this is a "back-handed" way of
undermining the corporate personality doctrine. Moreover, one could apply the
same doctrine of equitable estoppel in a different sense and argue that it was
inequitable for Del Monte, having chosen to structure its acquisition of SSD in
such a way that it remained a separate corporate entity, to then claim the "bene-
fit" of the arbitration clause in the licensing agreement with Sunkist. Sunkist, on
the other hand, could never have intended at the outset to have entered into an
arbitration agreement with anyone other than the subsidiary (which at that time
had nothing to do with Del Monte). This raises important consent issues. A
better approach would have been to apply a third party beneficiary analysis,
which might have produced the same result as, on the Court's own logic, Sun-
kist considered Del Monte received benefits from the licensing agreement and
Sunkist continued to sell products to SSD even after Del Monte became in-
volved. Importantly, however, the conclusion would have been dependent on
establishing that the parties intended for Del Monte to receive the benefits. Such
analysis is less likely to offend the consensual nature of arbitration.
As a result of the "hybrid" test, courts gave come to focus increasingly on
the "integral relationship" of the non-signatory and the signatory to the detri-
ment of the consensual basis of arbitration, with the consequence that he con-
sensual basis of arbitration has been weakened. Indeed, this shift of focus has
been exacerbated by the attitude of some courts and commentators that the
much-quoted "pro-arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act" justifies
further expanding both "prongs" of the hybrid test. As one commentator puts it:
Not all courts have been willing to apply this liberal concept to allow a non-signatory to com-
pel arbitration against a contracting party simply because the claims are closely related to its
existing contractual obligations. However, such a broad interpretation is necessary to coin-
cide with the policy of the FAA. The FAA's policy encourages fairness and efficiency by in-
cluding all necessary parties within a dispute. After all, how is it that a claimant could ever
receive a fair outcome when he has to arbitrate part of his claim and then go to court against
another party of the same dispute? Therefore, in observing the FAA's policy, the agreement
is specifically enforced according to its terms as required by general contract law.:
297
However, a result in which a signatory is equitably estopped from denying the
applicability of an arbitration agreement to a non-signatory merely because that
non-signatory is "closely related" is consistent with neither "general contract
law" nor "the policy of the FAA."
Whether applying the "direct benefit" approach or the "two-prong" test, the
overuse of the doctrine of equitable estoppel has led to conceptual confusion and
potential injustice. In the international sphere, this is evidenced in two represen-
tative cases. First, in Tencara, 298 marine surveyor (ABS) provided "classifica-
296. See McKinnes, id.
297. DeArman, supra note 225, at 672.
298. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d at 349.
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tion" (i.e. a seaworthiness certificate) to a boatbuilder (Tencara) who had manu-
factured a yacht under contract to a group of investors. The yacht proved to be
faulty and the investors (and their insurers) brought suit against Tencara while
Tencara sued ABS. The contract between Tencara and ABS contained an arbi-
tration clause that was expressly incorporated into the certificate of classifica-
tion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the order of the Dis-
trict Court compelling arbitration of claims between Tencara and ABS and ex-
tended it to the investors' claim as well. The Court ordered that the investors
were estopped from denying their obligation to arbitrate as they had received a
"direct benefit" from the contract containing the arbitration clause because the
classification had enabled them to obtain lower insurance rates and the ability to
sail under the French flag.299 However, this factual basis for a "direct benefit" in
fact seems far less direct than any benefit in Deloitte or Thomson. Moreover,
the result could better be explained by applying third party beneficiary doctrine,
i.e., the classification contract between ABS and Tencara was intended to bene-
fit the eventual owners as third parties such that any claim they made based on
the classification must trigger the arbitration agreement. Alternatively, one
might be able to argue that the arbitration agreement incorporated in the certifi-
cate of classification was also incorporated in the sale agreement with the own-
ers. By contrast, the result of the Court's reasoning is that all subsequent owners
would also be bound to arbitrate any claim relating to manufacture.3"
Second, Schwabedissen30 1 provides an example of a signatory compelling
arbitration against a non-signatory. Here, buyer (IPC or its predecessor) bought
an industrial saw from a distributor (Wood) of the German manufacturer
(Schwabedissen). The saw proved faulty and IPC's claim against Wood was of
little use as the latter had subsequently filed for bankruptcy. IPC brought suit
against Schwabedissen alleging breach of contract and warranties in the Wood-
IPC purchase order and on the basis that Wood was Schwabedissen's agent. It
subsequently amended its claim to include allegations of similar breaches based
on the Schwabedissen-Wood purchase order relating to the saw and claimed that
it was a third party beneficiary of that agreement. However, the Schwabedissen-
Wood purchase order was found to incorporate an arbitration provision. Al-
though IPC contended that it had no knowledge thereof, the District Court com-
299. Id. at 353. In fact, the Court went further to also extend the duty to arbitrate to the sepa-
rate claim brought by the investors' insurer which as "subrogee stands in the shoes of its insured."
Id.
300. Even if the claim was only in relation to Tencara it could presumably trigger the clause by
joining ABS on the basis that it provided the seaworthiness classification.
301. Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 411
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pelled it to arbitrate its claims.3 2 This it duly did and subsequently lost; the
tribunal finding that Wood was not an agent for Schwabedissen and that IPC
was not a third party beneficiary of the Schwabedissen-Woof contract. When
Schwabedissen sought to enforce the arbitral award, IPC defended on the basis
that it was never a party to the arbitration agreement. °3 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court's order enforcing the award.
Citing the Tencara test of receiving a "direct benefit," the Court concluded that
IPC was estopped from refusing to arbitrate its dispute with Schwabedissen as
"its entire case hinges on its asserted rights under the Wood-Schwabedissen
contract - it cannot seek to enforce those contractual rights and avoid the con-
tract's requirement that 'any dispute arising out of' the contract be arbi-
trated."' 3 ° However, if analyzed purely as a third party beneficiary claim or
agency claim, as discussed above, IPC - as the party bringing the claim - would
have had a strong argument that it was not bound by the arbitration provision. It
seems incongruous that IPC had to arbitrate its claim against Schwabedissen on
the basis of an arbitration clause in an agreement of which IPC had no knowl-
edge and in which the arbitrators eventually found it had no rights recognized by
contract law.30 5
3. Equitable Estoppel: France
While French law recognizes an analogous principle of "consistency",
premised on the notion that a party cannot contradict itself to the detriment of
another, 3°6 this has not been applied in the context of a non-signatory being
bound to arbitrate in the sense it is used in the United States. 3' However,
Fouchard & Gaillard posit the principle as being part of a larger "principle of
interpretation in good faith," which means simply that "a party's true intention
should always prevail over its declared intention, where the two are not the
same." 3 8 Thus, under the French law of obligations a party may be bound to an
arbitration agreement by some form of representation made to this effect3 9 or
some other conduct evidencing consent.3 0 Therefore, the function served by
302. Id. at 414-415.
303. Id. at 415.
304. Id. at 418.
305. IPC should, of course, have challenged the District Court's initial order compelling arbi-
tration rather than seeking to raise these arguments as a challenge to enforcing the award rendered in
the arbitration it initiated. Indeed, this in itself might be grounds for IPC to be estopped from deny-
ing that it is bound by the arbitration provision.
306. FOUCHARD, supra 11, § 1462, at 820, n. 187.
307. Id. at § 1462, at 820, n. 188 and cases cited therein.
308. Id. at § 477, at 257.
309. Id. at § 498, at 280.
310. J. BELL, S. BOYRON & S. WHrTTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRANCH LAW 337 (1998) (under
French law a "party to a contract" is simply the person who by his act of will (sa volonte) is found at
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estoppel in United States cases like Deloitte,31 ' is to some extent fulfilled by the
broad test of contractual intention applied in cases like V2000.31 2
4. Equitable Estoppel: International Law/Institutional Rules
The general principle of estoppel is regularly recognized as a "general prin-
ciple of international law" or, more arguably, a rule of the lex mercatoria (again
subsumed within a larger "good faith" principle). 3 For example, the principle
has been applied in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal,314 although not in the context
of extending the arbitration agreement to non-signatories.
5. Equitable Estoppel: Commentary
As described above, this article expresses concern with the broad applica-
tion of the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the doctrinal confusion and mar-
ginalization of consent to the arbitration agreement that this encourages. As a
summary of criticisms of the United States position, first, in as much as the
courts are concerned with investigating the scope of the arbitration clause" 5 and
the nexus of relationships between the parties, these are relevant inquiries in
terms of ascertaining the intention of all parties to bind the non-signatory. How-
ever, it is this test that should ultimately be the touchstone of whether to bind the
parties. Second, many of the results obtained by way of "equitable estoppel"
could instead be obtained by application of general contract law as required by
the FAA. Third, to the extent that an expansive estoppel doctrine is justified by
the concern that a party will sue a non-signatory to seek to avoid an arbitration
the origin of the formation of the contract) (citing J. Mestre, R.T.D. Civ. 125, 1988). See generally
S. Whittaker, Privity of Contract and the Law of Tort: The French Experience, 15 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUDIES 327 (1995).
311. Deloitte Noraudit A/S, 9 F.3d at 1064.
312. C.A. Paris, Dec. 7 1994, V2000 (formerly Jaguar France) v. Renault, REVUE DE
L'ARBrrRAGE 245 (1996); affirmed Cass. le civ., May 21, 1997, Renault v. V2000 (formerly Jaguar
France), REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 537 (1997), discussed supra at note 251. An analogy identified in
FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 187, at 282.
313. See FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 1462, at 820 and cases cited therein.
314. See Case No. 73-67-3, Woodward Clyde Consultants v. The Republic of Iran, 3 IRAN-U.S.
CL. TRIB. REP. 239 (1983); REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 1982 (1985).
315. This term is sometimes used inconsistently but generally refers to an examination of the
arbitration clause to decide, first, the scope of the arbitration agreement in terms of which parties are
bound by it and, second, scope concerning whether the instant dispute falls within the terms of the
clause.
69
Hosking: The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International C
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
clause, it should be noted that there are procedural mechanisms for dealing with
this (e.g. staying the litigation pending the outcome of the arbitration). 16
Interestingly, the expanded "second prong" of the equitable estoppel test
applied in certain circuits in the United States places courts in a similar position
to French courts applying the V2000 doctrine. That is, they are given a broad
mandate to consider non-signatories who may be "[d]irectly involved in the
performance of the contract... [if] their respective situations and activities raise
the presumption that they were aware of the existence and scope of the arbitra-
tion clause, so that the arbitrator can consider all economic and legal aspects of
the dispute."3 7 However the fundamental difference is that the United States
courts do so on the conceptually different basis that they are preventing the other
party from denying that it is bound by a valid arbitration agreement. Where
exercised against a non-signatory and on the basis of a mere benefit received
from the main contract, this amounts to creating rights that would not otherwise
exist.
E. Incorporation By Reference
An arbitration agreement can be "incorporated by reference", i.e. where a
contract does not specifically include the arbitration clause but does include a
term which refers to another document (often another contract or a set of stan-
dard form terms) which includes the arbitration clause. Thus, it is different from
the other scenarios studied in this article in that it is simply a case of interpreting
the sufficiency of the reference and whether or not it forms part of the contract.
However, it deserves mention for three reasons. First, it arises very frequently
in international arbitration, most often in two areas: construction and engineer-
ing disputes (due to the prevalence of standard forms and chains of contracts) 31 8
and bills of lading (incorporating terms of a charter party).319 Second, because it
almost always involves situations where it is the non-signatory third party seek-
ing to bind either another non-signatory or two signatories to another agreement.
Third, courts' attitudes to incorporation by reference arguments often reveal a
tendency to treat arbitration as a "special situation" rather than applying general
contract law principles.
316. See discussion infra at Section IV.A.
317. See V2000, supra at note 250 and accompanying text.
318. See PETER SHERIDAN, CONSTRUCTION AND ENGINEERING ARBITRATION, Chapter Two, at
21ff (1999).
319. See Idil Elveris, Binding Third Parties with Arbitration Clauses in the Charter Parties: A
Comparison of Turkish and American Cases, 22 TUL. MAR. L. J. 625 (1998).
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1. Incorporation by Reference: England
A leading English contract text simply states that "an arbitration clause may
be incorporated in a contract by reference, e.g. to the standard terms of the trade
association or by course of dealing between the parties.""32 In the bill of lading
context the same source suggests in very general terms that "[ilt is a question of
construction in each case" whether a bill of lading incorporating some or all the
terms of a charter party is sufficient to incorporate the arbitration clause.32 ' This
masks a vociferous debate in the English courts. The debate has centered on,
first, whether one must specifically refer to the arbitration agreement in the in-
corporating reference in order for it to be valid and , second, whether an arbitra-
tion agreement incorporated by reference constitutes an "agreement in writing"
for the Arbitration Act 1996 (and its predecessors).
On the first question there are two approaches, both of which were ad-
vanced in judgments by the Court of Appeal in Aughton.322 On the one hand,
Lord Justice Ralph Gibson advocated that one looks at the precise words of the
document doing the incorporating and the precise terms of the arbitration clause
said to be incorporated and from there decides whether it was the intention of
the parties to incorporate the arbitration agreement. 323 On the other hand, Lord
Justice Megaw took the view that there must be "distinct and specific words"
specifically referring to the arbitration clause in order for it to be incorporated
and that "the mere reference to the terms and conditions of the contract to which
the arbitration clause constitutes a collateral contract" is insufficient.324
Lord Justice Megaw's analysis relies heavily on older precedents325 and evi-
dences great concern that in the absence of clear language of consent an arbitra-
tion agreement should "oust the jurisdiction of the court." He states:
First, it would require very clear language to oust the jurisdiction of the Court and secondly
the requirement under s7(l)(e) of the Arbitration Act 1979 that an arbitration agreement must
be in writing was to emphasize that a party was not to be taken as having agreed to relinquish
resort to the Courts for the protection of his rights unless he had consciously and diffidently
agreed to do so.
326
320. CHrrrY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 133, at § 15-011, at 723.
321. Id.
322. Aughton Ltd. v. M.F. Kent Services Ltd. 57 BUILDING LAW REP. 1 (1991).
323. Taking the approach of the court in The Annefield, P. 168 at 173 (1971).
324. Aughton, 57 BUILDING LAW REP. at 32.
325. See especially Thomas v. Portsea Steamship Co. Ltd. [1971] A.C. I (H.L.).
326. Aughton, 57 BUILDING LAW REP. at 87.
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Courts have wavered between the two approaches. 327 Interestingly, courts
appear to have interpreted Lord Justice Megaw's words as requiring something
less than an express reference to the arbitration clause but rather only a specifi-
cally manifested intent to incorporate.328 The Law Commission committee
charged with drafting the Arbitration Act 1996 criticized the stricter view. 29
Further, a leading arbitration commentator and then judge of the Supreme Court
of Hong Kong questioned the policy rationale behind requiring specific refer-
ence to the arbitration provision:
[T]here has been a sea change of opinion and attitude as exemplified by the 1979 Act in Eng-
land, the 1982 and 1999 amendments in Hong Kong and the adoption of the model law in
Hong Kong and other jurisdictions... the expressions of reservations ousting the jurisdiction
of the court in [Thomas v. Portsea] fall on unfertile ground in Hong Kong at the end of the
twentieth century, afiori, when the legislature has enacted the model law which relegates the
role of the court to basically one of support for the arbitral process and gives full effect to the
principle of full party autonomy.
[I]nsofar as Thomas v. Portsea is authority for the proposition that the arbitration clause must
be specifically referred to before it can be satisfactorily incorporated, it has no application in
Hong Kong.
3 3°
As to the second question, section 5 of the Arbitration Act 1996 states that the
agreement must be "in writing" to bring it within Part One of the Act. However,
section 6(2) provides:
The reference in an agreement to a written form of arbitration clause or to a document con-
taining an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the reference is such as to
make that clause part of the agreement.
The agreement need not be signed by the parties (s5(2)(a)), the agreement can be
found in the exchange of communications (s5(2)(b)) and the "written agree-
ment" may also arise on the basis of any of the exceptions created by earlier
case law such as when it arises out of a course of dealing.33" ' The requirement
can also be satisfied by the arbitration agreement being "evidenced in writing"
(s5(2)(c)), which includes being recorded by only one of the parties or a third
party with the authority of the parties to the agreement; or it may be recorded in
some other medium (s5(3)) or in an exchange of submissions (s5(5)). Thus, the
327. See e.g. Lexair Ltd. v. Edgar Taylor Ltd. 65 BUILDING L. REP. 87, 102 (1992); Star-Trans
Far East Pte. Ltd. v. Norske-Tech, 2 SINGAPORE L. REV. 409 (1996).
328. See SHERIDAN, supra note 318, § 2.14, at 27.
329. DEPARTMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON ARBITRATION LAW (U.K.), A NEW
ARBITRATION ACr?, § 42 (Dep't of Trade & Indust. 1989), (hereafter "DAC REPORT") however the
Committee eventually decided that the matter should be left to the common law.
330. Astel-Reiniger Joint Venture v. Argos Eng'g & Heavy Indus. Co. Ltd., ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW J. 41, 48 (1995) (per Kaplan, J).
331. See Frank Fehr & Co. v. Kassam Jivraj & Co., Ltd., [1949] 82 Lloyd's L. Rep. 673 (C.A.).
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"formality" requirements have been significantly loosened.332 It remains to be
seen whether the Arbitration Act 1996 will have a similar effect on the express
incorporation controversy.
2. Incorporation by Reference: United States
MacNeil, Speidel & Stipanowich share the author's view that incorporation
by reference is essentially a matter of whether or not the parties intend to create
an arbitration agreement:
Incorporation by reference is a particularly important consensual concept. It is, however,
simply a way of consenting to a term in a contract without actually repeating in the contract
what has been incorporated. As such it is indistinguishable from other methods of manifest-
ing consent.
333
While this article will not address the convoluted case law on this topic,
there is ample authority for the proposition that incorporation by reference is
acceptable both where the term is incorporated from another contract containing
an arbitration agreement334 and where the contract incorporates a designated set
of rules that includes an arbitration clause.335
There is, however, disagreement over whether the clause incorporating the
arbitration agreement need mention the arbitration agreement. Thus, in an inter-
national case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that no trial
was necessary to establish whether or not there was a valid arbitration agreement
where an insurance policy signed by both parties stated that it was "subject to
Facultative Reinsurance Agreement"(FRA) and where the FRA contained an
arbitration clause though there was no mention of this in the policy. 336 The court
cited the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA. However, it was not cited in a case
in which the court refused to find an arbitration agreement had been incorpo-
rated into a bill of lading. In Cargill,337 the incorporation clause was sufficiently
ambiguous to be held invalid; the court stating that a bill of lading must "spe-
cifically refer to the charter party" for there to be an incorporation by reference.
332. Of course this does not necessarily overcome the requirements of Article 11.2 of the New
York Convention. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION
OF 1958, at 217 (1981) and discussion infra at Section IV.C..
333. MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 17.3.2.1.
334. E.g., Coffey v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 891 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1989).
335. See e.g., R.J. O'Brien & Ass'n. Inc. v. Pipkin, 66 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1995).
336. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. CA Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42
(2d Cir. 1993).
337. Cargill Inc. v. Golden Chariot, 31 F.3d. 316 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Despite these fact-specific instances, the general position is that "a Charter Party
is just a species of contract, subject to the same rules of interpretation as any
other binding agreement" and the existence of an arbitration agreement will be
determined accordingly.
338
It is also worth noting that what might otherwise be considered an incorpo-
ration by reference case has frequently been considered on the basis of other
contract law agency principles. Thus, in Alamria v. Telcor339 the court held
there was a triable issue as to whether a subsidiary could by a separate document
be bound to an agreement containing an arbitration clause. Arguably, the court
might have raised an incorporation by reference argument but the agreement
contained an "entire agreement" clause. One can infer that it is for that reason
that the claimants based their successful arguments instead on agency law.
Similarly, in another international case, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether or not a bill of lading
created a third party beneficiary that could enforce an arbitration agreement.
3Q
3. Incorporation by Reference: France
Fouchard & Gaillard characterize French law as having rejected principles
of strict interpretation of arbitration agreements of the sort characterized by the
English traditional position 34' and insist that French courts have instead followed
an approach to incorporation by reference much the same as any contract:
Arbitration agreements incorporated by reference must therefore be analyzed in terms of the
existence and extent of the parties' consent to have their disputes resolved by arbitration. The
existence and extent of that consent should be interpreted using the general principles of in-
terpretation of arbitration agreements, that is, neither extensively nor restrictively.
Having said that, the authors do acknowledge the well known series of decisions
of the French courts arising out of the Bomar Oil arbitration. In short, a Tuni-
sian oil company (ETAP) contracted to sell crude oil to Bomar by way of an
exchange of telexes referring to the general conditions of ETAP's standard con-
tract containing an ICC arbitration clause. After a dispute arose, Bomar refused
to take part in the arbitration on the basis that there was no binding arbitration
agreement; ETAP alleged that it had been incorporated by reference. The sub-
sequent award upheld the validity of the incorporation by reference. 343 The Paris
338. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d at 1019 (citing A/S Custodia v. Lessin Int'l Inc., 503 F.2d
318, 320 (2d Cir. 1974) (overturning a district court refusal to compel arbitration without hearing
evidence on the existence/validity of the arbitration agreement)).
339. Alamria v. Telcor Int'l Inc., 920 F. Supp. 658 (U.S.D.C Md. 1996).
340. See MIT Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d at 1019.
341. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 480 (citing, inter alia, Cass. Comm. March 13, 1978,
Hertzian v. Electronska Indeustrija, REVUE DE L'ARBrrRAGE 339 (1979)).
342. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 496.
343. Id. at § 495 (referencing Award of Jan 25 1985, ETAP v. Bomar Oil (unpublished)).
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Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the award, stating that Article II of the
New York Convention was no hurdle in that "the said convention admits the
adoption of an arbitration agreement by reference only to the extent that the
agreement of the parties does not involve any ambiguity" and that here there
was none as all parties had considerable oil industry experience.- 4  This was
overturned by the Cour de Cassation on the basis that the New York Convention
did not exclude incorporation by reference but rather that it required that the
clause be mentioned in the contract in the absence of a long standing business
relationship which ensures that the parties are aware of the usual written condi-
tions." However the Versailles Court of Appeals subsequently refused to set
aside the award holding:
[I]f the existence of such clause, however, is not mentioned in the main agreement, the prin-
ciple of consensualism requires the party invoking the arbitration agreement to prove that the
other party knew about the arbitral clause at the time it entered into the main agreement. As
both parties in this case are merchants, all types of evidence are allowed.
34 6
Accordingly, the Versailles Court of Appeal referred to the exchange of telexes
and the business acumen of the parties and concluded that the parties were
aware of the arbitration clause and the incorporation by reference was valid.
The Versaille Court of Appeal's broad fact-based inquiry into consent is
consistent with the approach of French courts in many of the areas under inves-
tigation in this article. Thus, Fouchard & Gaillard note that the "only case in
which a French court has refused to recognize the existence of an arbitration
clause incorporated by reference was where the factual circumstances left genu-
ine doubt as to the existence of the consent." '347 In that case, one of the parties
had made unilateral changes to the contract without the other party's knowledge
and thus there was insufficient consensus for the arbitration agreement to have
been validly incorporated.348
344. C.A. Paris, Jan. 29, 1987, Bomar NV v. ETAP, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 482 (1987).
345. Cass. Premier le civ., October 11, 1989, Bomar Oil v. ETAP, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE
134 (1990).
346. C.A. Versailles, Jan. 23, 1991, Bomar Oil v. ETAP, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 291 (1991).
347. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 496, citing Cass. Comm. Jan. 7, 1992, Psichikon Com-
pania Naviera Panama v. SIER, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 553 (1992).
348. Id.
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4. Incorporation by Reference: International Law/Institutional Rules
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods" 9 may provide assistance in upholding arbitration agreements incorpo-
rated by reference. Thus, in Filanto v. Chilewich,350 the defendant Chilewich
was an American trading company. It had contracted to supply footwear to a
buyer in the then Soviet Union. To meet its obligations under that contract,
Chilewich entered into a series of transactions with the plaintiff Filanto, an Ital-
ian footwear manufacturer. The agreement with Filanto at issue contained a
term incorporating by reference provisions of the Russian sale contract including
an arbitration provision. In holding Filanto bound by the arbitration agreement,
the court referred to a number of canons of interpretation contained within the
Convention, including Article 8(3) (permitting consideration of negotiations,
trade usages, etc) and Article 18(1) (a statement or conduct of the offeree indi-
cating assent to an offer may constitute acceptance). In that case, the court also
cited the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA to uphold the validity of the arbitra-
tion agreement.
35
'
5. Incorporation by Reference: Commentary
While English law still retains some vestiges of its traditional suspicion of
arbitration agreements, all three legal systems seem to have moved towards an
acceptance of incorporation by reference of arbitration agreements judged on
normal principles of contract law. Therefore, the primary focus is on ascertain-
ing the true intent of the parties. While bills of lading continue to represent a
challenge, general formal validity requirements of the "agreement in writing"
have been relaxed. This overview has not addressed some of the more complex
issues that arise as to the scope of the arbitration agreement incorporated and
circumstances where the arbitration agreement incorporated is in some way
inconsistent with the contract to which it allegedly applies. In most such cases
these issues are part and parcel of the general question of ascertaining the par-
ties' intent to arbitrate.
349. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, adopted Apr.
It, 1980, entered into force Jan. 1, 1988, 17 INT'L. LEGAL MAT'L. 668 (1980).
350. Filanto, SpA v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis-
missed 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
351. For a more detailed discussion see Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, CISG: Arbi-
tration and Contract Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the UN Sales Con-
vention, 12 J.L. & COMM. 239 (1993).
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THIRD PARTY
NON-SIGNATORIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. Procedural Mechanisms
As well as contractual solutions to the third party problem, several "proce-
dural" tools have been developed to lessen potential injustices caused by the
limitations of the contractual approach to arbitration law. While by no means
comprehensive, this section will outline some of these tools with special empha-
sis on provisions within arbitration legislation empowering tribunals or courts to
deal with third parties, civil procedure rules which enable courts to address third
party issues and common law rules governing the effect of an arbitral award on a
non-party.
352
1. Procedural Mechanisms: England
Joinder of Arbitral Proceedings
A defendant has the ability to join a third party to court proceedings. 353
There is no equivalent power enabling the court or arbitrators to join a third
party non-signatory. This is so even though there may be a series of contracts
arising out of the same transaction, each of which is governed by an identical
arbitration clause. All parties must consent. This was authoritatively decided
under the Arbitration Act 1950 in The Eastern Sag,354 in which the Court held
there was no power within the Arbitration Act 1950, nor any implied power in
the arbitration agreement, that empowers the arbitrator to order joinder in the
absence of consent.355 The Court justified the rule on the basis that it preserves
the confidentiality of evidence tendered to the tribunal, protects parties from
unnecessarily providing evidence and eliminates the possibility that the duration
and cost of the arbitration will be extended by adding further parties. 3 56 While
these rationales are debatable, the drafters of the Arbitration Act 1996 decided
352. In this respect this is not so much "procedural" as a substantive limitation on the effect of
an award.
353. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
354. Oxford Shipping Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, "The Eastern Saga," [1984] 3 All E.R.
835. See also Interbulk Ltd. v. Aiden Shipping Co. Ltd., "The Vimeira," [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 66,
75 (per Robert Goff L.J.).
355. Presumably it is still open to parties to include such a power expressly within the arbitra-
tion agreement.
356. Cited in MERKIN, supra note 84, at § 15.4.
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not to extend a statutory power to arbitrators to order joinder as to do so would
undermine the concept of "party autonomy." '357 Thus, section 35 of the Arbitra-
tion Act 1996 codifies the common law in that it states that the parties are free to
agree on consolidation or concurrent proceedings (subsection 1) and may confer
such power on the tribunal but, in the absence of such, the tribunal has no power
to make such orders (subsection 2).
Yet a blurring of this straightforward position occurred in The SMARO,
358
which concemed a sale agreement for the sale of a vessel from Willie to Rous-
sos or "company to be nominated." The sale agreement contained an arbitration
clause. Subsequently, Willie nominated Ocean Laser as the purchaser and the
purchase duly proceeded. A dispute arose and the parties commenced an arbi-
tration, but there was no agreement on whether Ocean Laser (as nominee) was a
party thereto. 9 The parties sought clarification from the court as to whether the
arbitration had been properly commenced and "how, if at all, can a party to an
arbitration agreement join an existing arbitration between the parties to the same
arbitration agreement?" The Court's decision rests ultimately on other grounds
but Justice Rix made lengthy obiter comments that he would have been willing
to hold that Ocean Laser had properly joined the Roussos/Willie arbitration:
I would be loathe to think that where a claim by party A to a contract with party B has been
submitted to arbitration under that contract's arbitration clause, another claim based on iden-
tical facts brought by a third party to the same contract, party C, could not (without the
agreement of B) be referred to the same arbitration but would have to be referred under an en-
tirely new arbitral submission. No authority has been cited to me which compels me to de-
termine that that would have to be done. I know of course that arbitration is a consensual
process, but where the relevant parties are bound to arbitrate, I do not see why the respon-
dent's refusal to recognize party C's submission of its claim to the same arbitrators can force
parties A and C to arbitrate in separate arbitrations... The vice of that (apart from time and
resources) is the danger of inconsistent decisions in separate arbitrations .... 360
Thus, if the "third party" can somehow be brought within the contract con-
taining the arbitration agreement (and here his Honor takes a fairly wide view of
"within") 6' then arbitration may be compelled absent a party's consent.
"Under or Through"
An important, although strangely underused, provision exists which may of-
fer some avenue of recourse for a non-signatory claiming to be a party and wish-
357. See DAC REPORT, supra note 329, at §§ 177-182.
358. Ocean Laser Shipping, [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 225.
359. Note that under the new Arbitration Act 1996 combined with the new C(RTP) Act 1999,
Ocean Laser Shipping would probably have been entitled to rely on the arbitration agreement in the
sale and purchase form to compel arbitration.
360. Ocean Laser Shipping, [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 228 (emphasis added).
361. The present case appears to have been decided on the basis that Ocean Laser had effected
a novation of the sales agreement (the doctrinal argument for this is questionable).
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ing to avail itself of the statutory powers granted to the courts to stay litigation
or otherwise to aid the arbitration process. Section 82(2) of the Arbitration Act
1996 states that "references in this Part to a party to an arbitration agreement
include any person claiming under or through a party to the agreement." Thus,
in as much as a non-signatory is able to come within the "under or through"
definition, it will be a "party" for the purposes of the entire Act. Based on the
similar but narrower provision in the Arbitration Act of 1950, Merkin suggests
that the provision will not be available where the third party is an insurer, 62 a
mortgagee3 63 or a guarantor.364  However it may apply to a contractual as-
signee 365 or to an assignee by operation of law including by death, bankruptcy or
liquidation.36
The potentially broad application of the "through or under" formula is best
evidenced in Roussel- Uclaf 367 In that case, the non-signatory UK subsidiary of
a US pharmaceutical company which was a signatory to a licensing agreement
including an arbitration clause, was granted a stay of litigation pursuant to sec-
tion 1, Arbitration Act 1975. The Court was willing to pierce the corporate veil
as it considered that the two companies (both defendants in the action) were "so
closely related on the facts in this case" that the UK subsidiary was "within the
purview of the arbitration clause" and on this basis it was making the application
for a stay "through or under" the signatory parent."
Thus, the availability of the "through or under" mechanism has ameliorated
the potential unjustness of the common law position3 69 that a third party has no
locus standi to ask the court to discontinue legal proceedings in the face of an
arbitration agreement to which it is not a party.37° Building on the Roussel
362. MERKIN, supra note 84, at § 1.37 (citing Frotanort, [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 254.
363. MERKIN, id. (citing Bonnin v. Neame [1910] 1 Ch. 732).
364. MERKIN, id. (citing Alfred McAlpine Constr. v. Unex Corp., [1994] N.P.C 16).
365. MERKIN, id. (citing Rumput (Panama) S.A. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines, "The Leak" [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 259).
366. Id. See also MERKIN, id. at §§ 2.18ff.
367. Roussel-Uclaf v. G. D. Searle & Co. Ltd., [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 225 (Ch.D.).
368. See also Etri Fans v. M.M.B. (UK) Ltd. [1987] 2 All E.R. 763 (Eng. C.A.). Roussel-Uclaf
was criticized and distinguished in Grupo Torras S.A. v. L. Sabah [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 374, 451.
In that case the non-signatory sought to rely upon an arbitration agreement contained in a contract
between its subsidiary and the parent company of the plaintiff. Mr. Justice Mance considered that
the nature of the claim sought to be stayed (a tort action dependent on the defendant's personal
conduct not that of its subsidiary) and the lack of relationship between the defendant's subsidiary
and the plaintiff's parent, precluded the claim from being considered "through or under".
369. Pennell v. Walker, [1856] 18 C.V. 651; Bannin v. Neame [1910] 1 Ch. 732.
370. The phrase also appears as "through or under" in earlier U.K. legislation and in other
Commonwealth legislation. There are a number of important decisions from other Commonwealth
jurisdictions which have adopted this provision to mitigate problems with third parties; see espe-
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precedent and the prima facie broader provision in section 82(2)of the Arbitra-
tion Act 1996, English courts may be empowered to grant to non-signatory par-
ties claiming "through or under" a party to an arbitration agreement not only a
stay of litigation but possibly even de facto joinder other remedies that have the
effect of this offers the potential to allow court-ordered de facto "joinder" of
such non-party to the arbitration. Support for this may be drawn from the obiter
comments in The SMARO 37 referred to above, although it remains to be seen
whether this approach will be adopted.
3 72
Other Mechanisms
Other mechanisms to overcome the potential injustice to a third party un-
able to bring itself within the arbitration agreement include:
Stay of proceedings pending arbitration: Under the former Arbitration Acts, it
was possible for a court to exercise its discretion not to order a stay of proceed-
ings pending arbitration. However since the Arbitration Act 1975 this option
has not applied to "international arbitrations" as defined in the Act. Under the
Arbitration Act 1996, section 9 removes the power to refuse a stay in all cases.3 73
Anti-suit injunction to prevent litigation: Similar to the stay provisions, a signa-
tory or non-signatory may achieve the same result by seeking an anti-suit injunc-
tion in the appropriate court or jurisdiction.374
Appointment of common arbitrator: The courts have developed a very limited
solution whereby a common arbitrator is appointed for multiple arbitrations
under the power to appoint a tribunal where the parties have failed to do SO. 375
cially Mt. Cook (Northland) v. Swedish Motors [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 720 (New Zealand) and Tanning
Research Laboratories, Inc. (US) v. O'Brien (Liq. of Hawaiian Tropic Ltd.) (Australia) 64 A.L.J.R.
(1990) 211 (H.C. Australia).
371. Ocean Laser Shipping, [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 225. See also supra note 356 and ac-
companying text.
372. See Kavrit Steel & Crane Ltd. v. Kone Group, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 129, 132 (Alb. Ct. App)
(supporting a broad interpretation of the English section 82(2) and expressing disappointment that
the same power is not available in the Alberta statute).
373. The section of the Act which makes separate provisions for domestic arbitrations has not
been enacted and is apparently intended to be repealed. Section 9 was applied in Wealands v. C.L.C.
Contractors Ltd. & Scaffolding Ltd. & Another, [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 739, 745 (citing the decision
at first instance, "I appreciate that the conclusion I have reached is in many ways an unsatisfactory
one but I remind myself again that the Act now gives priority to party autonomy. It entitles the third
party as of right, to the stay which it asks for").
374. British & Foreign & TMM Transcap, [1998] I.L.Pr. at 838.
375. Arbitration Act 1996, section 18 (Arbitration Act 1950, section 10). See Abudabi Liqu-
faction Col. v. Eastern Bechtel Corp. & Chiyoda Chem. Engineering & Const. Co. Ltd., [1982] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 425, (appointing the same arbitrators for two different hearings, one involving disputes
under the head contract and the other the sub-contract. Thus the procedure sought to lessen the
likelihood of different arbitrators reaching different factual conclusions).
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2. Procedural Mechanisms: United States
Federal Arbitration Act § 4
Of the several procedures available,376 the most likely recourse for a non-
signatory is to petition the court for a motion to compel arbitration. The relevant
part of § 4 provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect or refusal by another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition an United States District Court... for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement ... the
court shall hear the parties and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbi-
tration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order direct-
ing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement ... If
the making of the arbitration agreement or failure, neglect or refusal to perform the same be
in issue the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof...
To succeed, the non-signatory must prove that it is a party to a "written
agreement for arbitration" and the court may proceed to a trial thereon if that is
in issue. In this respect, the reference to "an agreement in writing," while on its
face restrictive, has been interpreted not to preclude the invocation of § 4 by a
non-signatory. 377 Note also that, unlike in other jurisdictions, an attack on the
arbitration clause itself is a question for the court to determine not the arbitral
tribunal.37
While § 4 may appear straightforward, the need to establish the facts rele-
vant to jurisdiction to make the orders can give rise to complications. For ex-
ample, in Limonium Maritime379 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld a District Court decision denying petitioners' motion to compel arbitra-
tion. The lower court had declined to decide whether the approximately 117
non-signatory appellees were parties to a charter agreement until after the com-
pletion of arbitration proceedings between the charter signatory and its guaran-
tor. The appellants argued that the court had no such discretion but rather was
bound by § 4 to determine the non-signatories' status under the charter agree-
ment before the pending arbitration proceedings could ensue. The Court of
Appeals rejected this proposition essentially on grounds of convenience, stating:
376. For a general discussion see MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 74, at § 23;
COE, supra note 268, at §§ 3.8.1, 5.3-5.5; Healey, An Introduction to the Federal Arbitration Act, 30
J. MAR. L. & COM. 223 (1989).
377. See also Keystone Shipping Co., 782 F. Supp. at 31.
378. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 395; see discussion infra at note 101.
379. Limonium Maritime SA v. Mizushima Marinera S.A., 201 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 1999); 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 30447 (2d Cir. 1999).
81
Hosking: The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International C
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
Nor do we see any abuse of discretion by that Court. The District Court deferred considera-
tion of whether the non-signatories were parties until after the arbitration was completed ...
for sound reasons of judicial economy ... as a general rule 'we are very reluctant to interfere
with district judges' management of their very busy dockets' . . . to adjudicate the non-
signatories [sic] status first ... would not expedite final resolution of the case but might actu-
ally delay it.
380
Thus the Court was willing to defer its obligation to "hear the parties" and if
satisfied "proceed summarily to trial" until after the arbitration against the signa-
tory and its guarantor was completed, despite the possibility that this may result
in a split arbitration.381
Federal Arbitration Act, Chapters Two and Three
A dispute relating to an international agreement may also arise for determi-
nation under FAA, Chapter Two (implementing the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) or Chapter Three (imple-
menting the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion). Analogous provisions to 9 U.S.C. § 4 exist in § 206 and § 303, providing
for orders to compel arbitration in reliance on the New York Convention or
Panama Convention, respectively.
By way of example, in Anderra Energy Corp.,382 disputes arose between
members of a joint venture (Petro Anderra and AEC) and SAPET concerning
the existence of projects in Peru. The joint venture initiated court proceedings
against SAPET as well as two other defendants. The defendants successfully
removed to federal court relying on the arbitration agreement provided in the
letter of intent between the joint venture participants and SAPET. The proce-
dural battle was then fought over FAA, § 205 which provided the basis for re-
moval to federal court and the plaintiffs motion to remand back to state court.
The District Court upheld the removal to federal court and granted the motion to
compel arbitration despite the fact that AEC was not a signatory to the arbitra-
tion agreement, because the nature of the joint venture with Petro Anderra
bound it to the arbitration agreement. Influential in the Court's decision was the
380. Id. at 431, id. at *3-4.
381. The power in 9 U.S.C. § 4 to compel arbitration is supplemented by 9 U.S.C. § 3, which
empowers the court to stay litigation pending arbitration. As a matter of practice, a request for relief
pursuant to §4 is often accompanied by a request for a stay of litigation pursuant to §3. In the non-
signatory context, see Keystone Shipping Co., 782 F. Supp. at 29. See also Minera Alumbrera Ltd.
v. Fluor Daniels, Inc., No. 98CIV5673, 1999 WL 269915, *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1999) (also consid-
ering the court's inherent power to stay a case but rejecting this as well as § 3).
382. Anderra Energy Corp. v. SAPET Dev. Corp., No. 3:94-CV-2683-P (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
1995), in 10 INT'L ARB. REP. E-1 (1995).
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extra deference given to international arbitration agreements and the "strong
public policy to channel this type of case into federal court. "383
Stay of Litigation Pending Arbitration
Anderra Energy Corp. is also interesting in that the Court granted a request
on behalf of the non-signatory defendants that all litigation be stayed pending
the conclusion of the arbitration between plaintiff joint venturers and defendant
SAPET.384 This is a matter of discretion for the District Court.385 In considering
this request, the Court rejected an argument that § 3 of the FAA mandates the
stay of litigation for issues within the scope of the arbitration agreement but
which relate to non-signatories (who are also not claiming to be parties to the
arbitration agreement).386 In exercising its discretion, the Court held that the
"identity of the issues in this case and the possibility of duplicative action coun-
sels in favor of a discretionary stay as to the entire litigation pending the out-
come of arbitration between the plaintiffs and SAPET." '387 The Court placed a
one year limit on the stay.
Other Mechanisms
Courts have occasionally executed their general powers under the state civil
codes of procedure, to consolidate arbitrations arising out of the same dispute, so
as to lessen the likelihood of conflicting determinations.388 They have also
stayed arbitrations to permit the completion of related litigation involving third
parties where such was the efficient result.
389
383. Id. at § 7 (citing McDermott Int'l Inc. v Lloyd's Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199
(5th Cir. 1991)).
384. Anderra Energy Corp., 10 INT'L ARB. REP. E-1 at § 19.
385. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 21 ("In some cases it may be advisable to
stay litigation among the main arbitrating parties pending the outcome of the arbitration. That deci-
sion is one left to the District Court as a matter of its discretion to control its docket").
386. Anderra Energy Corp. at § 19 (citing Talbott Bigfoot Inc. v. Boudreaux, 874 F.2d 611
(5th Cir. 1989)).
387. Id. at § 20.
388. See e.g. Mercury Ins. Group v. Super. Ct., 965 P.2d 1178 (1998). See generally Debra S.
Neveu, An Informative Note on Aggregation Devices in Arbitration, 10 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP.
224 (1999).
389. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 468 (relying on CAL. CODE CrY. PROc. 1281.2(c)).
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Enforcement/Intervention in Confirmation of Award
Unlike in some jurisdictions,3" there is no provision permitting a third party
not a party to the arbitration, to intervene as an interested person in the confir-
mation/enforcement hearing. Moreover, the Court's task is limited only to de-
termining "whether the arbitrator's award falls within the four comers of the
dispute as submitted to him." '391 Thus, the Court in that case refused to consider
whether the parties bound by the award included the signatory's alleged alter
ego.
392
3. Procedural Mechanisms: France
The French procedural position is similar to that of the United States or
England with respect to uncontroversial matters such as a stay of litigation, but
three unique characteristics are worth noting.
First, French courts generally are precluded from interpreting the arbitration
agreement on a preliminary application, leaving this instead to the arbitral tribu-
nal. 393 Second, in those circumstances where a French court is required to re-
view the validity of an arbitration agreement it will do so on the basis of French
law rather than considering any applicable law arguments. 394 Thus, in any action
before a French court the more permissive rules on third parties will apply, even
in the face of a mandatory rule of another state which would otherwise preclude
a third party from enforcing the agreement. 395 Third, unlike in domestic arbitra-
tion, French law in an international arbitration does not permit third party inter-
vention on a recognition/enforcement action. Fouchard & Gaillard suggest, "the
privity of the arbitration agreement and of the res judicata effect of the arbitra-
tor's decision suffices to protect third parties from any negative impact .... 396
390. Intervention is permitted for example in Polish arbitration law. See Mauro Rubino-
Sammartano, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW 184 (3d ed.1989).
391. Align Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.
1963).
392. Id. at 301.
393. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 474, at 255.
394. Goutal, supra note 73, at 439.
395. See FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 628, at 382 (stating that French law would uphold the
arbitration agreement even in the face of a law such as the 1989 Colombian law invalidating any
arbitration agreement that concerns a dispute "affecting a nonparty" (Decree No. 2279, Oct. 7, 1989,
amended by Law No. 23, Mar. 2 (1991))).
396. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 1598, at 918.
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4. Procedural Mechanisms: International Law/Institutional Rules
Several international institutions provide in their arbitration rules for proce-
dural mechanisms that may be relevant to the non-signatory. For example, the
London Maritime Arbitrators Association Terms empower the arbitral tribunal
to make orders as to concurrent hearings to the extent that such procedures are in
the "interests of economy and expedition. 397
Importantly, the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration
(1998) empower the tribunal, unless the parties otherwise agree, to:
allow, only upon the application of a party, one or more third persons to be joined in the arbi-
tration as a party provided any such third person and the applicant party have consented
thereto in writing, and thereafter to make a single final award, or separate awards, in respect
of all parties so implicated in the arbitration.
398
This provision is of potentially wide application in that one can envisage a num-
ber of situations where, for example, a subsidiary company may want to join its
parent company or vice versa. The "consensual" theory of arbitration is still
protected in as much as the parties must already have chosen to adopt the LCIA
Rules and are permitted to opt out of the rule if they wish.39
An interesting variation on this model in a specialized arbitration tribunal is
the Court of Arbitration for Sport created by the International Olympic Commit-
tee in 1983. 4' The rules provide for both compelled joinder of a party4°1 and a
broad "intervention" rule. 2 Such non-consensual provisions are perhaps only
397. London Maritime Arbitrators Assoc. Terms (2002), Article 14(b).
398. LCIA Arbitration Rules (1998), Article 22.1(h).
399. The same "opt in/opt out" approach is taken in many domestic enactments of the
UNCITRAL Model Law. For example, New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996, Second Schedule,
Clause 2 empowers the tribunal to order consolidation of proceedings (but not joinder of parties)
upon the application of at least one party to the proceedings. This power is excluded from "interna-
tional arbitrations" unless the parties specifically opt in to the additional rule or rules.
400. See generally Jose M. Marxuach, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, 10 WORLD ARB. &
MED. REP. 71 (1999). Awards rendered are enforceable under domestic international arbitration
legislation, such as in Switzerland. See Grundel v. Int'l Equestrian Fed., Tribunal Federal Suisse,
Mar. 15, 1993, 8 INT'L ARB. REP. F-I (1983).
401. Rule 41.2: "If a respondent intends to cause a third party to participate in the arbitration, it
shall so state in its answer, together with the reasons therefore, and file an additional copy of its
answer. The Court Office shall communicate this copy to the person the participation of which is
requested and set such person a time-limit to state its position on its participation and to submit a
response pursuant to Article R39. It shall also set a time-limit for a claimant to express its position
on the participation of a third party."
402. Rule 41.3: "If a third party intends to participate as a party in the arbitration, it shall file
with the CAS an application to this effect, together with the reasons therefore within the time-limit
set for the respondent's answer to the request for arbitration. To the extent applicable, such applica-
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feasible in a small membership-based organization such as the International
Olympic Committee.
5. Procedural Mechanisms: Commentary
Five brief conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. First, it is
striking that England, with its traditionally strict limitations on the ability of a
third party to participate in international arbitration, has indirectly remedied
some of the "injustices" 3 this creates by implementing legislative procedural
mechanisms. Thus, as seen in Rousell, by applying the seemingly innocuous
"through or under" provision, a third party has been able to obtain a stay of liti-
gation pending arbitration without relying on broader concepts such as the
French "group of companies" doctrine or the United States third party benefici-
ary principle. It will be interesting to see whether the wider "through or under"
provision in section 82(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 becomes more broadly
applied to situations other than a mere stay of litigation.
Second, there has been an increasing tendency for courts to favor either in-
creased third party participation or, as an alternative remedy, an increased use of
the court's discretionary powers to grant a stay of litigation pending the arbitra-
tion, so as to protect a third party's position.
Third, at least in the United States and France, there is particular deference
given to international arbitration agreements in terms of protecting third party
interests and in applying domestic procedural rules consistent with policies fa-
voring arbitration amongst international parties (e.g. Anderra Energy Corp.).
Fourth, there is ongoing tension between judicial efficiency concerns (e.g.
wanting to ensure an efficient use of court and parties' resources) and a contrac-
tarian desire to limit the arbitration to only those parties bound by the agreement
thereby leaving the other parties to pursue litigation. It is suggested that the
displeasure expressed by the English court in Wealands in forcing a split be-
tween the arbitrable and non-arbitratable claims and parties, could be resolved
by a more creative application of the broad discretion the court enjoys in order-
ing stays (as applied by the United States courts, e.g. Anderra Energy Corp.).
Finally, a related issue not directly discussed above, is the effect of the
award on third parties. The basic position in all these jurisdictions is that the res
judicata and collateral estoppel effects of the award are limited only to the par-
ties to the arbitration.' However this principle has been somewhat undermined
tion shall have the same contents as a request for arbitration. The Court Office shall communicate a
copy of this application to the parties and set a time-limit for them to express their position on the
participation of the third party and to file, to the extent applicable, an answer pursuant to Article
R39."
403. The term "injustice" is used to refer to Dr. Blessing's quote in the heading to this article.
See supra note 4.
404. See COE, supra note 266, at 299.
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by contemporary case law. The issue is too complex to discuss here, but by way
of example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has enforced an arbitral
award against a parent nonparty on the basis that it is the alter ego of the signa-
tory subsidiary. 4°5 More remarkably, failure by a non-signatory to challenge the
tribunal's jurisdiction in a timely fashion or to participate in the proceedings
may result in the third party being deemed to have waived its right of objection
on any subsequent challenge to the award.4°  These cases emphasize the impor-
tance of developing clear substantive law on the rights and duties of non-
signatories to participate in arbitration.
B. Choice Of Law/Applicable Law Issues
While already addressed within each of the individual legal theories dis-
cussed, it remains to comment on the overall degree of predictability and uni-
formity of choice of law rules and how that impacts on third party issues. It will
be recalled that, as previously discussed, ' D some commentators have suggested
that third party issues can be decided simply by applying clear choice of law
rules and then relying on the applicable national contract norms. It is suggested
that this is not feasible.
Fundamentally, there is potentially a multiplicity of different applicable
laws at issue. The law applicable to the validity of the arbitration agreement
may well be different to the law applicable to the substantive dispute, which
may in turn be different to the law applicable to the contract giving rise to the
third party's claim for compelling arbitration. To give a concrete example, an
insurance company subrogated to the rights of its insured vessel owner with
respect to a dispute over a cargo contract may have to deal with United States
law as the law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement vis a vis its
position as subrogee (perhaps because the cargo owner has brought suit in the
United States); English law may apply to the dispute over the cargo; and French
law may apply as the governing law of the insurance policy. When one adds to
405. See Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir.
1993) (successful claimant's award had already been reduced to a judgment but was then enforced
against the insolvent respondent's parent company). See also Nauru Phosphate Royalties Inc. v.
Drago Daic Interests, Inc., 138 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1998) (creditor non-party to the arbitration bound
by factual finding of liability in award where its interests were in privity to those of the party that
participated in the arbitration).
406. See Owen-Williams v. Merrill Lynch, 907 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D. Md. 1995).
407. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the "traditional approach").
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this, further complications like state law variations within the United States, the
potential for confusion abounds.
Even if one concentrates only on the validity of the arbitration agreement
vis a vis the non-signatory's claim to be entitled to enforce it, there are different
ways of rationalizing what the applicable laws should be. In the assignment
context, Girsberger & Hausmaninger have examined this problem extensively."°
The authors state:
Because the issue of transfer [by assignment] may be characterized in different ways, there
are several conflict-of-law approaches to the issue. If a court or arbitral tribunal characterizes
the question of arbitrability or of the scope and effects of an arbitration agreement or its inter-
pretation as a procedural matter, it may apply the lexfori, based on the general conflict-of-law
principles that the forum applies only foreign substantive law, but uses its own procedural
law. If it characterizes those questions as a substantive matter, it may apply the conflict of
law rules applicable to contractual matters. In this case, the chosen conflict-of-law approach
may still differ, depending on whether the issue is considered to be one of assignability or
scope and effects of the assignment, or one of arbitrability or scope and effects of the arbitra-
tion agreement. Finally, as a combination of the procedural and the substantive approaches
applied, a competent jurisdiction may use either one of these conflict-of-law approaches, or a
combination thereof.4° 9
Nevertheless, in terms of selecting the applicable law, there is at least some
uniformity across all three jurisdictions reviewed in this article in as much as
they appear to give at least considerable weight to the expectations of the par-
410ties.
However, as a final complication, some tribunals have also sought to re-
solve non-signatory issues by referring to not only the parties' intent but also
anational or transnational principles of law. Such a "cumulative" approach to
applying the conflict of laws rules has been identified as being the "principal
method" in ICC arbitrations.41 In Isover4"2 the respondent challenged the ICC's
jurisdiction with respect to subsidiary non-signatory companies on the basis that
it had never entered into an arbitration agreement with either. The arbitral tribu-
408. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 149-61.
409. Id. at 150.
410. For an English example see Arbitration Act 1996, section 4; compare Union of India v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48. For a United States example see comments in
Chelsea Square Textiles Inc. v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co., 189 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 1999). For a
French example see FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 437, at 230 (citing Cass. le civ., December 20
1993, Comit6 populaire de la municipalit6 de Khoms El Mergeb v. Dalico Contractors ("[t]he exis-
tence and effectiveness of the arbitration agreement are to be assessed, subject to the mandatory
rules of French law and international public policy, on the basis of the parties' common inten-
tions")).
411. See William Lane Craig, International Ambition and National Restraint in the ICC, ARB.
INT'L 49, 65 (1985).
412. Dow Chem. v. Isover Saint Gobain, I.C.C. Case No. 4131 (September 23, 1982), REVUE
DE L'ARBITRAGE 137 (1984), in IX YEARBK. COM. ARB. 131 (1984).
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nal rejected this challenge and reached its conclusion based not just on the
French law (the chosen substantive law) but rather stated:
[T]he sources of law applicable to determine the scope and effects of an arbitration clause
providing for international arbitration do not necessarily coincide with the law applicable to
the merits of the dispute submitted to such arbitration... [t]he tribunal shall accordingly de-
termine the scope and effects of the arbitration clauses in question ... by reference to the
common intent of the parties . . . and also by taking into account, following a particular
French case law relating to international arbitration, usages conforming to the needs of inter-
national commerce.. 413
The Paris Court of Appeals rejected the subsequent challenge to the award. 414
The Paris Court confirmed that the law applicable to determine the scope and
effect of an arbitration clause need not necessarily be the substantive law chosen
by the parties to govern the merits of the dispute and that in any event the ICC
Rules were sufficiently broad to permit the consideration of contract terms and
trade usage. Thus, the decision stands for the proposition that an ICC arbitrator
can make choice of law decisions independent of the national choice of law
rules and indeed can apply an anational set of rules, although once again based
on the intentions of the parties.
C. Enforcement Issues/Form Requirements
Briefly, while a non-signatory third party may be able successfully to com-
pel arbitration and obtain an award applying one of the legal theories discussed
above, it may still encounter difficulties in enforcing the resulting award or in a
subsequent application to have the award set aside. This issue is inextricably
linked to the minimum "form" requirements for an international arbitration
agreement.
As already discussed, the New York Convention on Recognition and En-
forcement of Arbitral Awards (1958) is the primary international mechanism for
recognition and enforcement of awards. 45 Article II of the Convention provides
that it applies only to an award arising from an "agreement in writing" that has
413. Id. § 3; reproduced in Craig, supra note 411, at 66.
414. Isover Saint Gobain v. Dow Chemical, 21 Oct. 1983, in IX YEARBK. COM. ARB. 132
(1984)
415. Note also that some international arbitral institutions may have specific procedures for
challenging an award and also specific form requirements that might be relevant to a challenge
premised on non-signatory issues. Most important of these is the annulment procedure provided for
in the ICSID Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States and Chapter VII of the Arbitration Rules promulgated thereunder. See Aron Broches,
Observations on the Finality ofICSID Awards, 6 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. LAW J. 321 (1991).
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been "signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams."
There is a vast body of commentary on this provision.416 For present purposes, it
suffices to say, first, that the form requirements generally have been liberally
applied. For example, in the United States a valid agreement has been found in
the absence of a signature, but on the basis of a long-standing business relation-
ship.417 Another agreement was upheld because "the clear weight of authority
holds that the most minimal indication of the parties' intent to arbitrate must be
given full effect, especially in international disputes."4 8 However, the caselaw
is unsettled, particularly in the United States, and there is always some danger
that a strict approach will be taken.419 Second, all three of the legal systems in
this study have to some extent adopted more lenient requirements, i.e. the Con-
vention sets only the minimum standards.42° Third, arguably, there is a distinc-
tion between fulfilling Article 11(2) in the context of a motion to compel as op-
posed to enforcement of an award.42'
As to the actual grounds for challenge to an award, in the non-signatory
context this is most likely to arise in one of two ways. First, Article V(1)(a)
provides that an award may be refused recognition where "[tihe said agreement
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made."
416. See e.g. ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958, at 217 (1981); F.A. Mann, An "Agreement in Writing" to Arbitrate, 3 ARB. INT'L 171 (1987);
Neil Kaplan, Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law
Out of Step with Commercial Practice? 12 ARB. INT'L 27 (1996). For a recent and illuminating
discussion see Toby Landau, 'The Requirement of a Written Form for an Arbitration Agreement,"
16TH ICCA CONGRESS, London (May 2002).
417. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987).
418. Republic of Nicaragua v. Std. Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 478 (9th Cit. 1990).
419. See e.g., Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark International Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir.
1999) (refusing to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in a series of unsigned purchase
orders). See also Bothell v. Hitachi Zosen Corp.,97 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 (W.D. Wash. 2000) ("in
a series of documents where the words used to refer to a proposed arbitration agreement are so vague
as to be meaningless and no further explanation is provided, either by attachment, discussion or
otherwise, the totality of the documents exchanged ... does not constitute a valid 'arbitration agree-
ment' under the [New York] Convention").
420. See supra note 332 and accompanying text discussing the English Arbitration Act 1996.
However, note that it is an unresolved issue, at least in the United States, as to whether these more
lenient standards apply to any application premised on the New York Convention. See Chloe Z
Fishing Co., Inc. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1246 (S.D. Cal. 2000) ("Arti-
cle 11 of the [New York] Convention exhaustively defines what constitutes an 'agreement in writing'
under Chapter 2 of the FAA" but on the facts accepting that the parties' conduct in negotiating and
purchasing the insurance policies constituted "an exchange of letters or telegrams" for the purposes
of Article 11(2)).
421. See Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., No. 01 Civ 1285(DAB), 2002 WL 31268635, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2002) (holding Kahn Lucas inapplicable as limited only to the context of a motion
to compel arbitration); compare Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 418, note 7 (accepting that New York
Convention, Article 1 applies to an application to enforce an award but stating that this does not
preclude enforcement of an award arising from a non-signatory situation).
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Second, and probably more likely, there may be a challenge under Article
V(I)(c) where the "[a]ward deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration ...."
As to procedure, parties may bring a challenge either in the court at the seat
of the arbitration or upon enforcement action being taken in that or another state.
A well known example of the first scenario is the Pyramids case4 22 in which the
Paris Court of Appeals set aside an arbitral award with respect to respondent
Egypt on the basis that there was no valid arbitration agreement. Similarly, in
Westland Helicopters,4 23 the Swiss Federal Tribunal confirmed the setting aside
of an interim award on the basis that the arbitration agreement could not be ex-
tended to the Arab states which controlled the signatory trading entity.424 As to
the second scenario, a New York federal court recently enforced an award ren-
dered by an Egyptian arbitral tribunal that had found a U.S. parent non-signatory
bound by the arbitration agreement and therefore jointly and severally liable
with its subsidiary for damages. 425 The court refused to revisit the tribunal's
finding that the parent was bound by the agreement and held that none of the
parent company's arguments constituted grounds on which enforcement could
be denied under New York Convention, Article V.426 In particular, it found that
the proposition that non-signatories could be bound to an arbitration agreement
did not contravene U.S. public policy for the purpose of Article V(l)(e).427
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: CONCLUSIONS
The commentary sections following each of the "legal theory" discussions
above have already provided specific conclusions on each of the addressed legal
doctrines. The following section offers five broader conclusions addressing the
422. Pyramids case, supra at note 40, at 752.
423. Westland Helicopters, supra note 23, at 688.
424. Id. (the award was only set aside in respect to Egypt absent any challenge by the other
state non-signatories).
425. Sarhank Group, v. Oracle Corp., No. 01 Civ 1285(DAB), 2002 WL 31268635 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 2002).
426. The tribunal's finding based on "a theory of partnership akin to veil piercing" (Sarhank,
id. at *7) had already been upheld by the Egyptian courts in an unsuccessful motion to set aside.
427. "The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that non-signatories to an arbitration agreement
may nevertheless be bound" and the theory espoused by the Egyptian tribunal "cannot be said to
undermine our most basic notions of morality and justice." Id. Importantly, because the parent
company "had ample notice and was represented by counsel and by pleading at the arbitration ... [it]
failed to demonstrate a violation of its right to due process of law." Id.
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questions posed in the Introduction. These conclusions will then serve as the
basis for the remaining sections, which focus on options for reform.
A. The "Third Party Problem" Does Exist
The comparative project in Section III identifies certain problems that arise
within each of the jurisdictions and also problems that arise across all three legal
systems. These problems are manifested in five key ways.
First, there is inconsistency within each jurisdiction's application of specific
legal theories. Even on such a common issue as whether an arbitration clause is
incorporated by reference, the position in England remains unclear. While the
Arbitration Act 1996 sought to resolve the inconsistent opinions expressed in
Aughton 2s the statutory reform itself leaves unanswered several questions about
how to apply the doctrine. So too in the United States with respect to the split
between those circuits which apply the "direct benefit" test429 to establishing that
a party is estopped from refusing to arbitrate and those which rely on the "two-
prong" test. 3° These distinctions could well produce different outcomes.
Second, there is inconsistency of approach between the three jurisdictions in
this study. Thus, the third party beneficiary hypothetical above43" ' reveals the
potential for different results in each of England, the United States and France.
Likewise, in the case of the application of the doctrine of "incorporation by ref-
erence," as evidenced in some different approaches to charter parties and bills of
lading.432 Different overarching jurisprudential notions, such as the French posi-
tion affected by a less formalistic notion of the "party" to a contract,433 the appli-
cation of the "principle of validity, 434 and the automatic transmission of the
arbitration clause along with the transfer of the main contract by assignment or
succession exacerbate these differences. 435 Similarly, what might appear to be
only minor differences in the details of applying the doctrine can in fact have
major potential consequences. For instance, the "nexus" limb of the equitable
estoppel test applied in the Eleventh Circuit in the United States has frequently
been applied to extend the arbitration agreement to a third party beyond the
much more limited approach in England.436
428. Aughton, 57 BUILDING LAW REP. 1.
429. See Deloitte Noraudit AIS, 9 F.3d at 1060 and see supra note 281 and accompanying text.
430. See Sunkist Soft Drinks, 10 F.3d at 753 and see supra note 291 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
432. See supra note 327 and accompanying text, compare supra note 346 and accompanying
text.
433. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
434. See FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 418, at 214-217.
435. Id. at § 712, at 427. See also comments of Messrs. Fouchard, Oppetit & Delvolve, in
Arbitrage, supra note 30, at 469-470 (despite the "separability" principle).
436. Compare Sunkist Soft Drinks Inc., 10 F.3d at 753 and Roussel-Uclaf [1978] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. at 225 (dealt with as a "through or under" case).
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Third, the comparative project has revealed doctrinal overlaps and confu-
sion as to how to characterize the third party scenario. Thus, in Detlev von Ap-
pen,437 the court speaks almost in one breath of the transactions involving all of
assignment, subrogation and succession. 38 In the United States, the third party
beneficiary principle has been inconsistently applied so as sometimes to permit a
signatory claimant to enforce the "burden" of an arbitration agreement against a
non-signatory.4 39 Meanwhile, courts have routinely employed the estoppel prin-
ciple where the third party beneficiary principle would provide a more doctri-
nally sound basis for extension of the agreement. 44°
Fourth, transnational differences are exacerbated by conflicting choice of
law rules 4' and uncertain division of responsibility between courts and arbitral
tribunals." 2 The former encourages forum shopping, may create difficulties in
enforcement, makes it difficult to contract with certainty and, even if the parties
have addressed the issue, may ultimately lead to a court imposing a different law
on the parties than that intended (e.g. by applying anational principles). As to
the latter, the United States position of having such "arbitrability" issues deter-
mined by the courts is in stark contrast to the standard position in France in
which the issue is left to the arbitrators. Such differences create in applicable
law and jurisdiction creates uncertainty in dealing with third party issues. 43
Fifth, many of the aforementioned inconsistencies and uncertainties also re-
sult in the marginalization of the concept of consent to the arbitration agreement.
This has already been identified and discussed above, however it is a striking
characteristic of many of the cases examined. To take just one example, a case
such as Enron reveals a doctrinal confusion that results in non-parties being
bound to arbitrate where this does not appear to have been the intention of any
of the parties or nonparties at the time of entering in to the contract. This issue
will be the focus of the final section.
In conclusion, more than just an academic abstraction, the third party prob-
lem is of real significance. Not only does it create uncertainty in conducting
international transactions but it also has serious implications for international
dispute resolution. This is seen most graphically in the third party who, al-
though not having participated in the arbitration, finds itself constrained by the
437. Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 291.
438. Id. at 293.
439. See e.g. Ex Parte Dyess, 709 So. 2d at 450 discussed supra note 233.
440. See supra notes 293 and 299 and accompanying text.
441. See supra Section IV.B.
442. See generally supra note 101.
443. See e.g. Bell Ray Co., 181 F.3d at 445.
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factual or legal findings in the resulting award 4' and is equally evident in the
infamous decade-long battle to obtain an enforceable award due to third party
complications in the Westland Helicopters case. 4 5
B. Common Concerns Expressed In Third Party Situations
Despite the inconsistencies identified above, the three jurisdictions do share
certain common policy concerns in trying to deal with the third party problem,
even if methods for resolving them may differ.
First, there is a concern for the position of the original promisor whose con-
sent to the arbitration agreement may have been conditioned on the prospects of
an arbitration with the original promisee (not the third party). Such concerns
come to light where it is the third party claiming against the promisor, either by
way of arbitration (in which case the court is concerned that the promisor did not
bargain on arbitrating with the particular third party) or by litigation (in which
case the court is concerned that the promisor bargained on resolving disputes by
arbitration). These concerns are all the more pressing where the third party may
be more (or less) financially able to meet the costs of international commercial
arbitration and honor any award, e.g. where the promisee international corpora-
tion assigns its interest to a nominee shelf company or, conversely, where the
rights of a small time operator are subrogated to a well-financed internationally
savvy and litigious insurance company.446 Another concern identified by Girs-
berger and Hausmaninger is that the third party may be more advantageously
placed in the arbitration, e.g. where he is a national of the pre-chosen arbitral
seat, is more conversant in the applicable law originally chosen for its neutrality,
or has some kind of relationship with a preselected arbitrator." 7
Second, there is a concern for the position of the third party who has been
"dragged into" an arbitration, either as respondent in an arbitral claim by the
promisor or as a plaintiff in litigation that she is subsequently compelled to arbi-
444. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
445. See Westland Helicopters, supra at note 23, at 1071. See WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 258
(1994) (noting settlement of case).
446. English courts seem particularly concerned with the cost implications of introducing a
new or substituted party to the arbitration. See Ocean Laser Shipping, [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 225
(where the promisee remains a party to the arbitration, cost implications can be resolved by the
arbitrators in their discretion). See London Steamship Owners, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21 (where the
promisee drops out of the pending arbitration the new third party should be held liable for any costs
incurred by the claimant for which the promisee is not responsible).
447. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 145-46. Certainly the last of these and
possibly the other two would demand corrective measures (perhaps based on the principle of equal
treatment of parties in UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 18). Alternatively, it is pointed out that such
evidence would go towards an argument that the arbitration agreement was not intended to be ex-
tended to that particular third party or may even constitute a personal, and therefore non-transferable
arbitration agreement intuitu personae.
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trate. The justification here is the obvious one that the third party did not enjoy
the opportunity to negotiate the original agreement, may not have enjoyed the
collateral benefits of other terms in the main contact which justified including
the arbitration provision, or may not even have been aware of the arbitration
agreement.
In the jurisdictions included in this study, courts and arbitrators have in-
creasingly marginalized these concerns. With respect to the promisor's con-
cerns, especially in the United States, the logic seems to be that "you reap what
you sow," i.e. having chosen to arbitrate all disputes arising out of a contract
these extend also to disputes with the third party (as seen most dramatically in
the equitable estoppel cases). Often this is justified by focussing on the broad
scope of the subject matter anticipated by the arbitration agreement rather than
probing the parties' intention to extend the agreement to the particular third
party."4
As to concern for the third party, in the United States and France the analy-
sis of claims by signatories centers on the relationship between the third party
and the promisee, i.e. is it reasonable for the third party to fulfill the promisor's
expectation it would arbitrate with the promisee? Where it is the third party who
has sought to sue and is being compelled to arbitrate, the courts have looked at
the subject matter of the third party's claim and whether it falls within the scope
of the arbitration agreement, the third party's relationship to the promisee, and
whether the third party has received any benefit from the main contract which
contains the arbitration agreement. Such analysis proceeds under various labels:
estoppel; third party beneficiary; group of companies doctrine; or is simply ap-
plied without relying on any stand alone doctrine (e.g. the V2000 test).
Addressing these concerns ultimately is a matter of establishing what were
the intentions of the parties. As will be discussed shortly, all three jurisdictions
use this as the yardstick for measuring the appropriateness of extending the arbi-
tration agreement. However, this analysis has been compromised by frequent
reliance on a blanket "policy" to uphold arbitration agreements."
448. This is tellingly seen in the confused use of the term "arbitrability" in dealing with the
issue of who is a valid party to the agreement. See e.g., First Options, 514 U.S. at 938.
449. Before leaving the topic of "common concerns", note that two concerns one might have
thought to be prevalent are mentioned only rarely. First, there is little reference to the position of the
promisee who transfers her rights and thereby may or may not remain bound to arbitrate disputes to
the extent still legally interested in such. See e.g. Bank v. Bank, I.C.C Award No. 6733 (1992), 121
JOURNAL DU DROIT INT'L 1038 (1994) (in the subrogation context); Samuel, supra note 6, at 102
("[w]hat little material exists in this area suggests that after an assignment, the assignor remains a
party to the arbitral agreement"). Second, there is only passing discussion of the practical effect of
adding the non-signatory to the arbitration as an extra party in terms of interfering with such issues
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C. The Policy Of Promoting International Commercial Arbitration
Recent court decisions from all three jurisdictions have ultimately held that
extension of the agreement to a third party has been at least partially influenced
by a policy to uphold arbitration agreements: "the federal policy [that] strongly
favors arbitration;"45 a direction that "courts should if the circumstances allow
lean in favor of giving effect to the arbitration clause;"45' and the French "prin-
ciple of validity" which exempts an arbitration agreement from all but French
mandatory rules and international public policy.4 52 While United States courts
emphasize that the policy should not impinge on the principle that "[a] party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed
to submit, 4 53 one has to question why it is so frequently cited in the first place.
This pro-arbitration policy applies even more strongly to international dis-
putes, expressed in the United States in the language of "considerations of inter-
national comity" or that enforcement is "an almost indispensable pre-condition
to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction."" The same is seen in France, to the extent that interna-
tional arbitration is accorded special treatment in terms of substantive rules ap-
plied to the conduct of the arbitral tribunal45 5 and subsequent enforcement of
foreign awards,4 56 and to some extent in England.457
Notably, Fouchard & Gaillard support the cour de cassation's rejection of
special interpretation based on the principle of in favorem validitas:
Where the disputed issue is whether a party agreed to be bound by an arbitration agreement, it
is unhelpful to refer to the "validity" and "effectiveness" of an agreement that may not even
have been concluded in the first place. Here, the debate is unconnected with both the princi-
ple of autonomy and that of the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement. The only relevant
as appointment of the tribunal and sharing of arbitration costs. Some institutional rules have at-
tempted to deal with this scenario. See ICC Rules (1998), Article 10; LCIA Rules (1998), Article
8.1. See also Dominique T. Hascher, Consolidation of Arbitration by American Courts: Fostering or
Hampering International Commercial Arbitration?, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 127 (1983) (discussing the
difficulties of third party rights).
450. Collins, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1465 (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nay.
Co. 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).
451. Astro-Vencedor Compania Naveira S.A. v. Mabanaft G.M.B.H. [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
267, 271 (per Mocatta J).
452. C.A. Paris, June 19, 1970, Hecht v. Buisman's JCP. This is the basis for the intention test
in V2000, discussed supra at note 252 and accompanying text.
453. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582.
454. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (This applies not in the extension of
the arbitration agreement context but in the arbitrability of securities law claims).
455. N.C.P.C. Title V, Arts. 1492-97.
456. Id.
457. See Arbitration Act 1996, Part 11 (applying only to domestic arbitration provisions, al-
though never actually entered into force).
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issue in such cases is the proof of the existence and the extent of the parties' consent to the
arbitration agreement, which is an entirely different question.
458
This must be correct as any general "presumption of validity" or "policy favor-
ing arbitration" cannot be a substitute for consent to arbitration. The application
of such policy arguments is at best unjustified and, at worst, counterproductive
to finding a reasoned solution to the third party problem.
45 9
D. Parties' Intention As A Common Touchstone
All three jurisdictions have as their Grundnorm for extending the arbitration
agreement a test based on whether this would be in accordance with the inten-
tions of the parties. The importance of "intention" differs across the jurisdic-
tions. At one end of the spectrum, is the French position that intention is enough
in and of itself to extend the arbitration agreement to a third party.4 6° In the
United States, intention to include a third party is but one (albeit necessary)
element in various of the legal theories employed to extend the arbitration
agreement.461  In England, intention is also important but is more likely to be
associated with other legal requirements (e.g. the sufficient designation test in
the new C(RTP) Act 1999)2 or constrained by formality requirements (e.g.
section 126 of the Law of Property Act 1925).463
A similar spectrum exists with respect to the fundamental issue of the scope
of the inquiry permitted to ascertain intention. France, as seen in the V2000
case, enjoys the most "liberal" policy, in that even mere "direct involvement"
with the performance of the contract "can raise the presumption that the con-
tracting parties' true intention was that the non-signatory party would be bound
by the agreement. '"" The French approach also judges the third party's intent
458. FoucHARD, supra note 11, § 440 (citing Cass. le Civ. June 11 1991, Orii v. Societ6 des
Lubrifiants Elf Aquitaine, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 95 (1992) (emphasis added)).
459. An example of such counterproductivity is the proposition that automatic transmission of
arbitration clauses may actually weaken the attractiveness of arbitration. See Girsberger & Haus-
maninger, supra note 73, at 141 (citing for the converse proposition Werner, supra note 73, at 17).
These "institutional issues" will be returned to in the final section.
460. See e.g. V2000, supra at note 250 and accompanying text.
461. See e.g. In re Prudential Ins. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 133 F.3d at 225 (applying third
party beneficiary doctrine).
462. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
463. See KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
464. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 499.
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on his or her "involvement" with the main contract as a whole, rather than re-
quiring some separate indication of consent to the arbitration agreement.
465
In the United States, the court in Thomson emphasized that the arbitration
agreement "[c]ould not be so broadly construed as to encompass claims and
parties that were not intended by the original contract. ' '41 Yet courts have been
willing to venture into the "close relationship between the entities involved, as
well as the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory's obligations
and duties in the contract . . . and [the fact that] the claims were intimately
founded in and intertwined with the underlying contractual obligations."4 7 In-
deed, much of the United States courts' expansive use of the estoppel doctrine in
this context is really a backhanded way of inferring intent from the parties' rep-
resentations (particularly in the case where a non-signatory seeks to establish
that the signatory held itself out as willing to arbitrate). 468 United States courts
are also willing to undertake some economic analysis, e.g. in probing the "close
relationship" between the promisee and third party. 469 However this is usually
justified on some other legal doctrine (e.g. "piercing the corporate veil") rather
than being part of an intention inquiry for its own sake. Compare the position in
France As in France, courts and tribunals are willing to gauge intent based on
the parties' intention to be bound to the main contract rather than focusing on
the arbitration agreement itself. Finally, critics also contend that the "pro-
arbitration policy" operates sometimes as a substitute for contractual intent.
470
In England the position is less clear. In applying the "through or under"
mechanism for obtaining a stay in the earlier Arbitration Act, courts were will-
ing to undertake relatively broad inquiries into, for example, corporate structure
and proximity to the dispute. 47' A similar analysis may be undertaken in finding
that an ad hoc arbitration agreement had arisen between the original promisor
465. V2000, supra note 251, as translated in FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 499.
466. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 776.
467. Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., 10 F.3d at 757 cert denied 513 U.S. 869 (1994) (quoting McBro
Planning & Dev. Co., 741 F.2d at 344).
468. In this case, the representations could meaningfully be relied on as an indication of intent
to extend the agreement to that particular non-signatory (as manifested by the representations made)
however the court often satisfies itself with the less precise inquiry of whether the signatory repre-
sented that it intended to arbitrate the claims (ignoring the issue of the third party's identity). This
approach also obfuscates the important issue of when such intention should be measured, i.e. at the
time of entering into the arbitration agreement, when transfer of the rights to the third party occurs,
or once the dispute arises.
469. J. J. Ryan & Sons Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th Cir.
1988).
470. See e.g., Steve Walt, Decision by Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial
Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 369, 398 (1999).
471. Roussel-Uclaf, [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 225.
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and/or promisee and the third party.472 However, these cases are few and of
limited application. Rather, the more common approach is that seen in the "in-
corporation by reference" cases, in which analysis of the parties' intentions takes
place only within the "four comers" of the documents at issue.473 A similar
desire to restrain the scope of inquiry into the parties' intent was evidenced in
the drafting of the C(RTP) Act 1996, although this has yet to be judicially dis-
cussed. 474 Perhaps consistent with this, with some exceptions,... in considering
the parties' intentions to expand the arbitration agreement to a third party Eng-
lish law still appears to focus separately on intention to be bound by the arbitra-
tion agreement itself.
However, the "spectrum" identified above should not detract from the ob-
servation that there is a discernible convergence of sorts in the treatment of third
party situations in arbitration law.476 Similarly, the rise of the broader intention
test has been accompanied by a decline in the importance of formal validity
requirements in all three jurisdictions.477 This convergence will be further dis-
cussed in the next section in the context of options for reform.
Finally, the touchstone of "intent" is also a feature of the principles of inter-
national law and the institutional rules analyzed as part of the comparative law
project. Certainly a theory based on the intention of the parties falls squarely
within such important transnational concepts as "good faith" and "pacta sunt
servanda". Moreover, arbitral tribunals applying international law concepts
have been more willing on the whole than those applying national substantive
law to extend third party agreements.478
472. See Almare Societ~ddi Navigazione S.P.A. v. Derby & Co. Ltd., The Almare Prima,
[1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 376 (no agreement found); Hoesch Export AG v. Hansa Projekt Transport,
The World Umpire [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 374.
473. See e.g. Aughton, 57 BUILDING L. REP. at 87.
474. See LAW COMMISSION REPORT 242, supra note 175, at § 4.17 (commenting that the more
expansive "intention to benefit" test "has, in practice, failed to achieve consistent results").
475. See e.g. Northern Reg. Health Auth., [1994] 2 All E.R. 175 (CA); see also section 8 of the
C(RTP) Act 1999.
476. See W. Lorenz, Contracts and Third Party Rights in German and English Law, in THE
GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE
OF THE 21sT CENTURY 65 et. seq. (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1994) (discussing convergence in the
general contract law context of English and German third party rights).
477. See supra Section IV.C.
478. See e.g. International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration: Interim Award Re-
garding Jurisdiction in the Arbitration Between Westland Helicopters Ltd. and The Organization for
Industrialization, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Arab British Helicopter Com-
pany, 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 1071, 1071 (1984) ("Everything in this case depends on the intention
expressed by the parties in the arbitration clause. It is necessary and therefore sufficient in principle
that they wish to bind themselves for the arbitrators to have jurisdiction at the same time against all
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E. Reliance On Contract Law Principles
Finally, a comment in answer to the introductory question: to what degree
does the arbitral law applied to the third party problem mirror the general con-
tract law position on third parties? Courts in all three jurisdictions have clearly
stated that contract law determines whether a person is bound to a valid arbitra-
tion agreement. In the United States, the Supreme Court has directed that courts
"apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." '479
In France, "the principles of interpretation that apply to arbitration agreements
are the same as the general principles frequently adopted with regard to all con-
tracts."'4 80 In England, "English law respects the parties' freedom to enter into
arbitration agreements in the same way it respects the freedom to enter into
other contracts." '' Yet one could argue that the third party context is different:
the question is not whether a person is necessarily a "party" to the arbitration
agreement but rather whether the person is bound thereto despite not having
signed the agreement. This is a distinction courts and commentators have not
been willing to make. Rather, the comparative analysis untertaken in Section LII
evidences a clear decision to apply third party contract principles on the basis
that the problem involves the same application of substantive contract law as is
required for determining the parties to the agreement. The final section dis-
cusses the correctness of this approach.
Before doing so, however, note that despite the courts' frequent declaration
that an arbitration agreement will be treated like any other contract, this is not
always so. Sometimes the arbitration clause may be subject to a more restrictive
interpretation than would otherwise apply.4 82 In other cases, the court is more
willing to extend the arbitration clause a more liberal interpretation."' On occa-
sion, the courts have even applied a specially tailored test based on the commer-
cial nature of arbitration provisions.4 84 Thus, there is some truth to the observa-
tion that the arbitration agreement is "governed by special rules." '485 The final
section of this article will return to the relationship between arbitration, contract
of them and for one of them to be able to initiate proceedings against all of the other parties within
one set of arbitral proceedings").
479. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
480. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 476.
481. RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, supra note 64, at § 2-003, at 28.
482. See e.g. Aughton, supra note 267, at 326, at 87 (there must be "very clear language to oust
the jurisdiction of the Court").
483. See e.g. Northern Reg. Health Auth., [1994] 2 All E.R. at 183 (extending the arbitration
agreement to a subcontractor because of the "unique contractual relations developed").
484. See e.g. The Annefield [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 252, 263 (1970) (interpreting an arbitration
clause on the test of "what an ordinary businessman.., would think with regard to the application"
of such a clause).
485. SAMUEL, supra note 6, at 41. Also cited in A. BERNARD, L'ARBITRAGE VOLONTAIRE EN
DROITE PRIVt 28 (1937).
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law, the "intention test," and the notion of the arbitration agreement as a "spe-
cial" contract.
VI. PossIBLE SOLUTIONS To THE THIRD PARTY PROBLEM
Having accepted the existence of a "third party problem" and concluded
that this impedes the efficiency and certainty of international commercial arbi-
tration as a tool of international commerce, this section compiles alternative
solutions to the problem.
A. Relying On Individual Contract Drafters
In the absence of a uniform identical rule, some standard form contracts
provide their own contractual term delineating the boundaries of third party
involvement in any arbitration.486 Ultimately, of course, the ideal outcome is
exactly that: parties should turn their minds to the problem and create a clear
allocation of responsibility in the event of a dispute arising. Indeed, in complex
networks of contracts this may be the norm. 87 However, in most instances this
is unlikely simply because, as a "matter of psychology," it is difficult in negoti-
ating an agreement to "contemplat[e] in detailed terms the problems" that may
attend the breakdown of a successfully completed relationship. 8'
Furthermore, parties may well be unable to predict legal variables that may
ultimately impact on the issue such as the applicable law of a subsequent third
party claim or factual variables like the later insolvency of a party. Indeed, the
third party problem arises in part due to the unpredictability of international
transactions and, in particular, long term contracts. This business uncertainty
combined with the legal uncertainty already identified has prompted some
486. For example: the FIDIC Sub-contract form for use in international contracting with the
main FIDIC contract form, sub-clause 19.2; the "blue form contractual provisions for multi-party
arbitration," subclause 18(10); so-called "name-borrowing" whereby a sub-contractor is contractu-
ally entitled to bring a claim against the employer in the name of the main contractor. The latter is
often used in conjunction with the JCT standard form but was disparaged as being "doctrinally
unsound" in Northern Reg. Health Auth., [1994] 2 All E.R. at 23-24 (per Dunn U).
487. B6ckstiegel, supra note 21, at 197 ("Finally, almost all contracts in this field [international
construction and infrastructure projects] are tailor-made for one specific project even if certain
model contracts such as those of FIDIC are used. Therefore, the usual guidance by national contract
law or international principles such as the Unidroit principles are either not applicable or do not suit
the specific contractual relationship.").
488. A.T. von Mehren, To what extent is international commercial arbitration autonomous? in
LE DROIT DES RELATIONS tCONOMIQUE INTERNATIONALES: tTUDES OFFERTES A BERTHOLD
GOLDMAN 217, 226 (1982).
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commentators to suggest that the "safest answer" to the third party arbitration
problem is simply to insert a clause explicitly negating any possible extension to
third parties.489 This "safe option" may have not only unintended circumstances
(e.g. in a subsequent insolvency) but may also represent a missed opportunity to
include some explicit mechanism for dealing with third party issues, e.g. explic-
itly incorporating a subcontract. Acknowledging the practical restrictions on
contract drafters, reliance on individual action to resolve third party issues is
unwise. 49°
B. Piecemeal Reform
Certain statutory and common law exceptions have been developed to clar-
ify whether third parties are entitled to rely on an arbitration agreement despite a
lack of privity, e.g. case law arising out of the Third Party (Rights Against In-
surers) Act 1930 in England;49' and the autonomy of a bank guarantee from any
arbitration agreement in France.492 While these examples reflect domestic law,
there is no reason why international treaties could not undertake a similar role to
effect universal piecemeal reform. 493
While something is better than nothing, such piecemeal efforts may in fact
be counter-productive as they may usurp the urgency of obtaining a comprehen-
sive solution.494 Furthermore, piecemeal reform may create injustices where the
underlying business transaction does not fit entirely within the recognized sub-
ject matter for third party arbitration rights. For example, a trustee in bank-
ruptcy may be able to compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of the bank-
rupt's contract but the dispute may also involve another third party unable to
avail itself of such procedures (e.g., a guarantor of a loan). Further complica-
489. Blessing, Extension of the Arbitration Clause to Non-Signatories, in AAMCA, supra note
54, at 163-164; see also Wright, supra note 198, at 138.
490. Of course even if a clear international solution to the third party problem was developed,
the principle of party autonomy should still dictate that a clear contractual prohibition on the exten-
sion of the arbitration agreement would trump all other arguments.
491. British & Foreign & TMM Transcap, [1998] I.L.PR. at 838, at § 38, citing Firma C-Trade
S.A. v. Newcastle Prot. & Indem., [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 191 (H.L.). See supra note 142 and ac-
companying text. See also London Steamship Owners, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 21 (discussing
position where arbitration proceedings have already commenced).
492. See Bernard Hanotiau, Arbitration and Bank Guarantees, 16(2) J. INT'L ARB'N 15
(1999).
493. This could be in a discrete subject-specific area in which arbitration is common (e.g.,
software distribution) or in a broader substantive convention such as the Convention for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods.
494. An analogy exists to the decline in England of the rule against a contractual beneficiary
enforcing the contract to which she is not a party. Piecemeal legislative reform (e.g. the Third Par-
ties Rights Against Insurers Act 1930) and common law reform (e.g. the device of "Trust of a Prom-
ise) are believed to have slowed the pace of implementing the reforms eventually initiated in the
C(RTP) Act 1999. See Atlas Shipping v. Suisse Atlantique [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 188.
570
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tions could arise where there are questions of the applicable law, such that a
trustee in bankruptcy in one jurisdiction may not have the same rights as in an-
other. In short, piecemeal reform is an unattractive option for establishing a
long term workable rule of general application.
C. Procedural Protections/Powers
The complexity and uncertainty of "protections" for third parties contained
in arbitration legislation, civil procedure rules, and arbitral institution rules have
already been outlined.495 Importantly, these "procedural protections" are usually
nothing more than mechanisms to ameliorate the procedural complications that
arise specifically because non-signatories are not permitted to participate in
arbitration. Therefore, this seems an inappropriate basis for addressing the third
party problem.
A variation on this would be to empower arbitrators or the courts to make
orders analogous to civil litigation joinder or consolidation to address some of
the circumstances where third parties seek involvement in a hearing. However,
applying such reforms could undermine the consensual basis for arbitration and
call into question the legitimacy of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. For the reasons
developed in this Section, it seems preferable to have a jurisdiction-creating rule
premised on an inquiry into consent rather than some more unrestrained discre-
tion enjoyed by the arbitrators or courts. This allows parties to conduct them-
selves, including their initial contracting, with more certainty. It also maintains
the appropriate distinction between arbitration (based on consent) and litigation
(based on compulsion).
D. Strengthening The Choice Of Law/Applicable Law Rules
A less radical option for reform is to accept Professor Sandrock's conten-
tion that the resolution of the third party problem lies in the application of the
"respective rules of national proper laws of contract." '496 However, the inconsis-
tency of proper law makes it difficult to meet the needs of international com-
merce on this issue.497 Thus, one option is to clarify and harmonize choice of
law rules so that parties can contract with a level of predictability in knowledge
of what rules will apply to decide (a) the validity of an agreement vis-A-vis the
495. See supra Section IV.A.
496. Sandrock, supra note 12, at 168.
497. See supra Section IV.B.
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third party, (b) the validity of the contract creating the right in the third party
(e.g. an assignment agreement); and (c) who will decide (a) and (b), i.e. the arbi-
tral tribunal or the courts.
Of course, pursuing such an option would require international coordina-
tion, e.g. a treaty promulgating conflict of laws rules or a model law (or amend-
ment to the existing UNCITRAL Model Law or the New York Convention)
providing a blueprint for national legislation. This is an attractive option in as
much as it uses the existing "traditional" tool of private international law to
resolve the problem. Indeed, there have been advocates of developing a specific
"conflict of laws" set of rules for international arbitration.498 However, there are
four qualifications to the feasibility and desirability of approaching the problem
this way.
First, this theory represents only a "partial solution" in that it would not
achieve harmony of outcome, i.e. an enforceable agreement in one state might
still be unenforceable in another. Rather, it simply clarifies whose law should
determine the issue and by whom that law should be applied. Second, the enor-
mity of the task cannot be underestimated. Other attempts at developing uni-
form rules for the law applicable to arbitration agreements have been unsuccess-
ful4 Although this does not apply to all such attempts,5°° third party issues can
arise in legal fields as diverse as corporate law (group of companies doctrine)
and the law governing assignment. As such, is it even feasible to fashion one
rule for all? Third, and related to the above, if this option were to be pursued, it
could better be made part of a broader project of harmonization by international
agreement (e.g. the Rome Convention) or by lex mercatoria. Fourth, to the
extent that any clarified or harmonized conflicts rules were to be based on other
more traditional doctrines (e.g. supremacy of lex fori), this has the potential to
undermine the parties' intentions and to encourage forum shopping. Both are
results inimical to the attractiveness of international commercial arbitration.
498. Von Mehren, supra note 488, at 277. ("Indeed, scholars have noted that there is a 'strong
argument' to be made for the development of a 'lex mercatoria of conflictual rules... in response to
the special opportunities and challenges that conflicts questions present for the arbitral process."').
499. See e.g. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome, Jun. 19
1980), Art. 1(2)(d) (specifically excluding its application to arbitration agreements). Failure to
achieve a consensus view also stymied efforts to clarify the position of judgments concerning arbi-
tration in the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters (Brussels, 1968). See Dominique Hascher, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
on the Existence and Validity of an Arbitration Clause under the Brussels Convention, 13 ARB'N
INT'L 33 (1997) (discussing the failure to issue a joint declaration or amend the Convention).
500. See e.g. Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention or Art. IX(l) of the European Conven-
tion on International Commercial Arbitration (Geneva, April 21 1961).
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E. Creating A Formal Test For Third Party Arbitration
This option could take many different forms. One possibility is a test that
has as its foundation the principle that an arbitration agreement will bind a third
party non-signatory if this is consistent with the intention of all parties.50' The
justification for this test stems from the use of intention as a touchstone in vari-
ous forms in all three jurisdictions examined and applied (albeit inconsistently)
under all of the legal theories analyzed. Arguably, it is the rule that already ap-
plies generally in French law.
Pursuing this option requires formalizing it into a substantive rule of arbitra-
tion law. Ideally, this would be achieved in an international agreement (e.g. an
amendment to the New York Convention) or a model law that provides a basis
for harmonization at domestic law (e.g. an amendment to the UNCITRAL
Model Law). The desirability of this approach depends greatly on the exact
wording of the mooted law. Ideally, the rule should address all the concerns
identified in the conclusion to the comparative project above.5"2 In some re-
spects, the rule must also achieve a compromise between these concerns, e.g. the
English courts' hesitancy to apply an intention test as widely as that accepted in
France. The drafter of such a rule also faces the daunting task of overcoming
the differences between dissimilar factual situations identified as giving rise to
disparate legal theories, e.g. the range of legal theories applied to the charter
party/bill of lading situation." 3
However, the fundamental objection to such an approach is that present
conventions do not seek to lay down substantive laws for determining who is a
party, so why should they seek to create rules for third parties? Moreover, the
formulation of such a rule raises a host of ancillary questions. Must the dispite
still arise out of "a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not?"
Should the parties ignore the requirement of "an agreement in writing" or does it
act as a useful constraint on the extension to third parties? Must the parties
manifest their intent in writing? Should one set some bounds on the extent to
which one is entitled to refer to documents outside the four corners of the con-
501. And the non-signatory will also be permitted to compel arbitration of a dispute within the
scope of the agreement.
502. See supra Section V.
503. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 164. This argument would support adopt-
ing an international rule for each of the legal theories analyzed. Indeed, models have already been
offered in the assignment field. Id. However, this author's concern is that such piecemeal harmoni-
zation will simply encourage recharacterization of a particular scenario to suit the outcome desired.
If piecemeal reform is pursued it would be better done in discrete factual areas (e.g., insurance), but
for the reasons discussed supra at Section IV.B, this too is unsatisfactory.
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tract containing the arbitration agreement? What consequential amendments are
necessary to address appointment of the arbitral tribunal etc? Must there be a
prohibition on amending the arbitration agreement after its formation, i.e. does
the third party have rights to prevent the arbitration agreement from being al-
tered?
While these ancillary questions are complex, it is possible that such a rule
could develop over time. However, it would seem incongruous for a principle to
be established applying only to the narrow issue of third parties in arbitration. It
would be more conceivable for this task to be undertaken as part of a broader
project of harmonization of substantive arbitral law, possibly in conjunction
with a more ambitious effort to harmonize general contract law in transnational
commerce.
504
F. Relying Upon (And Developing) Anational/Transnational Rules
In the conclusions section to the comparative analysis, 5°5 it was already
noted that the rise of a test premised on "the intention of the parties" is consis-
tent with that the "good faith" principle found in the lex mercatoria and other
anational or transnational legal regimes. Therefore, a further option for resolv-
ing the third party problem would be to encourage arbitrators and courts to deal
with non-signatory issues by reference to such a principle. This differs from the
previous reform option in that it does not depend on international agreements or
domestic legislation but rather operates as part of a transnational or anational
body of rules "[d]erive[d] from the convergence of the main legal systems from
which they are drawn.
' 506
There would be two ways to invoke the rule. First, where the parties explic-
itly have chosen to have their dispute governed by transnational rules and the
arbitral tribunal or court extends those rules to the determination of the validity
of the agreement as it concerns a third party. Second, and more controversially,
an arbitral tribunal could exercise its powers to apply the law determined by the
conflict of laws rules it considers applicable 7 in order to determine the validity
of the agreement as it concerns a third party on the basis of transnational rules
504. Of course this presupposes that developments in international commercial arbitration are
constrained by contract law. The non-contractual development approach premised on transnational
norms is discussed in the next section.
505. See supra Section V.D.
506. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 1447, at 806. This could be characterized as transnational
rules, "general principles of law", "lex mercatoria" or any of the other terms used to refer to legal
rules derived from outside of national domestic law.
507. UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 28(2).
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(regardless of the law applicable to the substance of the dispute). °s The validity
of such "transnational" approaches has been the subject of much debate.5"
For present purposes, it suffices to say that there is some appeal to the idea
that transnational rules regarding the role of third parties to the arbitration
agreement could be crystallized from the partial convergence of the rules ap-
plied in the legal systems discussed above. Further, instead of being a "formal-
istic" rule of the sort envisaged in the previous section, a transnational rule could
be premised on the "broader" principles of good faith and pacta sunt servanda
as generally accepted "principles of international commercial law."'5 ° Indeed,
arbitral tribunals have previously applied these principles to the interpretation of
a contract in order to determine its validity, tied also to the touchstone of the
parties' intentions:
The requirement that contracts be interpreted in good faith is merely another way of saying
that a literal interpretation should not prevail over an interpretation reflecting a party's true
intentions. As observed in an earlier award, 'the fundamental principle of good faith ... en-
tails searching for the common intention of ... the parties.
' 511
This formulation sounds remarkably close to the proposition put in the last of
the quotes introducing this article: justice demands that a formalistic interpreta-
tion of the agreement not prevent the extension of the arbitration agreement to a
third party if that is what the parties intended.5"2
However, such an approach is inherently dangerous. To pick just one of the
critical commentators:
[B]roadly speaking the problems associated with the new lex mercatoria may be divided into
three categories. First, there is no clear consensus on its sources, although a number of
sources have been identified with some consistency in the literature and elsewhere. Second,
508. An arbitrator may rationalize such an approach on the tronc common method of determin-
ing a rule based on the commonalties of the applicable legal systems, although this is usually applied
only where the parties have so chosen See FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 1457.
509. See generally Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats de l'arbitrage
intemationaux: rialiti etperspectives, 106 J. DROrr INT'L 475 (1979); 0. Lando, The Lex Mercato-
ria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L COM. L. Q. 747 (1985); Michael J. Mustill,
The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, 4 ARB'N INT'L 86 (1988); von Mehren, supra
note 489, at 217; FOUCHARD, supra note 11, §§ 1443 et seq.
510. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 1460 (citing the LIAMCO Award, 12 Apr. 1977, 20
INT'L. LEGAL MAT'L. 54 (1980)).
511. FOUCHARD, supra note 11, at § 1470, at 825 (citing Award of Jun. 10, 1955, Gouverne-
ment Royal Hell6nique v. Gouvernement de sa Majest6 Britannique, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 15
(1956)).
512. See Blessing, supra note 4 (author's paraphrasing).
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it is unclear where the new lex will be applied. Third, the new lex mercatoria is simply lack-
ing in content.
5 13
In this instance, the same lack of convergence in the details of the various intent-
based tests plus the diversity of third party situations raise concerns about
whether any rule really has crystallized as a truly anational norm. Moreover, it
is doubtful whether such a transnational rule would achieve the certainty neces-
sary for efficient risk allocation in international contract making. Finally, adop-
tion of such a vague standard may impede developing a more precise rule as part
of any general contract harmonization.
G. Relying Upon General Contract Law
As discussed in the conclusion to the comparative section, careful applica-
tion of general contract law principles can solve many third party scenarios.
Therefore, one option would involve strictly treating third party issues as a mat-
ter of contract law and applying the "general principles of contract and agency"
to govern the extension of the arbitration agreement to a non-signatory third
party.5
14
This approach differs from "creating a formal test for third party arbitra-
tion" '515 because there it was sought to fashion an "intention of the parties" test
which would not directly be constrained by contract doctrine. With the instant
option, the "ordinary principles of contract and agency" would constrain the
ability of a third party to compel and to be compelled to arbitrate. While the
intention of the parties may be a fundamental part of the principles of contract
and agency, the more doctrinally sound approach is to adhere to existing general
legal doctrine rather than create a special third party test for international com-
mercial arbitration agreements.
Accordingly, such principles as assignment, third party beneficiary and sub-
rogation should all be applied on the same basis as with any other contract.
Thus, for example, English courts should abandon the last vestiges of the rule of
strict interpretation of arbitration agreements historically linked to a fear of
"ousting the jurisdiction of the courts." However, so too should United States
courts forego the vague "pro-arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act"
and reliance on the uncertain "equitable estoppel" theory (at least in its broad
hybrid sense).5t6 The French position is somewhat harder to criticize in a system
where the nature of the agreement (i.e. international arbitration) seems to be a
513. Phillip D. O'Neill & Nawaf Salam, Transnational Rules and International Commercial
Arbitration LC.C. Pub. No. 480/4 (1993), cited in REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 2, at § 2-61, at
120.
514. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 776.
515. See supra Section VIE.
516. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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fundamental part of the general law of obligations, however the applicable test
should remain anchored to the touchstone of consent to be bound by the agree-
ment, and eschew the dangers of fabricating "intention" based on economic
proximity or interrelatedness of business transactions.
5 17
The obvious disadvantage of such an approach would be that it foregoes the
advantages of an internationally harmonized approach, leaving the parties at the
mercy of the vagaries of choice of law issues. Further, one would lose the op-
portunity to provide a unified rule for all the different sorts of third party scenar-
ios (if that is possible). However, the doctrinal and policy advantages to a more
constrained contractual approach outweigh these disadvantages, as are discussed
in the following section.
VII. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE REMEDIES To THE PROBLEM: GETTING BACK
To THE CONSENSUAL NATURE OF ARBITRATION
Before reaching a final conclusion, it is useful to stand back from the doc-
trinal detail of the comparative project and attempt to put the debate about the
third party problem (and hence the solutions offered) in perspective.
A. Jurisdiction Premised On A Synthesis Of Consent/Contract
The working assumption posited at the outset of this article was that the
third party problem exists within two fundamental characteristics of arbitration.
In the substantive dimension, commentators accept that arbitration is "contrac-
tual by nature." In the jurisdictional dimension, the distinguishing feature of
arbitration is that it is dependent on the consent of the parties. This section will
discuss the possible synthesis of these two fundamental concepts by applying
the "general principles of contract and agency" to determine what constitutes
consent so as to permit extension of the arbitration agreement to a third party.
This raises three questions.
Is it Appropriate to Apply Substantive Contract Law to the Third Party
Problem?
Courts have on occasion strained to treat arbitration agreements as a "spe-
cial" kind of contract, e.g. in applying onerous form requirements so as to evi-
517. Supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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dence intention to incorporate an arbitration clause into a bill of lading.5"' One
can surmise that such special treatment is an attempt to address the concerns
about extension of the arbitration agreement as identified in Section V.B. Given
this uneasiness, is it desirable to be applying substantive contract law principles
to the third party problem?
First, despite differences in implementation, all jurisdictions studied assess
whether or not a party is bound by an arbitration agreement on the basis of gen-
eral contract principles: was there an intention to be bound; was the clause suffi-
ciently certain; was consent vitiated by duress, mistake or unconscionable con-
duct? These are all classic questions of contract law. Why then should "exten-
sion" of the contract to a third party, which raises the same basic issues, be dif-
ferent? Contract law frequently has to deal with the problem of defining the
rights of parties who are not signatories to the agreement. In such situations, it
may be necessary to transfer rights (e.g. assignment, subrogation, etc.) or to
allow non-parties to enforce rights (e.g. incorporation by reference, third party
beneficiary principle, etc.). Similarly, there may be disputes about who the par-
ties to the contract really are so that it is necessary to rely on equitable estoppel
or agency principles. Why should arbitration agreements be treated any differ-
ently?
Second, acceptance of the contractual nature of arbitration and recognition
of the decreased reliance on formal requirements," 9 will inevitably involve the
need for some kind of objective basis for establishing consent. Thus, courts
have been able to draw on contract principles like "constructive notice" to bind
third parties to an arbitration agreement based on the reasonable expectations of
a person in a sophisticated third party's position where the third party was using
a common standard form.
520
Third, in as much as the arbitration agreement may be considered "proce-
dural," is it appropriate to apply "substantive" contract law?52' It is suggested
that this is not a valid ground for treating the third party problem any differently.
518. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing Aughton, 57 BUILDING LAW REP.
at 87).
519. See VARADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 5, at 86-87 ("During the last dec-
ades, however, the accepted notion of what constitutes a written agreement has become more and
more flexible." This in turn affects the "position of parties closely connected with the transaction
but not signatories of the arbitration agreement.").
520. Steel Warehouse Co., Inc. v. Abalone Shipping Ltd. of Niccosai, 141 F.3d 234, 237 (5th
Cir. 1998) (holding "proper incorporation yields constructive notice" in what was really an incorpo-
ration by reference case).
521. None of the jurisdictions studied in this article treat the arbitration agreement in this
manner. However, this is not the case in other legal systems. See Girsberger & Hausmaninger,
supra note 73, at n. 106 and n. 109 (suggesting the arbitration agreement may be treated as procedural
in Austria, Switzerland and Germany but noting that this conclusion has several qualifications). This
author also suggests subsequent legislative reform in those countries further limits the extent to
which the arbitration agreement is considered procedural.
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After all, the question of whether a signatory is party to a valid arbitration
agreement would trigger the same objection, yet all three jurisdictions treat this
as a matter of contract law. 522 Moreover, other analogous procedural jurisdic-
tional rights-creating agreements are also judged on "normal" contract law prin-
ciples. For example, in the case of forum selection agreements, courts have held
that non-parties may be bound to the agreed forum if some element of traditional
substantive contract law would confer those rights and duties, e.g., courts have
used third party beneficiary,5 23 assignment5 24 and novation5 25 doctrines to bind
non-parties to the forum selection agreement.5 26 Similarly, contract law princi-
ples are applied to cases involving additional named insureds in insurance poli-
cies (non-signatories with rights to enforce an insurance policy)527 and disputes
concerning manufacturers' warranty exclusion clauses (being jurisdictional
right-limiting agreements) included in the manufacturer-retailer contract where a
consumer brings a direct action against the manufacturer on the basis of that
contract. 528 Note also that the third party arbitration provision enacted in the
English C(RTP) Act 1999 was based in part on what the Law Commission con-
sidered to be the analogous scenario of applying contract principles to exclusive
jurisdiction clauses.52 9 Finally, Girsberger & Hausmaninger suggest that even if
the arbitration agreement is treated as procedural, this does not preclude the
application of substantive law rules "per analogiam where no specific rules
govern a particular issue and where sound reasons speak in favor of such an
analogous application."53 °
522. See supra Section V.E.
523. See, e.g. Process & Storage Vessels, Inc. v. Tank Serv. Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725 (1982),
aff'd, 760 F.2d (3d Cir. 1985).
524. See e.g. Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Ass'n, 668 F. Supp. 103 (D.R.I. 1987).
525. See e.g. Richardson Eng'g. Co. v. LB.M. Corp., 554 F. Supp. 467 (D. Vt. 1981), aftfd 697
F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982).
526. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts
after Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 85 n.253
(1992).
527. See Mark Pomerantz, Recognizing the Unique Status of Additional Named Insureds, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 11 (1984) (arguing that general contract law doctrine should be applied and that
this provides sufficient flexibility to recognize the special nature of the insurance contract).
528. See Dean. W. Russell, Enforcing Warranty Exclusions Against Non-Privity Commercial
Purchasers: The Need for Uniform Guidelines, 20 GA. L. REV. 461,462 (1986).
529. LAW COMMISSION REPORT 242, supra note 175, at §14.18, n.25 (referring to the Privy
Council decision in The Mahkutai [1996] 3 W.L.R. I in which an exclusive jurisdiction clause was
distinguished from exception and limitation clauses (jurisdiction rights-limiting provisions) on the
basis that the former creates mutual rights and obligations as to jurisdiction rather than just benefit-
ing one party).
530. Girsberger & Hausmaninger, supra note 73, at 141.
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Fourth, there is the simple fact that courts have unambiguously and repeat-
edly upheld the applicability of general contract principles to the third party
problem. 53  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in the context of whether
there is a binding agreement, has recently repeatedly reaffirmed its contractualist
approach to arbitration. 32 While there have been objections to United States
courts' contractualist approach, these have been largely limited to issues of
questionable consent in the labor and consumer contexts,533 which are of limited
relevance to international commercial arbitration.
What Do "General Principles of Contract and Agency" Have to Do
With Consent?
One could imagine the courts and tribunals applying a test which asks only
whether the parties consented to the arbitration agreement being extended to the
third party in question; a position similar to the "intentions" aspect of the tests
identified in Section V.D. This would be unsatisfactory for the following rea-
sons. First, to do so would be to apply a looser standard than applies to deciding
who is a party to the agreement in the first place. Second, it would deprive the
decision-maker of the use of the standards contract law doctrine has developed
for dealing with third parties whose consent is not manifested in the agreement
itself. Thus, for example, substantive contract assignment doctrine is able to
balance form requirements (e.g. Law of Property Act 1925 in England) with the
possibility that a contract was entered into intuitu personae (e.g. in France) and
with the practical necessity of transferring obligations in string contracts (e.g. in
marine insurance). Furthermore, assignment doctrine provides guidance as to
what is binding and the proper scope of inquiry into whether the parties intended
the agreement to be assignable.
In other words, "consent" by itself is not enough without some more struc-
tured framework within which to assess the extent of third party rights and obli-
gations to arbitrate. The "general principles of contract and agency" provide
that necessary framework as long as they are applied with sensitivity to the
touchstone of "consent."
531. See discussion above at Section V.E and especially at note 479 and accompanying text.
532. See e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) ("This Court has
determined that 'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbi-
tration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."') (citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
533. See e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33 (1997).
580
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What Does Reference to "General Principles of Contract and Agency"
Mean?
This phrase is simply used to suggest that the general contract law of the
domestic legal system should be applied to arbitration agreements to determine
the extent of the rights and obligations of third parties. Which begs the question
what is meant by the reference to "agency"? Admittedly, the "contractual" dis-
cussion above marginalizes the "agency" limb of the test espoused in Thomson.
However, this can be explained by the fact that arbitration is contractual by na-
ture and the only need for a reference to agency is to address those cases where
the signatory to the agreement is not the real contracting party but rather signed
the contract on behalf of her principal (in which case it is the principal who is
the real party). Thus, the matter could really be described as one of contract
law.53
B. Contours Of The Academic Discussion Of The Third Party Problem
The various options and conclusions drawn from the comparative project
can also be analyzed through the filter of the different jurisprudential theories
applied to international commercial arbitration. 3 The classic formulation rec-
ognizes four theories: the jurisdictional; the contractual; the mixed or hybrid;
and the autonomous. These have been summarized in the following way:
A contractual theorist would necessarily advocate unhindered party autonomy, whereas a ju-
risdictionalist would argue for substantial judicial supervision of arbitration. An adherent of
the mixed or hybrid theory is likely to favor an effective mixture of autonomy and regulation,
whereas an autonomist would focus on what is necessary to ensure that arbitration meets the
needs and objectives of the parties.
536
Applying these labels to the third party problem, one can appreciate the options
identified in the previous sections are more or less appealing depending on one's
understanding of the nature of arbitration. Most obviously, a solution based on
534. See e.g. Bell-Ray Co., 181 F.3d at 435 (rejecting the wider "agency theory" in refusing to
extend the arbitration agreement to the officers and directors of the defendant-claimant).
535. Volumes have been written on this topic and the following serves only the limited purpose
of providing vocabulary to analyze the options and to set up the final conclusion. The discussion is
drawn mainly from the following sources: A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts and Arbitral
Choice-of-Law Process and Techniques: A Critical Appraisal 15 J. INTL'L ARB'N. 65 (1999);
SAMUEL, supra note 6; von Mehren, supra note 488, at 217.
536. Maniruzzaman, supra note 536, at 67 (citing OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE-OF-LAW
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14 (Quorum Books 1994)).
113
Hosking: The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International C
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
the development of a transnational rule to govern third party situations would be
inimical to a strict jurisdictionalist and, possibly, most appealing to those who
view international arbitration agreements as autonomous.
Understanding the range of opinions expressed in the Basel and Paris con-
ference papers discussed throughout this article is best accomplished through a
jurisdictional approach. Thus, Professor Sandrock's rejection of the "group of
companies doctrine" as the product of a "poorly defined lex mercatoria" which
is rendered unnecessary by reliance on the respective rules of the national proper
laws of contract,5 37 displays a classic "jurisdictional" reliance on national proper
laws of contract and the substantive national rules of contract to govern exten-
sion of the arbitration agreement. For Professor Sandrock, the "solution" to the
"third party problem" lies solely within the realms of national domestic law,
both in terms of choice-of-law rules and contract doctrine. Contrast this with the
qualified support for the development of the group of companies doctrine pro-
posed by Charles Jarrosson5 3' and the more enthusiastic support of Yves De-
raines.5 39 The former proposes development of the doctrine within the confines
of contract law (albeit the French law of obligations);' 4 the latter sees the devel-
opment as a function purely of international commercial arbitration."4  The
authors are proposing in these papers something closer to, respectively, the hy-
brid and autonomous schools of thought.
Dr. Blessing's introduction suggests that the above dichotomy can be ex-
plained as a divide between, on the one hand, those who "favor a more formalis-
tic approach" (i.e. those who would negate the existence of a valid arbitration
clause where it is not evidenced in a written document; are less likely to con-
sider other documentary evidence; and are skeptical of the group of companies
doctrine) and, on the other hand, those who take a "less formalistic approach"
(i.e. who consider an arbitration agreement to be "validly concluded when all
relevant circumstances permit such a conclusion and where such a conclusion is
warranted having regard to the objectively fair and subjectively reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties"). 2 Applying this dichotomy to the non-signatory
situation, Dr. Blessing divides the camps into "mercatorists" and "non-
mercatorists." Mercatorists:
maintain that the leading criteria are to be derived from general principles of law, i.e. from a-
national or transnational law, or from a lex mercatoria. According to them it is neither ap-
propriate nor necessary to search for a legal basis in the applicable lex causae ... to determine
537. Sandrock, supra note 12, at 168.
538. Charles Jarrosson, Conventions d'Arbitrage et Groupes de Societes, in AAMCA, supra
note 4, at 209.
539. Yves Deraines, L'Extension de la Clause d'Arbitrage aux Non Signatories - La Doctrine
des Groupes de Societes, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 241.
540. Jarrosson, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 209.
541. Yves Deraines, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 241.
542. Blessing, in AAMCA, supra note 4, at 18.
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whether or not a third party must be deemed to have become a party to the particular contract.
... Mercatorists will also say that it is quite unnecessary to examine particulars of the rele-
vant national laws... because .... the extension of an arbitration clause to a non-signatory
must necessarily be made as a consequence of the bona fides principle, in particular its re-
quirement to act in good faith, and such principle does in fact underlie all national laws ...
Mercatorists also tend to say that it is a demand of the times that the key and fundamental
principles of international trade should be judged according to the standards of internationally
recognized principles consistently applied around the world, rather than to have regard to
purely local niceties or perceptions which may not stand in conformity with the objectively
fair and subjectively reasonable expectations [of the parties].5
4 3
Compare this to the "non-mercatorists" who:
maintain a position that it is . .. not necessary to resort to any transnational notions, or to
vague principles as those which are said to pertain to the lex mercatoria. They do say that the
relevant national laws do contain all necessary legal tools and remedy [sic] to adjudicate the
situation in a manner responsive to those demands of modern international business and trade,
and particular reference is made to ... rules on estoppel and the rules on acquiescence in
common law, the alter ego doctrine in common law, notions pertaining to the doctrine of
piercing of the corporate veil, notions pertaining to apparent and ostensible authority etc. 5
4
However, the two camps are described as engaging in a "pillow fight" be-
cause both approaches will lead to the identical result. This is because:
the provisions of national laws applicable in this context are directly grounded in the bonafi-
des principle ... and it is exactly the very same bona fides-principle which is the heart, the
most essential center piece, of all transnational rules, of the so-called general principles of
law (private or public) of the lex mercatoria, as well as the trade usages; and it is again the
bona fides-principle which has directly been transcribed into . . . the UNIDROIT princi-
ples.
54s
While one cannot dispute that some notion of bona fides underlies the ap-
plication of contract and agency law in national legal systems, Dr. Blessing's
conclusion obscures the important jurisprudential divide between the two
"camps" understood by applying the labels discussed. Moreover, to reduce the
debate to the semantics of what constitutes "bona fides," avoids the fundamental
issue of whether and how such a notion of "fairness" can co-exist with the strict
requirements of the consensual nature of arbitration. Section VII.A of this arti-
cle suggested a synthesis of consent and contract to achieve this function. The
following section argues it is the best model for an imperfect world.
543. Id.at2l.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 22.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION To THE THIRD PARTY
PROBLEM
This article commenced with three quotes. Each underscored the contrac-
tual nature of arbitration and the necessity that there could only be a valid arbi-
tration where there is a valid agreement. However, the quotes from, first, Thom-
son, and then from Dr. Blessing, introduced qualifications on this apparently
straightforward principle. First, that a "non-signatory can also be bound by the
arbitration agreement; second, that in certain circumstances "justice would not
seem to be done" if a non-signatory third party were not considered bound by
the arbitration agreement.
This article has sought to show that these qualifications are not novel when
viewed as part of the larger development of contract law. Indeed, ever since
Roman law rejected the notion of a third party acquiring rights and obligations
under a contract, Western legal systems have grappled with how to define a third
party and how to remedy those situations where it would be "unjust" to deny a
non-party the ability to enforce a contractual benefit or to be bound by his con-
duct in relation to the contract.
While the third party problem in general contract law is nothing new, the
specific context of international commercial arbitration raises some unique
complications. In particular, the need to remain true to the touchstone of arbitra-
tion: consent to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. As well as the common concerns
identified in Section V.B, there are such complicating factors as addressing ap-
plicable law/choice of law issues, distinguishing between intention to be bound
to the underlying agreement and to the arbitration agreement, and judicial suspi-
cion exacerbated when such "ouster of the courts' jurisdiction" is being ex-
tended to a third party. Thus, it is little wonder that courts in the jurisdictions
studied have a tendency to treat arbitration agreements as a "special" kind of
contract, while simultaneously and incongruously declaring their commitment to
applying the "ordinary principles of contract and agency."
Sections VI.G and VII.A have put the case that application of the "general
principles of law and agency" is the best model for mediation between the rele-
vant concerns discussed, while still remaining true to the contractual and con-
sensual nature of arbitration. That is, any solution to the third party problem
should be confined within the parameters of contract doctrine. This is the fun-
damental lesson this article has sought to instill: it is preferable to draw on the
rich (even if sometimes confused) national bodies of contract law to define the
boundaries of what the circumstances are where "justice" demands the arbitra-
tion agreement be extended to a third party (to use Dr. Blessing's language).
Contractual theories such as assignment, subrogation and the rule pertaining to
third party beneficiaries already carry the imprimatur of law and the conceptual
depth of accepted doctrines. It is they that should define what constitutes a
situation where a third party will be subject to an arbitration agreement.
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To restate a recurring theme of this article: too often courts and arbitral tri-
bunals have succumbed to the "temptation . . .to reach for the real personae
dramatis"54 despite the limitations imposed by the contractual nature of the
arbitration agreement and the primacy of consent to arbitral jurisdiction. There
are six main complaints. First, bending contract doctrine to bring a third party
within the purview of the arbitration agreement (e.g., imposing the burden of an
arbitration agreement on a defendant non-signatory as a third party beneficiary).
Second, an overly expansive application of estoppel doctrine to create consent to
the arbitration agreement (e.g. where a non-signatory is bound merely by pursu-
ing a claim the subject matter of which relates to the contract containing the
arbitration agreement). Third, confusion between substantive rights to make a
claim on the underlying contract, and intention to be bound by the imbedded
arbitration agreement. Fourth, unreasoned amplification of the scope of the
arbitration agreement (i.e. scope of subject matter) to be indicative of parties
with whom the signatories intended to arbitrate. Fifth, a tendency to succumb to
efficiency arguments by joining parties and consolidating arbitrations, but in so
doing, undermining the consent doctrine and thus the distinction between arbi-
tration and litigation. Sixth, an overly broad application of "pro-arbitration poli-
cies" in the absence of reasoned analysis. The danger is that these extensions, at
best, significantly lower the threshold for establishing consent and, at worst,
impose consent where the facts suggest it does not otherwise exist.
Furthermore, a contractual solution is also justified on the basis that many
of the same results achieved by "lazy" use of estoppel and pro-arbitration poli-
cies could be achieved by applying contract doctrines. The comparative project
in Section III identified a number of, especially United States and English, cases
where the courts appropriately employed third party beneficiary or subrogation
doctrines and further cases where they could have been employed to extend the
arbitration agreement. More generally, Section V.D identified a broad overarch-
ing test based on the intentions of the parties. Such focus is appropriate to re-
main sensitive to "consent" concerns, however it can be accommodated within
existing contract doctrine rather than unconstrained factual investigations as is
presently the trend in the United States and France and appears in occasional
English decisions. Contract law sets limits on the scope of the inquiry, thereby
lessening the likelihood of inconsistency and uncertainty identified in Section III
and summarized in Section V.
Further, contract law is able to recognize and give weight to the "special
features" of arbitration law and international commerce. For example, the arbi-
546. VARADY, BARCELO, VON MEHREN, supra note 5, at 203.
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tration agreement might be analogous to the established "trade usages" doctrine,
thereby enabling an arbitral tribunal or court to take account of international
arbitral practice but within the rubric of contract law. This could enable a more
focused intentions test by judging the parties' conduct on the basis of "the rea-
sonable expectations of an international business person," or noting that arbitra-
tion is a standard method of doing business in a particular industry, or consider-
ing evidence of standard usage of particular phrases in a bill of lading to estab-
lish the validity of incorporation of terms from a charter party. The point is that
rather than relying on a vague pro-arbitration policy or on an unlimited inquiry
into intent, general contract law provides a more doctrinally-sound tool for es-
tablishing consent.
Abandoning any attempt at international codification or acceptance of a
transnational norm leaves parties having to face different approaches in different
jurisdictions. However, this problem is best handled at the "macro level" by
focusing efforts on international harmonization of conflict of laws rules and,
ultimately, contract doctrine. This is preferable to preempting and possibly
retarding such a development by seeking to address only the limited situation of
third parties in international commercial arbitration.
Finally, at the policy level, the world is simply not yet ready for reliance on
anational or transnational rules for a matter of such potentially far-reaching im-
portance as third party issues. When one recalls the antipathy engendered in the
developing world by the attempts to apply anational general principles of law to
the series of Middle East oil concession arbitrations,547 it becomes evident that
there is much at stake in jettisoning international dispute resolution conducted in
accordance with national rules of law.
Ultimately however, it is the users of arbitration - international business
people - who will dictate the pace of change. It is always open to contracting
parties to adopt an applicable law governing third party issues other than that of
a national legal system. Similarly, it is open to parties to draft arbitration
clauses specifically dealing with third party issues. It would be a shame if one
commentator's advice to include a standard term excluding the extension of the
arbitration agreement to third parties just "to be on the safe side"54 became the
norm. This may be a "knee jerk" reaction to the sometimes dangerously expan-
sive approach of courts and tribunals in the jurisdictions studied. Rather, arbi-
tration, rooted as it is in the theory of contract and the notion of consent, would
do better to place its trust in the international harmonization of arbitration law
and the rational development of national contract laws as they apply to interna-
547. See e.g. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), Aug. 23, 1958, 27 INT'L
L. REP. 117, 198 (1963). See M. Somarajah, Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration,
14 J. INT'L. ARB. 103, n.60 (1997) (discussing the ARAMCO case and others as examples of self-
interested "internationalization" to avoid domestic law).
548. Wright, supra note 200, at 138-139.
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tional commercial arbitration. Consent is too fundamental a concept to sacrifice
for the sake of the fleeting satisfaction of having done justice in the particular
circumstances.
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